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BALANCED JUSTICE
I. INTRODUCTION*
In his first five years on the United States Supreme Court, Justice Lewis
F. Powell, Jr. has become and will most likely continue to be a leading
force in shaping the direction of the Court. In many areas, Justice Powell's
desire for judicial flexibility as well as judicial restraint has made him a
leader in turning the Burger Court away from the bright-line tests enunci-
ated by the Warren Court. However, where the Warren Court had been
flexible, Justice Powell has usually preserved this flexibility and expanded
it if possible. The tool consistently utilized to achieve this flexibility has
been a balancing formula that has sought to accommodate all the compet-
ing interests.
It is the intent of this note to examine Justice Powell's judicial philo-
sophy in limited areas of Constitutional adjudication. The areas to be
examined include the first, fourth and fifth amendments and the due
process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
II. DUE PROCESS
In order to appreciate fully Justice Powell's impact upon and contribu-
tion to the Supreme Court in the area of due process, one must keep in
mind the direction and approach taken by the Warren Court. In general,
the Warren Court preferred inflexible, rigid rules of due process and sought
to assure the imposition of uniformity in procedure among the various
states.' It is in this area, perhaps, that "the divergencies of the Burger from
the Warren Court [are] most pronounced."12 The Burger Court has been
less amenable to rigid rules of due process and more likely to adopt flexible
standards allowing some variety.' The trend on the Burger Court has been
to limit the rigid Warren-era rulings rather than overrule them.'
* The student contributors are Randolph C. DuVall, John E. Ely, Mark S. Gardner,
William C. Goodwin and H. P. Williams.
1. Prominent examples include Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), hold-
ing that due process requires notice and a prior hearing in any prejudgment procedure to
garnish wages; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), which held that indigent defen-
dants have a fundamental right to assistance of counsel in criminal trials.
2. Dionisopoulos, The Uniqueness of the Warren and Burger Courts in American Constitu-
tional History, 22 BUFFALO L. REv. 737, 739 (1972). See also Ulmer & Stookey, Nixon's Legacy
to the Supreme Court: A Statistical Analysis of Judicial Behavior, 3 FLA. ST. U.L. Rv. 331
(1975).
3. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 96 S. Ct. 2960
(1976); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356
(1972).
4. Paulsen, Some Insights into the Burger Court, 27 OKLA. L. Rav. 677, 682-83 (1974). A
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Justice Powell has been the Burger Court's leading advocate of the more
flexible approach to questions of due process. However, his approach to
this broad area of constitutional law can best be understood by analyzing
the more specific issues involved in due process controversies. These issues
may be grouped for convenience under two general topic areas-criminal
and civil due process.
A. CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS
1. The Incorporation Controversy
a. Introduction
Generally, the Warren Court followed what is known as a "selective
incorporation" approach in the area of criminal due process. Once it deter-
mined that a particular procedural right in the Bill of Rights was "funda-
mental," the entire amendment in which the right was found was literally
"incorporated" and made to apply in all its detail to criminal procedure
in the state courts.' Mr. Justice Harlan was the most vocal opponent of
this doctrine on the Warren Court.' Justice Powell, in turn, has led the
Burger Court in rejecting the selective incorporation approach to criminal
due process.7 Justice Powell has pointed out that the selective incorpora-
tion approach derogates basic principles of federalism and deprives the
states of the opportunity to experiment with their procedural methods, all
in the name of imposing uniform high standards. 8 Justice Powell views this
approach as symptomatic of judicial nearsightedness. Because of this dis-
taste for incorporation, Justice Powell and other members of the Court
have sought to avoid the requirements which stem from literal incorpora-
good example of the Burger Court's tendency to limit rather than overrule the rigid procedural
rules established by the Warren Court can be seen in the area of prejudgment garnishments.
See the discussion in section H B(3) infra.
5. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (incorporating the sixth amend-
ment). See Cushman, Incorporation: Due Process and the Bill of Rights, 51 CORNELL L.Q.
467 (1966).
6. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 172 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting), where Justice
Harlan wrote that "the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that those
procedures be fundamentally fair . . . . It does not . . . impose or encourage nationwide
uniformity for its own sake .. "
7. For comparison of Justices Powell and Harlan in this respect see Gunther, In Search of
Judicial Quality on a Changing Court: The Case of Justice Powell, 24 STAN. L. REv. 1001,
1026-29 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Gunther]; Yackle, Thoughts on Rodriquez: Mr. Justice
Powell and the Demise of Equal Protection Analysis on the Supreme Court, 9 U. RiCH. L.
REV. 181, 197-205 (1975).
8. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 375 (1972).
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tion. However, in so doing, previously unquestioned federal rights have
been "diluted."
9
Justice Powell believes that the details of criminal procedure embodied
in the Bill of Rights should apply in force to federal courts.' 0 However, the
source of procedural rights held by defendants in state trials is not the Bill
of Rights, but the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment." Jus-
tice Powell feels that while the Bill of Rights embodies certain "fundamen-
tal rights" which are guaranteed to defendants in state courts by due
process, this does not necessarily mean that the procedural details
protecting those rights in the federal courts are incorporated into the due
process clause. 2 Thus Justice Powell's approach would hold that the due
process clause requires not a literal incorporation of all the details in a
particular amendment but a thoughtful determination as to whether a
particular detail is so essential to fair process that it should be held binding
on the states.'" Literal incorporation should be avoided because, while it
insures protection of the defendant's right in the procedure, it fails to take
into account the legitimate interests of the state." Justice Powell empha-
sizes the advantages to be gained from allowing diversity among the states
on procedural matters and the disadvantages in forcing national uniform-
ity.'" So long as the state's alternative procedure is "fundamentally fair,"
9. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), in which petitioner claimed that he should
have been tried by a twelve-member jury rather than the six-member panel provided by
Florida law. The Court avoided the conclusion that incorporation of the sixth amendment
now required twelve-member juries in all state criminal trials and upheld the Florida proce-
dure. As Justice Harlan's dissent pointed out, this put in doubt the previously unquestioned
guarantee of twelve-member juries in federal criminal trials. Id. at 118.
10. Justice Powell reached this conclusion not because those details were necessarily fun-
damental to due process but "because that result is mandated by history." Johnson v. Louis-
iana, 406 U.S. 356, 370 (1972).
11. Id. at 366, 371.
12. For example, Justice Powell felt that the right to trial by jury was "fundamental"
because it was a "cherished element of English common law" and "[b]ecause it assures the
interposition of an impartial assessment of one's peers between the defendant and his
accusers. . . ." Id. at 367. Therefore, due process required the state to provide trial by jury.
However, merely because that "fundamental" right was found in the sixth amendment did
not mean that due process required that all details of trial by jury embodied in that amend-
ment, such as unanimity of verdict, be imposed upon the states. Id. at 369.
13. Id. at 373.
14. Id. at 376. In Johnson, the state's primary interest was in providing the defendant a
fair trial, but there were other legitimate state interests as well. These included such matters
as efficiency and expense. Justice Powell believed that if local diversity on procedural details
was not barred by "an unduly restrictive application of the Due Process Clause, [it] might
well lead to valuable innovations. . ." without in any way prejudicing the defendant. Id.
15. Although the need for the innovations that grow out of diversity has always been
great, imagination unimpeded by unwarranted demands for national uniformity is of
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
he believes it should not be invalidated on due process grounds.'"
Thus, it is clear that Justice Powell is sensitive to the competing inter-
ests in the area of criminal procedure. But because he recognizes the exist-
ence of legitimate, competing interests, Justice Powell continually rejects
the establishment of unbending, per se rules which fail to take those inter-
ests into account. 7 The only way to best accommodate the greatest num-
ber of interests and still guarantee "fundamental fairness" in every case,
in Justice Powell's view, is through a case-by-case balancing.'8
b. Right to Counsel
One of the earliest implementations of this case-by-case approach by
Justice Powell in the criminal procedure area came in Argersinger v.
Hamlin.'" In Argersinger, it was argued that the Court should require the
states to provide counsel for indigent defendants in criminal prosecutions
only in those cases involving the possible imposition of more than six
months imprisonment."0 The plurality opinion went further, however,
holding that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be
imprisoned . . . unless he was represented by counsel at his trial."2' Jus-
special importance at a time when serious doubt exists as to the adequacy of our
criminal justice system.
Id.
16. See Hampton v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1646 (1976); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.
778 (1973); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972). Justice Powell has not said specifically
what is meant by the term "fundamental fairness," but he has made it clear that in order to
be fundamentally fair, any procedure must accommodate the competing interests of the state
and the accused (i.e., a procedure protective of the interests of one while ignoring those of
the other could not be fundamentally fair).
17. "[Dlue process is not so rigid as to require that the significant interests in informality,
flexibility, and economy must always be sacrificed." Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788
(1973).
18. See Doyle v. Ohio, 96 S. Ct. 2240 (1976); Middendorf v. Henry, 96 S. Ct. 1281 (1976);
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
19. 417 U.S. 25 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring). Petitioner, an indigent, argued that his
conviction on a petty offense and sentence of ninety days in jail denied due process in that
he was not represented by counsel, which the state had refused to provide.
20. The state argued that such a holding would be consistent with Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968), in which the Court held that due process required that a defendant have
the right to a jury trial in any case involving a serious offense or a petty offense with possible
prison sentence in excess of six months. 407 U.S. at 27.
21. 407 U.S.at 37. The plurality relied on and extended Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963), in which the Warren Court held that indigent defendants have a fundamental
right to assistance of counsel in criminal trials and that the petitioner's conviction of a felony
without assistance of counsel denied due process. The plurality interpreted this holding as a
per se rule requiring counsel in any prosecution resulting in incarceration of the defendant.
Id. at 32-33.
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tice Powell preferred a "middle course ' 22 between these tworigid positions.
He would follow a principle of "fundamental fairness" and have the states
provide counsel "whenever the assistance of counsel is necessary to assure
a fair trial."' This approach would preserve the flexibility Justice Powell
believed was demanded by due process24 and avoid the numerous problems
he foresaw resulting from the plurality's "immutable line drawing." ' Jus-
tice Powell recognized the danger inherent in balancing and pointed to
several general factors, the weighing of which, he felt, would greatly limit
arbitrary decisions. 2 This balancing, however, may have been weakened
by a failure to deal with one legitimate argument: should this approach
be followed, "there may be cases in which a lawyer would be useful but in
which none would be appointed because an arguable defense would be
uncovered only by a lawyer." Nonetheless, Justice Powell continues his
adherence to the balancing technique in counsel cases. The most recent
example was Middendorf v. Henry," where Justice Powell, in a concurring
opinion, underscored the Court's holding that the right to counsel recog-
nized in Argersinger did not apply in military tribunals.29 He considered
the serviceman's right to counsel but said that the right must be viewed
22. Id. at 47.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 65-66.
25. Id. at 49. Justice Powell raised several questions regarding the per se rule which the
plurality chose not to address. Specifically, Justice Powell felt that the rule would have the
effect of favoring the indigent defendant over the barely self-sufficient one; the Court's
reasoning, extended to its logical conclusion, would require provision of court-appointed
counsel in all petty offense cases; the rule forced on state judges a Hobson's choice-they
must appoint counsel in every petty offense case carrying a possible jail sentence as an
alternative to fines or proceed without counsel and abandon their discretion in sentencing and
it would add to the expense and increase the backlog of cases in the state courts. Id. at 50-
55.
26. Specifically, these were: (a) the complexity of the offense charged; (b) the probable
sentences and likely consequences of such a sentence if a conviction was obtained; and (c)
the individual factors peculiar to each case. Id. at 64. In Professor Gunther's words, "A
Supreme Court opinion should strive for more than a fair balancing in the individual case
... . It should also provide the maximum possible guidance for lower courts and litigants
." Gunther, supra note 7, at 1026 (emphasis added). But Justice Powell saw it as
"impossible, as well as unwise . . ." to set any more precise guidelines than those in
Argersinger. 407 U.S. at 64.
27. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789 (1973). In Gagnon, Justice Powell made a brief
reply to this argument, admitting that it had "some force" but said that it was not important,
for in this case the Court was dealing "with the more limited due process right of one who is
a probationer or parolee." Id. This seemed to be at least an implicit admission that the
argument had more than "some force" when applied to the criminal trial situation involved
in Argersinger. See generally Gunther, supra note 7, at 1028-29.
28. 96 S. Ct. 1281 (1976).
29. Id. at 1294.
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"in light of the 'unique military exigencies' that necessarily govern many
aspects of military service." 0 Thus, these "unique military exigencies" will
be weighed against the defendant's right to counsel in order to determine
what is necessary for a fair trial under the circumstances.',
c. Right to Confront and Cross-Examine
Justice Powell acknowledges the right of the defendant in a criminal trial
to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses as "more than a desirable
rule of trial procedure . . . .It is, indeed, 'an essential and fundamental
requirement.' "32 Although fundamental, it "is not absolute" and may "in
appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests. .... ,,3
Still, because this right is fundamental, any infringement thereof "requires
that the competing interest be closely examined. '35 This illustrates how
Justice Powell's balancing technique may be very protective of the individ-
ual's right without declaring a per se rule which must be adhered to in all
cases, regardless of the circumstances.
For example, in Chambers v. Mississippi,3 Justice Powell balanced the
defendant's interest in cross-examining an adverse witness against the
state's interest in preserving the "voucher" rule, 3 which he labeled a "rem-
30. Id. at 1294-95. Justice Powell pointed out that Congress has always recognized this
principle by enacting special legislation applicable only to the armed services. For example,
see the current provisions in the Uniform Code of Military Justice for summary courts-
martial. 10 U.S.C. § 816(3) (1970).
31. Justice Powell made it clear that a defendant never has had the same procedural rights
in military tribunals as in civilian criminal courts. Id. at 1294-95. Still he did not say precisely
what "unique military exigency" mandates the particular result reached by the Court.
32. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973). Justice Powell said in Chambers
that the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses "is implicit in the constitutional right of
confrontation." Id. To support his statement that these rights were "fundamental," Justice
Powell cited Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), which in turn relied upon history and a
long line of precedent. See 380 U.S. at 403-06.
33. 410 U.S. at 295.
34. Id. As an example of a case where this right has been made to "bow" to other legitimate
interests, Justice Powell cited Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972). In Mancusi, the Court
held that where an adverse witness was truly unavailable, the requirements of the confronta-
tion clause were satisfied when prior-recorded testimony of the witness was admitted if that
prior testimony bore "indicia of reliability" that would afford "the trier of fact a satisfactory
basis for evaluating" its truth. Id. at 213-16.
35. 410 U.S. at 295.
36. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
37. Mississippi denied Chambers' request to cross-examine a particular witness on the
basis of its common law rule that a party may not impeach his own witness, based on a
presumption that a party who calls a witness "vouches" for his credibility. See 3A WIGMORE,
EVIDENCe § 896, 658-60 (J. Chadbourn ed. 1970).
Chambers was charged with murdering a policeman and the witness he sought to cross-
[Vol. 11:335
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nant of primitive English trial practice ' 38 which "bears little . . .
relationship to the realities of the criminal trial practice . . . ." Justice
Powell thus concluded that the fundamental right here weighed more
heavily than did the state's interest."
In Gagnon v. Scarpelli,41 Justice Powell adhered to his holding in
Chambers. Faced with the question of what procedure the due process
clause demanded in probation revocation, 2 he determined that minimal
procedural safeguards included the probationer's right to confront and
cross-examine adverse informants." Still, he made it clear that this right
was not absolute and could be denied by the state upon a showing of
"specific good cause."" Last term, in Doyle v. Ohio,4" this issue arose once
more but under more complex circumstances. Justice Powell's majority
opinion held that there was a denial of due process under the test of
"fundamental fairness" when the silence of a defendant, after having re-
ceived his Miranda warnings, was used to impeach his testimony at trial.46
Here, unlike the earlier cases, Justice Powell was forced to consider the
importance of the state's right to cross-examine.47 Justice Powell recog-
examine had made and later repudiated a written confession, and had orally confessed to
three separate persons that he, and not Chambers, had committed the murder. The voucher
rule prevented Chambers from calling this witness and then cross-examining him, obviously
weakening Chambers' defense.
38. 410 U.S. at 296.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 295-98.
41. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
42. The initial question was whether a probationer was entitled to a hearing when his
probation was revoked. Justice Powell answered that due process required both a preliminary
and a revocation hearing. Id. at 781-82. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), dealing
with the rights of parolees when parole is revoked.
43. 408 U.S. at 487-90. Justice Powell extended the procedural requirements spelled out
in Morrissey to apply to probationers as well as parolees, since he saw no "difference relevant
to the guarantee of due process between the revocation of parole and the revocation of
probation . . . ." Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973).
44. Morrissey, v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 489. The Court has followed this reasoning in refusing
to extend these requirements in all their force to a proceeding in which prisoners could lose
only good-time credits, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), and in refusing to require a
prior hearing before a state prisoner could be transferred to a less favorable institution unless
such transfers were conditioned on proof of serious misconduct by the prisoner or on some
other occurrence, Meachum v. Fano, 96 S. Ct. 2532 (1976). Justice Powell joined the majority
in both opinions.
45. 96 S. Ct. 2240 (1976).
46. "After an arrested person is formally advised by an officer of the law that he has a right
to remain silent, the unfairness occurs when the prosecution . . . is allowed to undertake
impeachment on the basis of what may be the exercise of that right." Id. at 2245 n.10.
47. In both Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411
1977]
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nized the legitimacy of the state's right 8 but held due process was violated
when that right was exercised to use a defendant's silence for impeachment
purposes after informing him of his right to remain silent.49
d. Right to a Speedy Trial
Justice Powell recognized, in Barker v. Wingo,55 the right to a speedy
trial as "fundamental" and guaranteed to defendants in state prosecutions
by the due process clause. His comprehensive opinion rejected both "in-
flexible approaches" urged on the Court,5' and adopted instead "a balanc-
ing test, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant
are weighed."52 Balancing with regard to this right was made more difficult
by the nature of the right, which Justice Powell said was "generically
different '5 3 from other specific procedural rights guaranteed the accused
by due process.54 Justice Powell stated that a rigid rule requiring trial
within a specified time period had its virtues, but he rejected the tempta-
U.S. 778 (1973), Justice Powell was faced with the issue of the importance to be given to the
defendant's right to cross-examine.
48. 96 S. Ct. at 2244 n.7.
49. Id. at 2245.
50. 407 U.S. 514 (1972). Petitioner was not brought to trial on murder charges until more
than five years after his arrest. He made no objection to the delays obtained by the prosecu-
tion until 31/2 years after his arrest. Finally, he was tried and convicted. He appealed his
conviction on the ground that his right to a speedy trial had been denied. In classifying the
right to a speedy trial as "fundamental," Justice Powell relied on Klopfer v. North Carolina,
386 U.S. 213 (1967). On the right to a speedy trial generally, see Note, The Right to a Speedy
Trial, 20 STAN. L. REV. 476 (1968); 10 U. RICH. L. REV. 449 (1976).
51. The Court was urged to adopt a per se rule regarding the right to speedy trial. First, it
was urged that the Court interpret the Constitution to require trial within a specified time
from the date of arrest. Justice Powell rejected this because of his belief in judicial restraint,
saying that to adopt such a rule would be "to engage in legislative . . . activity, rather than
in the adjudicative process to which we should confine our efforts." 407 U.S. at 523. Cf.
Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161 et seq. (1975). Second, the Court was asked to adopt a
"demand-waiver rule" under which a prior demand must have been made before any consid-
eration could be given to the speedy trial right. Justice Powell rejected this because he found
it "inconsistent with this Court's pronouncements on waiver . . ." 407 U.S. at 525, and
"insensitive to a right which we have deemed fundamental." Id. at 529-30. See generally
Note, The Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 853 (1957).
52. 407 U.S. at 530.
53. Id. at 519.
54. Justice Powell saw three essential differences: (a) a societal interest in speedy resolu-
tion of the charges which was distinct from and sometimes opposed to the individual's inter-
est; (b)the fact that deprivation of this right may actually work to the advantage of the
accused in some cases; and (c) the right to a speedy trial was a more vague concept than were
other rights of criminal procedure, in that it was impossible to set a deadline beyond which
it could be stated flatly that the right had been denied. Id. at 519-22.
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tion to formulate such a rule"5 and adhered to the balancing formula. He
balanced skillfully and convincingly in Barker, specifically identifying cer-
tain criteria to be weighed by lower courts in determining in future cases
whether a particular defendant's right to a speedy trial had been violated.56
e. Reasonable Doubt Requirement
In a criminal trial, due process requires that every element of the crime
charged be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.57 However, the reasonable
doubt standard is subject to rules allocating the burden of going forward
with the evidence. One such rule involves the prosecutor's freedom to use
inferences establishing elements of the crime." The use of any inference,
however, brings into question the sufficiency of the evidence for conviction
or, in other words, the question of whether the reasonable doubt standard
of due process had been satisfied. 9
In Mullaney v. Wilbur," Justice Powell dealt at length with the general
constitutionality of inferences in criminal prosecutions. A determination
of whether a particular inference satisfied due process required, in Justice
Powell's view, "an analysis that looks. . . to the interests of both the state
and the defendant as affected by the allocation of the burden of proof."'"
55. See note 51 supra.
56. These criteria included the length of, and reason for, any delays in the trial and the
likelihood that those delays prejudiced the defendant. While Justice Powell felt the fact of
the defendant's assertion or failure to assert his right to a speedy trial should not be determi-
native (see note 51 supra), it too was among the factors to be weighed. 407 U.S. at 530-33.
57. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), in which the Court expressly held that "the Due
Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime. . . ... Id. at 364.
58. See generally Comment, Due Process Requirements for Use of Non-Statutory Infer-
ences in Criminal Cases, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 897.
59. The Court has most often used standards other than "beyond reasonable doubt" by
which to judge the constitutionality of inferences. Some cases have required a "rational
connection" between the proven fact and the ultimate fact inferred. See, e.g., Tot v. United
States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943). Others have asked only whether the fact inferred was "more-
likely-than-not" to result from the proven fact. See, e.g., Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6
(1969). Justice Powell has recognized that if the inference satisfies the reasonable doubt
standard "it clearly accords with due process." Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 843
(1973). Cf. note 66 infra.
60. 421 U.S. 684 (1975). This case involved a challenge to a Maine law which in effect
established three categories of felonious homicide-murder, voluntary-manslaughter and in-
voluntary manslaughter. Absent justification or excuse, all intentional or criminally-reckless
killings were felonious homicides. Felonious homicide was punished as murder (life imprison-
ment), unless the defendant proved by a preponderance of the evidence that it was committed
in the heat of passion on sudden provocation in which case it was punished as voluntary
manslaughter (maximum $1000 fine or maximum imprisonment of 20 years). Id. at 691-92.
61. Id. at 699.
1977l
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
In short, Justice Powell would once again balance the competing interests
in deciding whether a particular procedure accorded the defendant due
process. 2 However, while Justice Powell recognized that the burden of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt "is often a heavy burden for the prosecu-
tion to satisfy,"6 it was nonetheless a "traditional" 4 and "essential ' 6
burden of our criminal system which could be lightened only where it
imposed "unique hardship" on the prosecution. 6
f. Double Jeopardy
Justice Powell's majority opinion in Chaffin v. Stynchcombe 6 clearly
showed his disdain for per se rules of due process. In this case, the imposi-
tion of a higher sentence on retrial raised the possibility of vindictiveness.66
The petitioner had urged the Court to protect the defendants from the
possibility of vindictiveness on retrial either by limiting the jury to impos-
ing a sentence no harsher than the original one or empowering the judge
62. In Mullaney, Justice Powell dealt with the nature of the competing interests in de-
tail-his balancing was comprehensive. He saw the defendant's interest in having the infer-
ence invalidated as very weighty, based on the possible differential in sentencing (a minimum
fine versus life imprisonment) which could result; "the stigma to the defendant"; the fact
that society's confidence that innocent men were not being condemned could possibly be
jeopardized; and the further possibility that "the likelihood of an erroneous murder convic-
tion" could be increased by the lowering of the burden of proof. Id. at 700-01. As to the state's
interest, Justice Powell felt that proving the absence of heat of passion was similar to proving
"any other element of intent," and that the requirement of proving a negative was not unique.
Id. at 702. Since leaving the burden of proof entirely on the state imposed "no unique
hardship" on the state, the use of the inference was unjustified and violated due process. Id.
at 702.
63. Id. at 701.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 702. Again, Justice Powell rejected establishing rigid or absolute rules of due
process. It seems clear that Justice Powell has not foreclosed the possibility that circumstan-
ces could arise in which an inference which failed to satisfy the reasonable doubt standard
could nevertheless be used in accordance with due process, because not to allow its use would
impose a "unique hardship" on the prosecution.
67. 412 U.S. 17 (1973). Petitioner's conviction was overturned and remanded on appeal.
He was then reconvicted and given a higher sentence by the jury. The Supreme Court had
earlier established limitations on the imposition of higher sentences by judges in similar
circumstances. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). See 19 AM. U.L. Rzv. 290
(1970).
68. This was the primary concern in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). In
Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47 (1973), the Court was faced with the issue of whether the
limitations established in Pearce should be made retroactive. Justice Powell's majority opin-
ion implied his distaste for what he called the "prophylactic" restrictions in Pearce. Id. at
51. Justice Powell balanced several factors and concluded that retroactive application was
not required. Id. at 51-57.
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to reduce a higher sentence. Justice Powell rejected the rigid rule, 9 satis-
fied that a more flexible formula would adequately protect the defendants
on retrial. He saw no violation of due process in the imposition of a harsher
sentence by the jury on retrial so long as the jury was not informed of the
prior sentence and there was no other evidence of vindictiveness on the
jury's part." This implied that due process would be offended where the
jury had knowledge of the prior sentence, but Justice Powell expressly
avoided establishing even this much of a per se rule. 1
Justice Powell, as this case exemplifies, seems determined to examine
the likely effects any rigid rule will have on the interests of all concerned
parties. Invariably, a strict, inflexible rule of procedural due process for-
mulated to protect the defendants'rights in every case will, at least in some
cases, infringe upon the legitimate rights of the state. Thus Justice Powell
consistently opts for the more flexible balancing technique which he feels
can be utilized to assure the maximum protection of the interests of both
parties.
One further example of this logic can be seen in Chaffin where the
petitioner argued that allowing imposition of higher sentences upon retrial
would have a "chilling effect" on defendants' exercise of their right of
appeal, in effect denying due process.72 Predictably, Justice Powell admit-
ted there may be such a problem but said that "the inquiry, by its very
nature, must be made on a case-by-case basis. .... -. 3
69. "Although these alternatives would provide an absolute protection from ... vindic-
tiveness, they would also interfere with ordinary sentencing discretion. ... 412 U.S. at 29
n.15.
70. "The potential for such abuse of the sentencing process by the jury is. . .de minimis
." where the jury had no knowledge of the prior sentence. Id. at 26.
71. "We do not decide, however, whether improperly informing the jury would always
require limitation of the sentence or whether such error might be cured. Id. at 28 n.14
(emphasis added).
72. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968). Here the capital punishment provi-
sion of the federal antikidnapping statute was invalidated because it limited to the jury the
power to impose the death sentence thereby discouraging defendants from exercising their
right to trial by jury.
73. 412 U.S. at 32. Justice Powell has said that the defendant in a criminal trial is often
faced with "difficult choices" concerning the effects that the exercise of a particular right may
have on the outcome of his case. The fact that the right is one of "constitutional dimensions"
does not of itself preclude the making of such choices. The question is "whether compelling
the election impairs to an appreciable extent any of the policies behind the rights involved."
Id. Therefore, the nature of the question required, in Justice Powell's view, a case-by-case
solution. Id. at 29-35. Cf. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 32 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing). Respondent was convicted of a misdemeanor and appealed. The prosecutor then brought
felony charges based on the same act and respondent pleaded guilty. The majority held that
the second prosecution violated the due process clause. Justice Powell joined part II of Justice
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g. Capital Punishment
The capital punishment cases perhaps offer a clearer illustration of the
basic precepts of Justice Powell's judicial approach than any other group
of cases. They also provide clear evidence of his growing influence on the
Court. In Furman v. Georgia," the Court was badly splintered75 but held
the death penalty, as imposed, to be a cruel and unusual punishment"
violative of the due process clause. Justice Powell, dissenting, strongly and
at some length criticized the Court for what he saw as its lack of judicial
restraint.7 7 He strongly rejected the per se abolition of capital punishment
urged by the petitioners and approved by Justices Marshall and Brennan.7 8
He chastised the majority for its extensive use of sociological data and its
concurrent failure, in his view, to deal with the applicable precedents.7 9
Justice Powell asserted that balancing was both the "traditional and
[the] more refined approach . . ."8 to the issue of capital punishment.
He agreed with the majority's contention that the concept of due process
was evolving rather than static.8 But Justice Powell viewed the evolution
as permissible only with respect to the questions of the manner of execu-
tion employed and the appropriateness of the punishment for the
crime-not on the validity of execution itself.2 The notion of capital pun-
ishment, in Justice Powell's view, was so clearly founded in the Constitu-
Rehnquist's dissent which argued that in pleading guilty to the more serious charge, respon-
dent effectively waived his claim on the "antecedent constitutional violation." Id. at 35-37.
74. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
75. Five Justices filed separate concurring opinions, while four, including Justice Powell,
filed separate dissenting opinions. Justices Douglas, White and Stewart felt all existing capi-
tal punishment statutes (except for that of Rhode Island which was mandatory and therefore
beyond the scope of the decision) were unconstitutional. Justices Brennan and Marshall flatly
stated their feelings that capital punishment was per se unconstitutional.
76. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
77. Justice Powell eloquently stated his feelings, always evident but rarely expressed, on
judicial restraint:
[W]here as here, the language of the applicable provision provides great leeway and
where the underlying social policies are felt to be of vital importance, the temptation
to read personal preference into the Constitution is understandably great. It is too easy
to propound our subjective standards of wise policy under the rubric of more or less
universally held standards of decency.
408 U.S. at 431 (Powell, J., dissenting).
78. Justice Powell felt that such a "judicial fiat" would be "plainly at variance" with the
language of the Constitution. Id. at 420-21.
79. Justice Powell cited a string of prior Supreme Court decisions dealing with capital
punishment. See 408 U.S. at 423-25. Justice Powell said that in these cases "the power of
the States to impose capital punishment was repeatedly and expressly recognized." Id. at 424.
80. Id. at 430.
81. Id. at 429.
82. Id. at 430.
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tion as to be beyond question.0 In short, Justice Powell saw ad hoc balanc-
ing" as the only judicial approach compatible with judicial restraint and
the intent of the Framers which could satisfy due process while also pro-
tecting the legitimate interests of both the individual defendant and so-
ciety. 5
Justice Powell's forceful arguments in Furman and a change in Court
personnel" had their effect. Last term, the Supreme Court reconsidered
the capital punishment issue in five companion cases, which included
Proffitt v. Florida" and Gregg v. Georgia."5 Justice Powell wrote for the
plurality in Proffitt 9 which upheld the new Florida death penalty statute9
and capital sentencing procedure.' It appeared from these opinions that
there had been a substantial swing in sentiment by the Court toward
Justice Powell's position in Furman. The Court in Proffitt and Gregg ex-
pressly rejected any notion that Furman established a per se rule abolish-
ing capital punishment in all cases.2 Rather, the Court limited Furman
to those instances where the death penalty was being imposed "capri-
ciously and arbitrarily."93 Thus the Court rejected not only the per se
abolition of capital punishment but also the per se acceptability of capital
punishment. The death penalty in any given case was held to be accepta-
ble only after the nature of the crime and the character of the defendant
have been considered. 4 What was a separate dissent by Justice Powell in
83. Id. at 417-20.
84. "Although this case-by-case approach may seem painfully slow and inadequate. . . it
is the approach dictated both by our prior opinions and by a due recognition of the limitations
of judicial power." Id. at 461.
85. Id. at 430.
86. Justice John Paul Stevens replaced the retired Justice Douglas who had voted with the
majority in Furman.
87. 96 S. Ct. 2960 (1976).
88. 96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976).
89. Justice Powell was joined by Justices Stewart and Stevens; Justice White, the Chief
Justice and Justice Rehnquist concurred; Justice Blackmun filed a separate concurrence.
Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented, still insisting on a per se abolition of capital
punishment. Justice Powell's opinion in Proffitt was brief and cited the reasoning in Gregg.
90. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1) (Supp. 1976).
91. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (Supp. 1976).
92. 96 S. Ct. at 2922-32.
93. Id. at 2940.
94. It should be noted that Justice Powell stressed the importance of considering these
factors in his Furman dissent. 408 U.S. at 420-21. Justice Powell's basic premise was that
capital punishment itself was not unconstitutional. See notes 78-79 supra. Still, the require-
ments of due process must be satisfied in the imposition of the death penalty. Due process,
in Justice Powell's view, can only be satisfied by means of ad hoc balancing because rigid
rules (such as per se abolition and, implicitly, mandatory death sentences) fail to take into
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Furman had now become, in all its essentials, the plurality opinion in both
Proffitt and Gregg.
2. Vagueness Test
While it may sometimes seem that Justice Powell's balancing technique
is more likely to favor the interests of the government than those of the
individual, 5 the technique as utilized by Justice Powell is in fact very
sensitive to an individual's rights. A good example of this sensitivity can
be seen in Justice Powell's opinion in Smith v. Goguen.9 6 Goguen, who wore
a small U.S. flag sewn to the seat of his jeans, was convicted of violating a
flag-misuse statute that subjected to criminal liability anyone who "pub-
licly . . . treats contemptuously the flag of the United States . . .
Justice Powell's opinion held that the "treats contemptuously" language
in the statute was void for vagueness under the due process clause.
Balancing the competing interest with some sensitivity, Justice Powell
implicitly recognized the state's interest in preventing flag misuse,9" but
felt that the individual's interest in knowing precisely what conduct was
proscribed was very important, particularly where the conduct could lead
to imprisonment.9 Justice Powell did not adopt a rigid rule. He did not
say that individuals could never be punished for flag misuse, nor did he
even say when individuals could be so punished. He merely held that due
process demanded that an individual be informed in advance that his
conduct is criminal.' 0 Thus Justice Powell not only condemned the statute
account all the legitimate interests and pertinent circumstances. See 408 U.S. at 420-21.
95. See generally Ulmer & Stookey, Nixon's Legacy to the Supreme Court: A Statistical
Analysis of Judicial Behavior, 3 FLA. ST. U.L. Rgv. 331 (1975).
96. 415 U.S. 566 (1974). Justice Powell delivered the majority opinion in which four justices
joined; Justice White concurred; and Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist and the Chief Justice
dissented.
97. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN., c. 264, § 5 (1968). The statute carried a possible penalty of $100
fine plus one year in prison and Goguen was in fact sentenced to six months imprisonment.
98. 415 U.S. at 567-76.
99. Id. at 572-76. Justice Powell said this statute set up a "standard so indefinite that
police, court and jury were free to react to nothing more than their own preferences for
treatment of the flag." Id. at 578.
100. In the vagueness area, Justice Powell seems to say that he will weigh the individual's
interest in being forewarned precisely against the difficulty confronting the state in formulat-
ing precisely what conduct is to be proscribed. Due process places a burden on the state to
draft its laws with specificity. Justice Powell's view has been that this burden can be lessened,
but only where it would be very difficult for the state to meet this burden and where the
individual's interest in specificity was slight. For example, Justice Powell cited "control of
the broad range of disorderly conduct" as one such area where vagueness may be constitu-
tional. Id. at 581. But he saw "no comparable reason" for failure to enunciate clear guidelines
in the area of flag-misuse. Id.
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for allowing officials to impose "their own preference" in this matter, but
he also rejected the temptation to impose his own preference.
B. CIVIL DUE PROCESS
Justice Powell's approach to due process questions in civil cases has
differed little, if at all, from his approach in criminal cases. He has consis-
tently balanced the conflicting interests. He has continued to reject the
establishment of unbending, rigid rules and has continued to apply his
basic policy of judicial restraint.
1. Termination of Benefits and Employment
Once an individual has been imbued with a property interest protected
by the fifth or fourteenth amendment, the question arises as to exactly
what procedures are required to satisfy due process in the termination of
that interest.'0 ' Consistent with his views on judicial restraint, Justice
Powell has shown a reluctance to meet the constitutional issue when the
case can be settled on other grounds. 2 When, however, the constitutional
issue has to be resolved, Justice Powell has consistently balanced by point-
ing to three factors which must be considered: (a) the private interest in
continued, uninterrupted benefits or employment; (b) "the risk of an erro-
neous deprivation"'0 3 of that private interest; and (c) the governmental
interest.' 4
The balancing of these factors has typically resulted in a finding that
no pretermination evidentiary hearing was required, at least when an early
opportunity for posttermination hearings was provided.' 5 In this balancing
101. "Governmental deprivation of such an interest must be accompanied by minimum
procedural safeguards, including some form of notice and a hearing." Arnett v. Kennedy, 416
U.S. 134, 164 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
102. See, e.g., Dillard v. Industrial Comm'n, 416 U.S. 783 (1974). This case involved
suspension of workmen's compensation benefits without notice or opportunity for a prior
hearing. Justice Powell felt that if, as indicated in argument by counsel, state law permitted
a claimant whose benefits had been suspended to have them reinstated by a state trial court
as a matter of course pending a full administrative hearing on the merits, it would be unneces-
sary to reach the .constitutional question.
103. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (involving termination of Social Secu-
rity benefits).
104. Id.; Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 389 (1975).
105. This was Justice Powell's conclusion in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976);
Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379 (1975); and Dillard v. Industrial Comm'n, 416 U.S. 783
(1974). In each of these cases, benefits were terminated without prior hearings. In Fusari, the
case was remanded for reconsideration in light of subsequent changes in state law, but Justice
Powell clearly spelled out the factors to be weighed in judging the new procedure. 419 U.S.
at 387-89. In Mathews, Justice Powell's opinion held that no pretermination hearing was
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process, the determining factor has usually been the likelihood of "an
erroneous deprivation," since the private and governmental interests have
generally offset one another.10
Justice Powell's approach to cases involving termination of government
employment has been similar.' 7 In Arnett v. Kennedy,'0 Justice Powell
concurred in the result but objected to the majority's reasoning.109 Justice
Powell's view was that, while Congress may confer by statute a property
interest, '" ° it may not, once the interest has been conferred, provide proce-
dures for termination of that interest unless those procedures meet the
requirements of due process. In other words, the question of what satisfied
due process was a matter for the courts and not the legislatures."' Again,
he would balance the competing interests in making this judicial deter-
mination."2
necessary because the claimant would be awarded retroactive relief if he prevailed in the
posttermination procedure and because the temporary denial was unlikely to be a serious
deprivation. 424 U.S. at 339-43.
106. More precisely, it is the degree of deprivation which will result from the error that
has been critical. If an erroneous deprivation is likely to occur, still a pretermination hearing
is not required by due process unless the degree of potential deprivation is severe. Justice
Powell has recognized that the denial of welfare benefits based upon financial need, even
though only temporary, could very well amount to a serious deprivation. See Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). A temporary deprivation of disability benefits unrelated to finan-
cial need, on the other hand, is not likely to cause as serious a deprivation in Justice Powell's
view.
107. Contra, Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 651 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring), where Justice Powell argued for an equal protection analysis rather than the due
process approach taken by the Court. See section V C(1) infra for further discussion.
108. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
109. Petitioner challenged the procedural provisions for removal of government employees
under the Lloyd-La Follette Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7501 (1970), which left it within the discretion
of agency officials to hold a pretermination hearing. The majority rationale was essentially
that Congress conferred upon the petitioner a protected property interest in his employment
by the provision in the challenged Act that he could be removed only for "cause", and since
Congress had granted the property interest, it had the power to determine by what procedure
it could be terminated. 416 U.S. at 150-54.
110. Justice Powell agreed that the Act conferred an "entitlement" on the employee by
providing that he could only be removed for "cause." 416 U.S. at 166. See Board of Regents
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972), where the Court said that to have a protected property
interest in a benefit, an individual must "have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it," and
that claims of entitlement must be supported by "rules or understandings" independent from
the Constitution. Accord, Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 604 (1972).
111. 416 U.S. at 166-67. This can be seen as evidence that while he has advocated judicial
restraint, Justice Powell will in no sense allow judicial abdication.
112. Id. at 168-71. Justice Powell saw the same basic factors being weighed here as in the
denial-of-benefits area. See notes 103-04 supra and accompanying text.
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2. School Expulsion
Justice Powell has strongly criticized the Court for its rigid approach to
the due process requirements in school expulsion cases, which he has seen
as an abandonment of the more "reasonable" balancing approach.13 By its
holding in Goss v. Lopez,"4 the Court established a rigid rule of due
process requiring notice and a hearing either before or promptly following
suspension of a public school student for as much as a single day. Justice
Powell felt the Court's approach failed to take into account either the
significance of the right or the substantiality of its deprivation-factors
that would be considered in a more flexible balancing approach."' By its
failure to consider these factors, Justice Powell felt that the Court had
enunciated a standard under which "it is difficult to perceive any princi-
pled limit . . ..
However, the Court has not been receptive to Justice Powell's arguments
in this area. Since Goss, the Court has held that school board members
may be personally liable to students whom they expel." 7 In contrast, Jus-
tice Powell would impose on school board members a less rigid standard"8
which would consider all the relevant circumstances and grant to the
school official personal immunity from suit where it appeared that he had
acted "reasonably and in good faith.""' 9
3. Prejudgment Attachment and Garnishment
The requirements of procedural due process in the area of prejudgment
113. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 599 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting).
114. 419 U.S. 565 (1975). See generally Wilkinson, Goss v. Lopez: The Supreme Court as
School Superintendent, 1975 Sup. CT. REv. 25.
115. 419 U.S. at 599-600.
116. Id. at 600.
117. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). Two public high school students were ex-
pelled for violating school regulations prohibiting the use or possession of intoxicating bever-
ages at school. They brought suit against members of the school board under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1970) alleging that their constitutional right to due process had been violated under color of
state law by their expulsion without a prior hearing. The majority rejected arguments for
immunity of school board members to such suits and held that they should be liable if they
knew or should have known that their action would violate a student's "unquestioned consti-
tutional rights." 420 U.S. at 322.
118. Justice Powell said in his opinion that the meaning of the phrase "unquestioned
constitutional rights" is not likely to be self-evident to constitutional law scholars-much less
to the average school board member. 420 U.S. at 329.
119. Id. at 330. Justice Powell said he could see no reason why the Court should impose a
higher standard upon school officials in expelling students than it imposed on the Governor
of Ohio for his role in summoning the National Guardsmen who subsequently killed Kent
State students. Id. at 331. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
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attachments and garnishments do not yet appear to be firmly settled.'2
Justice Powell disapproved of Fuentes v. Shevin,'2 ' which he viewed as
having laid down a sweeping, inflexible rule. Therefore, he concurred in
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co. ,122 and expressed his opinion that the Court
had withdrawn from its per se rule and to that extent had overruled
Fuentes."2 Justice Powell felt that the procedure in Mitchell should be
upheld not because it satisfied any rigid rule of due process but because it
struck a reasonable balance between competing interests.2 4 Apparently,
Justice Powell's optimism toward the Court's approach in Mitchell was
little more than wishful thinking because a more recent holding25 "appears
to resuscitate Fuentes.'' 21 In this area, while Justice Powell has not yet
completely convinced the Court to abandon its rigid approach to due pro-
cess questions in favor of balancing, the Court does appear to be wavering.
120. In Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), the Court established a firm
rule forbidding garnishment of wages without notice and an opportunity for a prior hearing.
See generally Kennedy, Due Process Limitations on Creditors' Remedies: Some Reflections
on Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 19 AM. U.L. REV. 158 (1970). In Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67 (1972) (a decision in which Justice Powell did not participate), the Court seemed
to require a prior hearing in attachment or garnishment proceedings. Then in Mitchell v.
W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974), the Court validated a prejudgment attachment proceed-
ing which made no provision for a prior hearing.
121. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
122. 416 U.S. 600 (1974). The decision validated a Louisiana procedure which made avail-
able to creditors a writ of sequestration to forestall waste or alienation of encumbered prop-
erty. The procedure required only a creditor's affidavit and bond; no notice or prior hearing
was provided. The Court distinguished Fuentes on the ground that the procedure in Mitchell
required a more extensive showing of proof by the creditor and because the procedure was
controlled throughout by the judiciary, unlike Fuentes where a creditor had only to make his
claim and a writ of replevin was issued automatically without involvement of the courts.
123. Id. at 623.
124. Id. at 625-27. Justice Powell emphasized his view that this procedure was more protec-
tive of the debtor's interest while not totally disregarding the legitimate interests of creditors,
which he clearly felt was the result of the more rigid Fuentes approach.
125. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
126. Id. at 609. The Court relied on Fuentes in invalidating a Georgia prejudgment garnish-
ment procedure. Justice Powell objected to the Court's reliance on Fuentes and argued that
the same result would have been reached on these facts under the more flexible approach the
Court had appeared to adopt in Mitchell. Again, he expressed his view that creditors as well
as debtors have legitimate interests in the property and that the interests of both can only
be accounted for by balancing. Id. at 609-10. To avoid leaving the question to the unguided
discretion of lower court judges in future similar cases, Justice Powell outlined a minimal
standard for prejudgment attachment or garnishment proceedings, which he felt differed from
the majority's standard in that it accommodated the interests of both creditors and debtors.
His standard would require that: (a) the garnishor provide security and proof before a "neu-
tral officer" of the need for the writ prior to issuance; (b) the state provide opportunity for a
prompt hearing in which the burden of showing probable cause would be on the garnishor;
and (c) the state provide the debtor an opportunity to free garnished assets by posting
adequate security. Id. at 611-12.
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C. CONCLUSION
Upon analyzing Justice Powell's opinions in the area of due process, at
least this much becomes obvious: He has consistently opposed rigid, per
se rules and has opted instead for a more flexible balancing approach.
There seem to be several reasons for Justice Powell's position. His view has
been that "due process in essence means fundamental fairness. . ."'2 and
that "[a] fair system of justice normally should eschew unbending rules
that foreclose . . . judicial discretion."' 28 Justice Powell has not expressly
said what is meant by "fundamental fairness." However, the term as he
has used it in the due process area seems to be a label for what he has
viewed as fair to all the parties concerned, under all the circumstances and
in light of all the legitimate interests to be affected by the result. When
viewed in this sense, it becomes apparent that "fundamental fairness" can
only be accomplished in all cases by ad hoc balancing.
Obviously, a system of due process totally void of absolutes involves
risks of confusion and unbounded discretion in its application. Justice
Powell has sought to minimize this risk by his searching, extensive evalua-
tions of the competing interests ' and by singling out factors to be consid-
ered in future applications of the balancing technique. ' This has not made
Justice Powell's approach infallible, but it has, arguably, made it more
protective of all the competing interests than a rigid, uncompromising
approach. Under Justice Powell's approach, the legitimate interests of
both the state and the individual can be protected; on the other hand, per
se rules will in some cases necessarily infringe upon one interest with no
perceptible benefit to the other.
III. FIFTH AMENDMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
By the end of the sixties, the Warren Court had significantly enlarged
the individual's sphere of protected rights in fifth amendment controver-
sies.' Most famous, of course, were the Miranda requirements for a full
127. Hampton v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1646, 1652 n.6 (1976).
128. Id. at 1652 n.5.
129. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 584
(1974) (Powell, J., dissenting); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 414 (1972) (Powell, J.,
dissenting); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 366 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
130. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308,
328 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Procunier v. Martinez, 416
U.S. 396 (1974); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
1. Howard, Mr. Justice Powell and the Emerging Nixon Majority, 70 MICH. L. Rav. 445,
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and knowing waiver during custodial interrogations.' But apart from any
specific holdings, there had been an attitude that fifth amendment rights
were to be liberally construed; the rights were to be secured "for ages to
come and. . . designed to approach immortality as nearly as human insti-
tutions can approach it."' With or without changes in the Court, Justice
Powell felt that this attitude could not be maintained, that a retrench-
ment would and should take place.4 And so it has. While the Burger Court,
including Justice Powell, has been reluctant to overrule directly any
Warren Court or earlier precedent, the recent cases have shown a definite
reevaluation of the Constitution's typically cryptic command that "no per-
son . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself. ... "I
B. THE NATURE OF THE RIGHT
The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination was part of the
common law of England that was brought to the early colonies.' In codified
form, it has represented a complex of ideas7 and has been taken to be one
of the marks of an advancing civilization.' Of the many policies inherent
in the fifth amendment, the ones which Justice Powell has taken as his own
can be summarized as follows:
Our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma
of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial
rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-
incriminating statements will be elicited by inhuman treatment and abuses;
452 (1972). See Powell, An Urgent Need: More Effective Criminal Justice, 51 A.B.A.J. 437,
439 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Powell].
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. Id. at 442, citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 387 (1821). Justice Marshall
made this statement in Cohens concerning the entire Constitution and not just the fifth
amendment.
4. Report on the Court, Address to the Labor Law Section of the American Bar Association,
August 11, 1976, at 11.
Justice Powell voiced his concern over the expanding rights of the accused in two articles
written for the American Bar Association Journal: Powell, supra note 1; Powell, The Presi-
dent's Annual Address: The State of the Legal Profession, 51 A.B.A.J. 821 (1965). His com-
ments indicated his basic philosophy on fifth amendment, as well as all personal, rights:
But the immediate problem is one of balance. While the safeguards of fair trial must
surely be preserved, the right of society in general and of each individual in particular
to be protected from crime must never be subordinated to other rights. ...
Powell, supra note 1, at 439.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2250 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
7. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444 (1972).
8. Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956).
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our sense of fair play. . . our respect for the inviolability of the human
personality.'
Despite this sweeping statement of policy, Justice Powell has seen the
privilege as an exception to a broader rule-that the public has a right to
each man's testimony." This broader rule, Justice Powell has felt, has been
essential to the functioning of the courts and to the maintenance of an
ordered society, although it has often been at loggerheads with the privi-
lege to be silent absent immunity. By casting the privilege into the shadow
of the public's right to know, Justice Powell laid the groundwork to reverse
the trend of the Warren Court, which, to him, was threatening to permit
the exception to engulf the general rule."
To prevent this, Justice Powell has distilled the values and policies of
the privilege to uncover its essential elements. Although he has not labeled
them as such, these essential elements have been that the privilege is
personal, that it prevents the compulsion of testimonial evidence and that
the evidence must be such that it may be used or potentially used in a
criminal prosecution. Since they must co-exist, each element has been
important in each case.
C. THE ELEMENTS OF THE RIGHT
1. Personal
To Justice Powell, the central element of the fifth amendment privilege
has been its personal nature. Corporations, 2 and now partnerships, 3 are
not privileged from revealing incriminating evidence. But to define the
constitutional limits, Justice Powell has looked for more than just the
presence of a natural person; he has attached great significance to the
individual on whom the compulsion was worked. Justice Holmes' state-
ment that "a party is privileged from producing evidence but not from its
9. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973), citing Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n,
378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
10. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443-44 (1972). See also Garner v. United
States, 96 S. Ct. 1178, 1182 (1976); United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230 (1975). The
importance of the government's ability to compel testimony has been noted by others. See,
e.g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 93 (1964) (White, J., concurring).
11. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 336 (1973).
12. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
13. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974). See also United States v. White, 322 U.S.
694 (1944), where it was held that a labor union official was not privileged from producing
books and records of the union. The Court restricted the privilege to natural individuals. Id.
at 698.
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production .. ." has been the foundation of many of Justice Powell's
decisions. Or, in his words:
By its very nature the privilege is an intimate and personal one. It respects
a private inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought and proscribes
state intrusion to extract self-condemnation.' 5
Justice Powell has stated that it has been not so much the private nature
of the information but its use to incriminate in an accusatorial system that
has put it beyond the public reach and made it personal.'" The "extortion
of information from the accused himself' has been the breach of the consti-
tutional command that has marked the value to be protected.'7 This per-
sonal element played a significant role in three of his majority opinions:
Couch v. United States,'" United States v. Nobles,'" and Doyle v. Ohio.25
Documents, and especially tax records', have been an area of particular
difficulty for the Court. Documents were held to be within the scope of the
privilege in the landmark case of Boyd v. United States,2 2 where the Court
14. Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913), cited in Couch v. United States,
409 U.S. at 328.
15. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. at 327.
16. The purpose of the relevant part of the Fifth Amendment is to prevent compelled
self-incrimination, not to protect private information. Testimony demanded of a wit-
ness may be very private indeed, but unless it is incriminating and protected by the
Amendment or unless protected by one of the evidentiary privileges, it must be dis-
closed.
United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 233 n.7 (1975), citing Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449,
473-74 (1975). See also Andresen v. Maryland, 96 S. Ct. 2737, 2747 (1976).
17. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. at 328.
18. Id. at 322.
19. 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
20. 96 S. Ct. 2240 (1976).
21. See Garner v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1178 (1976); Fisher v. United States, 96 S. Ct.
1569 (1976); Lyon, Tax Investigations Revisited, 29 TAx LAw. 477 (1975). Some of the more
important lower court decisions include United States v. Beattie, 522 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1975);
United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1967); In re Fahey, 300 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1961);
United States v. Guterma, 272 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1959).
22. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In this case, the Government had charged that thirty-five cases of
plate glass had been imported into the country without paying the necessary customs charges.
A district court judge ordered the invoice for the glass to be produced. The defendants
complied with the order, but protested its use at their trial. The Supreme Court upheld their
fifth amendment objections, stating:
We have been unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's private books and papers
to be used in evidence against him is substantially different from compelling him to
be a witness against himself.
Id. at 633.
The Boyd decision may well be outdated. It has not been construed liberally, and Justice
White, writing in Fisher v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1569 (1976), observed that the precise
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rejected a narrow, literal interpretation of "being a witness" and included
papers and private effects within the meaning of those words. Though
often private, documents may be diverse in ownership and possession,
raising doubts about who may be privileged from producing them.
Justice Powell in Couch was presented with just this issue.23 He viewed
the essential element in the case to be the compulsion, or lack of it, against
the person. Possession of the documents was important only to the extent
of being an indicator of compulsion. 24 And since the tax records had been
held for years by an independent accountant, they were not in Mrs.
Couch's possession, constructive or otherwise.
No doubt, Justice Powell's idea of what is personal for the purposes of
the fifth amendment has been more restricted than the theories on per-
sonal rights that had been developing in the Warren Court. Justice Doug-
las in his dissent to Couch argued that penumbral rights as described in
Griswold v. Connecticut should be protected.2" He would have held all
personal effects and possessions sacrosanct. Justice Brennan in his con-
currence would have expanded the protection to include at least those
instances when an individual had taken steps to protect his privacy.27
However, Justice Powell has not equated privacy or intimacy of the infor-
mation with the personal element of the fifth amendment.2 Although there
was language in Couch about privacy,2 once Justice Powell accepted as the
basis of the right the desire to prevent compulsion by prohibiting the use
of inquisitorial techniques on the person, he rejected any broad reading of
privacy as a judicial construction not dictated by the Constitution.
claim that was upheld in Boyd would now be rejected. Id. at 1579. The invoice had belonged
to a partnership, and under Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974), partnership records
are not privileged.
23. The defendant had turned over possession of her tax records to an independent accoun-
tant, though she retained title in herself. The Court held that she could not interpose her fifth
amendment privilege to defeat an Internal Revenue Service summons issued to her
accountant, since there was no compulsion against her personally.
24. Justice Powell's view was criticized in Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion for creating
a "bright line" rule that equated possession with personal compulsion. 409 U.S. 322, 344
(1973); cf. id. at 337 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Powell rejected this thesis as mis-
guided. 409 U.S. at 336. He noted that divestment of possession could be so insignificant or
temporary that the documents would still be in the constructive possession of the accused
and thus part of her personal sphere. See generally, 15 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 185 (1973);
40 BROoKLYl L. REV. 211 (1973).
25. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
26. 409 U.S. at 341.
27. Id. at 337-38.
28. The open question is whether this is adequate to protect the complex of values and the
"inviolability of the human personality." See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
29. 409 U.S. at 335-36.
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This formulation served as the basis for Justice Powell's decisions in
United States v. Nobles" and Doyle v. Ohio.3 In Nobles, he held that the
accused could not claim any fifth amendment privilege to prevent the
production of notes belonging to another, since there was no personal com-
pulsion against the accused in ordering the papers produced. On the other
hand in Doyle, the evidence-personal silence-had been obtained directly
from the defendants. It, therefore, followed from Couch and more directly
from another case, 3 that Doyle was presumably exercising his fifth amend-
ment privilege and to have allowed the use of an adverse inference from
the exercise of a constitutional right was unfair. 31
2. Compulsion
The second element of the privilege is that there must be some compul-
sion against the accused. This element is closely linked to the personal
nature of the right, but it has some characteristics of its own. For example,
volunteered information has been held not to be within the fifth amend-
ment restriction, even if the information was personal, and may properly
be entered into evidence. Justice Powell has twice found this element
essential in determining the fifth amendment rights of the accused.
The simpler case was Barnes v. United States. 35 Barnes had been
charged with knowingly possessing government checks stolen from the
30. 422 U.S. 225 (1975). Nobles was accused of robbing a federally-insured bank. The most
damaging evidence against him was the testimony of a teller and one other witness, a sales-
man. During the investigator's interviews, the teller suposedly was less than certain about
identifying the defendant, and the salesman was quoted as saying that all blacks look alike.
Counsel for the defense sought to put the investigator on the stand to impeach this testimony.
The trial judge held that, should he testify, the investigator's notes, edited by the court,
would have to be opened to the prosecution. Defense counsel excepted, and the court of
appeals reversed the conviction on appeal. 501 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1974).
31. 96 S. Ct. 2240 (1976). Doyle and codefendant Woods were accused of selling ten pounds
of marijuana to a police informer. Neither Woods nor Doyle offered any account of any of
the events at the time of his arrest. The prosecutor used this silence to impeach their testi-
mony at trial as to what was to have supposedly occurred. Unlike Nobles or Couch, the
information, in this instance, inferred from silence, was elicited from the persons of the
defendants, not from their agent-investigator or tax accountant. Informed of their Miranda
rights, the defendants had the right to remain silent, and this could not be used as evidence
against them. In any event their silence was ambiguous. It could as easily have been a
cautious response to the warnings as a silence from not yet having constructed their story.
32. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
33. The actual basis for the decision was that the state's action was fundamentally unfair
and violated due process.
34. United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (1943); Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immi-
gration, 273 U.S. 103, 113 (1927).
35. 412 U.S. 837 (1973).
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mail. He challenged a permissive inference of knowledge that the checks
had been stolen, claiming that the inference compelled him to testify and
thereby violated his privilege to be silent. Justice Powell said that, al-
though the inference put pressure on the defendant to testify, it was no
more than a part of the adjudicatory procedure, not an inquisitorial tool,
and, therefore, was not a denial of any right. Previous cases had clearly so
held."
A more complex case was Garner v. United States3 in which Justice
Powell turned away from the implications of Warren Court precedent to
narrow the element of compulsion. In Garner, the Court was faced for the
first time with the question of whether information on an individual's tax
return could be entered against him in a criminal prosecution not involving
the tax matter.
3 1
A line of cases from late in the Warren era had dealt with self-disclosure
statutes which had been directed at an identifiable group in a field of
inquiry permeated with criminal sanctions.3 9 Registration was held tanta-
mount to an admission of guilt. Garner claimed that similar reasoning
should be employed in his case, at least to preclude the use of evidence
disclosed in tax returns, since the completion and filing of returns was
mandatory"0 and the reporting of illegal income was also required.' Garner
felt that because such information was supplied by him as required, it
should not be used against him. 2
Instead of following these precedents, Justice Powell turned to older
precedent 3 and held that Garner could have claimed his privilege on the
36. Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925). Yee Hem was convicted under a three-
part opium statute. The third part stated that opium found after July 1, 1913 would be
presumed to have entered the country after April 1, 1909. Yee Hem contended that this
presumption violated his fifth amendment rights. The Court dismissed the assertion summa-
rily:
The statute compels nothing. It does no more than make possession of the prohibited
article prima facie evidence of guilt. It leaves the accused entirely free to testify or not
as he chooses.
Id. at 185.
37. 96 S. Ct. 1178 (1976).
38. See generally Note, Garner v. United States: Self-Incrimination and the Use of Tax
Returns in Nontax Criminal Prosecutions-The Ninth Circuit Attempts a Balancing Act, 24
HASTINGs L. J. 959, 961 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Self-Incrimination].
39. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62
(1968); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968).
40. United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
41. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
42. Some commentators have felt that this was a valid argument. See Self-Incrimination,
supra note 38, at 978-84.
43. United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927). Sullivan had failed to file his tax
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return itself but by having not done so his disclosure was voluntary. The
threat of prosecution arising from claiming the privilege was held insuffi-
cient to amount to compulsion.4 The Garner decision has been criticized
as coming perilously close to forcing taxpayers to pay the penalty of a
criminal prosecution for exercising their constitutional privilege." At a
minimum, it was a shunning of the broader aspects of compulsion which
had become recognized by the Warren Court.
3. Testimonial
As a third element involved in the fifth amendment privilege, the evi-
dence compelled from the person must be testimonial. Other than tangen-
tially, as in Couch, Justice Powell has not written a decision addressing
this issue. However, he did join the Court's opinion in Fisher v. United
States,"6 which added another significant limitation to the fifth amend-
ment privilege.
It had long been recognized that not all evidence is free from compelled
production; only a testimonial communication that is incriminating.47
Thus involuntary voice exemplars" or blood samples49 have been consid-
returns. When prosecuted on this account, he claimed that filing a return would have violated
his fifth amendment rights, since it would have announced his illegal operations. The Court
disagreed. They held that he could have claimed the privilege on the return, but that the
privilege was no defense for failing to file a return.
44. 96 S. Ct. at 1187-88. Prosecution could come under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 7203 (26
U.S.C. § 7203 (1970)) (failure to file). Justice Powell affirmed that a valid claim of a fifth
amendment privilege could serve as a defense to a section 7203 prosecution. By the reasoning
of Sullivan, Garner had his opportunity to validly claim the privilege if he could. The threat
of having to test the validity or invalidity of the claim in a criminal trial was thought to be
insufficient compulsion to make Garner forego his privilege on the original returns.
45. Saltzman, Supreme Court's Garner Decision Puts Illegal Income Earners in a Bind,
1976 J. TAX. 334. Saltzman believed that the expense and disgrace of a criminal prosecution
to test the privilege ought to be constitutionally meaningful. Even if acquitted, the taxpayer
would carry the ill-fame of the trial, thus exacting a price for the exercise of a privilege
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. In that regard, this decision seems somewhat contradictory
to the holding in Doyle. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
46. 96 S. Ct. 1569 (1976). Fisher was the consolidation of two cases: United States v. Fisher,
500 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1974), and United States v. Kasmir, 499 F.2d 444 (5th Cir. 1974). In
both cases, the IRS began investigations of the defendants by approaching their accountants
for information. Before the summonses were issued, the taxpayers transferred the working
papers and records first to themselves and then to their lawyers. The lawyers then refused to
comply with the summonses, asserting their client's fifth amendment privilege and the
attorney-client privilege. The fifth circuit reversed the enforcement order; the third circuit
granted it. The majority opinion in the Supreme Court was written by Justice White.
47. 96 S. Ct. at 1579.
48. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
49. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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ered to be only physical evidence and not testimonial communications.
Fisher added another restriction: to be testimonial, the communication
must now be the product of the accused himself, and if not, production
may possibly be compelled . 5  Thus, in Fisher, the Court held that a
taxpayer's lawyer could be forced to turn over the working papers of the
taxpayer's accountant. There was no derogation of the lawyer-client privi-
lege;' rather, the Court decided that the working papers were not the
"testimony" of the taxpayer, since they had not been prepared by him.5"
If Justice Powell's assent to the case is an accurate reflection of his
thoughts, information will not be "testimonial" unless it is the accused's
oral testimony or the compelled product of his own hand. 3
4. Criminal
As in the testimonial cases, Justice Powell has written only indirectly
on the criminal element of the privilege. For the most part, it is well
settled. In Kastigar v. United States,54 he noted in passing that the privi-
lege could be put forward in all governmental hearings-court cases, in-
quiries, grand jury hearings, etc. What has mattered is that the testimony
could be used in a later criminal prosecution.
This point was well illustrated in Maness v. Meyers,5 a decision in which
Justice Powell joined. An attorney was cited for contempt as a result of
counselling his client to disobey a subpoena duces tecum in a civil case.
The judge in the trial court had mistakenly thought that the privilege
could be raised only in criminal proceedings. The lawyer's citation for
contempt was thrown out.56 So long as there was a reasonable apprehension
of criminal prosecution, the nature of the forum was irrelevant.
50. 96 S. Ct. at 1580.
51. The information had been originally transmitted to the accountant by the client and
the worksheets had been prepared by the accountant. These worksheets were in the hands of
the accountant when the IRS investigation began. They were then transferred to the client
and then to the lawyer. However, documents which could have been obtained when in the
possession of an attorney's client may be obtained even after transfer to the attorney. See
also Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74 (1913).
52. The Court acknowledged that by the production of the documents the taxpayer was
tacitly conceding the existence of them and his possession and control over them. 96 S. Ct.
at 1581-82 n.12. The Court felt, however, that, at least on the facts of this case, no testimonial
evidence was compelled, since the accountant had prepared the papers and the simple act of
production did not involve self-incrimination.
53. The Court left open the question of whether records prepared by a taxpayer could be
compelled from him, since the making of the records would not have been compelled. Id. at
1582. But see Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973). See also Andresen v. Maryland,
96 S. Ct. 2737 (1976).
54. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
55. 419 U.S. 449 (1975).
56. Id. at 468.
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D. IMMUNITY CASES
Immunity cases have offered a different perspective on the fifth amend-
ment. Although the Constitution prohibits the compulsion of incriminat-
ing testimony from a person, the Court has held that the privilege can be
supplanted by an immunity which is coextensive with it." The contours
of the privilege, then, may also be examined by looking at the scope of the
constitutionally recognized immunity.
Two forms of immunity had been propounded. The first type of immun-
ity was transactional immunity. Under this standard the government was
barred from prosecuting the individual for any event about which he testi-
fied. The second type was "use-or-derivative-use" immunity under which
the government was merely barred from using the individual's testimony
or any fruits derived from it.5 In Kastigar v. United States, Justice Powell,
writing for the Court, held that immunity from use and derivative use was
coextensive with the constitutional privilege."
The holding in Kastigar was not dictated by prior cases, but, unlike the
other areas of the privilege, Justice Powell continued a trend that had been
developing throughout the Warren Court era,"0 that use immunity com-
57. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
58. Transactional immunity has at least two policies behind it: it prevents the enormous
difficulties of enforcing a "use-or-derivative-use" standard, and it also prevents the person
from being "whipsawed" between two jurisdictions. The arguments for use immunity are that
it shifts the burden of proof and, therefore, adequately protects the party, and that it prevents
an overbroad "immunity bath" for those who could otherwise be prosecuted. Note, Immun-
ity: The Dilemma of "Transactional" Versus "Use," 25 OKLA. L. REV. 109, 114-16 (1972).
59. 406 U.S. 441, 459 (1972). The literature on Kastigar is huge. It includes Zimmet, The
Federal Use Immunity Statute Since Kastigar, 1973/1974 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 343; Note,
Kastigar v. United States: The Required Scope of Immunity, 58 VA. L. REv. 1099 (1972);
Note, Standards for Exclusion in Immunity Cases after Kastigar and Zicarelli, 82 YALE L.J.
171 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Standards].
Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1972), was handed
down on the same day as Kastigar. That case also held the use-or-derivative-use standard to
be adequate.
60. The earliest case on the subject, Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892), was
ambiguous, but the Congress and some later court decisions thought of it as requiring
transactional immunity. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S.
591 (1896). The issue was never squarely before the Court. A conflict arose later when the
fifth amendment was made applicable to the states in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). If
states were required to grant full transactional immunity, prosecution for federal crimes as
well as state crimes would be barred for those transactions. Arguably at least, such a holding
would violate the supremacy clause. In response, the Warren Court in Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), held that immunity from use and derivative use was sufficient
for interjurisdictional prosecutions. Justice White in his concurrence to Murphy urged that
"use" standards be adopted for all immunities, and the Court later hinted its acceptance of
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ported with the fifth amendment. It appears likely that Justice Powell
adopted this standard because of its more limited scope. Transactional
immunity offers something of a "blunderbuss" approach; it prevents the
evil contemplated but is usually overbroad in its application. Immunity
from use and derivative use better fits Justice Powell's more narrow fifth
amendment views. It protects the individual from being forced to give
testimony which would lead to criminal prosecution while at the same time
it gives greater weight than transactional immunity to society's needs to
judge the accused. Like the right to remain silent, it "grants neither par-
don nor amnesty."6'
E. CONCLUSION
Justice Powell has been in full agreement with the Burger Court's reeval-
uation of fifth amendment protections. Under the Warren Court, the rights
were liberally applied. Now, "despite its cherished position, the Fifth
Amendment addresses only a relatively narrow scope of inquiries." 2 The
privilege has come much closer to Justice Powell's view of its historical
origins and grammatical terms. Justice Powell also believes that this is
more in line with the government's interest in obtaining the information
it needs, and the interests of the fifth amendment itself, which, in his view,
had become somewhat turgid.
IV. FOURTH AMENDMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
The traditional purpose of the fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution' has been "to safeguard the privacy and security of indivi-
duals against arbitrary [and unreasonable] invasions [searches and sei-
zures] by government officials." 2 The exclusionary rule, prohibiting intro-
duction by the prosecution of evidence obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment, is the judicially-formulated means of effectuating the protec-
this position. 378 U.S. at 92. See Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548 (1971) (certiorari
dismissed as improvidently granted); Standards, supra note 59, at 174 n.19.
61. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 461 (1972).
62. Garner v. United States, 96 S. Ct. 1178, 1183 (1976).
1. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
2. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
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tion afforded by the fourth amendment.' The exclusionary rule was ex-
tended to state court prosecutions in 1961.1
The Supreme Court under Chief Justice Warren was particularly inno-
vative in expanding the constitutional protection afforded criminal de-
fendants by the fourth amendment.' This expansion was accomplished
chiefly by the use of precisely delineated constitutional guidelines,' and a
change in emphasis in fourth amendment protections from places to per-
sons.7 In contrast, the Supreme Court under Chief Justice Burger, instead
of further expanding individual protection under the fourth amendment,
has returned to more traditional concepts in certain areas.
B. THE SUBSTANTIVE PROTECTION
1. Introduction
Justice Powell has viewed the fourth amendment as an expansive but
not absolute protection of the privacy of an individual.8 The protection has
not been absolute because, as with most rights of the individual, counter-
vailing forces of society must also be considered? These countervailing
forces have been the foundation of probable cause, which must exist in
order to intrude constitutionally upon the individual's right. To ensure
that the protection is not swallowed by the exception, the Court, at least
in the area of searches, has required that probable cause, absent exigent
3. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
4. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
5. Not only was the exclusionary rule extended to the states, but the substantive protection
from warrantless searches and seizures was expanded. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Warrant provisions were tightened. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). Warrantless administrative inspections by municipal housing and
fire officials were barred. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of
Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967). And the right to attack a state conviction on the basis of a fourth
amendment violation by federal habeas corpus petition was granted to state prisoners. Kauf-
man v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
6. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523
(1967); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
7. This protection of persons was first enunciated in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967). This protection has been commonly couched in terms of a reasonable expectation of
privacy. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
8. In his decisions, Justice Powell has described the protected right in terms of privacy,
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), or "an expectation of
privacy," United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
9. For example, see the quartet of border search cases discussed infra p. 369, where one of
the main concerns of Justice Powell was the almost impossible burden on the border patrol
of controlling the entrance of illegal aliens into the United States.
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circumstances, be determined by a neutral and detached third party.'
However, at times even nonexigent circumstances have been held suffi-
cient to allow a search or seizure to occur without a neutral determination
of probable cause" or even the existence of probable cause.12
Thus, fourth amendment protections by their nature are extremely con-
ducive to being evaluated by balancing. Justice Powell, as well as most of
the Burger Court, has used this opportunity to develop a flexible standard
of protection.'3 This standard has been essentially one which asks whether
it would be reasonable to say that the individual's fourth amendment right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is more important than
the interests of society in conducting the search or seizure under the cir-
cumstances.
2. Neutral, Independent Magistrate
Justice Powell has emphasized that the very heart of the protection
afforded by the fourth amendment has been judicial approval by a neutral
and detached magistrate prior to any invasion of privacy so that executive
discretion will not go unchecked.' 4 However, this, as with other protections
provided by the fourth amendment, has been subject to the possibility of
modification in particular circumstances. An early example of this possi-
bility was United States v. United States District Court,'5 where Justice
Powell scrutinized the conflicting values by balancing the expansive but
not absolute right of the individual against the exigency of the situation,
the burden strict adherence to the fourth amendment would place upon
the investigation and the extent to which an individual's privacy would be
invaded.
Justice Powell has employed this balancing test in several other situa-
tions involving who should determine probable cause. A significant ele-
10. See, e.g., United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972). Contra,
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1974).
11. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 96 S. Ct. 3092 (1976).
12. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
13. The Warren Court also used a balancing test to some extent. See Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). However, the Warren Court
was less inclined to give substantial weight to facts that could have affected the reasonable-
ness of the expectation of privacy than has been the Burger Court. Compare Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), with United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 297 (1972).
14. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316-18 (1972).
15. 407 U.S. 297 (1972). In this case, Justice Powell concluded that the potential danger
to individual privacy posed by unrestricted surveillance was greater than the burden placed
upon the government in requiring the issuance of a warrant prior to electronic surveillance
to protect domestic security. Id. at 321. But see United States v. Donovan, 45 U.S.L.W. 4115
(U.S. Jan. 18, 1977).
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ment in this balance has been statutory requirements which he has viewed
as explicit directions by society through the legislature on how probable
cause should be determined in particular situations. It follows, therefore,
that a violation of the statute would render the determination invalid
regardless of the circumstances."6
The danger of overburdening a municipal court was found sufficient in
Shadwick v. City of Tampa'7 to allow the determination of probable cause
by a magistrate with neither a law degree nor special legal training. Justice
Powell concluded that the essence of the probable cause requirement lay
in the determination being made by an independent and neutral" individ-
ual who was capable of determining probable cause. 9 He felt legal training
was unnecessary to such a determination. Thus, the optimum level of
individual protection was sacrificed when the circumstances necessitated
such action.
This manner of balancing, in Gerstein v. Pugh,0 resulted in the holding
that, although probable cause for arrest must exist at the time of arrest, it
need not be determined by an independent and detached magistrate prior
to arrest. It was sufficient if the determination occurred subsequent to
arrest.' Justice Powell believed that the right of the individual to be free
from restraint without a showing of probable cause would be maintained
by such a showing subsequent to arrest, while at the same time the govern-
ment's ability to maintain law and order would not be unduly hampered.2
16. United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974). Justice Powell concurred with the
majority in this case which held that evidence obtained by wiretap should be excluded,
because the warrant application had not conformed to the procedure established by 18
U.S.C.A. § 2516(1) (Cum. Supp. 1976). Justice Powell dissented on a separate issue.
17. 407 U.S. 345 (1972). Pursuant to a local ordinance, court clerks (without special legal
training) issued arrest warrants for violation of minor local ordinances. Justice Powell bal-
anced heavy court dockets and a shortage of legal personnel against the desirability of review
of warrant requests by a judge or lawyer.
18. A situation as found in Shadwick could not be alleviated by allowing the prosecutor or
any individual connected with the police to determine probable cause, since such a person is
neither neutral nor independent. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
19. 407 U.S. at 353, 354.
20. 420 U.S. 103 (1975). Pursuant to a local ordinance, no prearrest or postarrest probable
cause determination was required to hold a suspect for trial when charged by an information
filed by the prosecutor.
21. The crucial element that Justice Powell found in Pugh that permitted this conclusion
was the burden that would be placed upon legitimate law enforcement by requiring a warrant.
He noted that while Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964), had expressed a preference for the use
of arrest warrants, an arrest had never been invalidated when supported by probable cause
because of the lack of an arrest warrant. Accord, United States v. Watson, 96 S. Ct. 820
(1976), which upheld a warrantless arrest in public.
22. Pugh and Watson have created a peculiar anomaly in the search and seizure area. Both
a search and a seizure require probable cause. However, for a search to be valid, absent
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3. Administrative Searches
a. Border Searches
The cases dealing with border searches" also illustrate Justice Powell's
concern for probable cause determination and the fourth amendment's
warrant requirement. As with the question of who should determine prob-
able cause, Justice Powell has been willing to sacrifice some individual
fourth amendment protections when the circumstances have required it.
An examination has been made in each case of the severity of the circum-
stances, the legitimate needs of law enforcement and the extent of the
invasion of individual privacy. This scrutiny has led Justice Powell to
expand not only the situations where no warrant will be required but has
led to a dilution of the requirement of probable cause as well. 4
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States" is the first case in which Justice
exigent circumstances such as an emergency, probable cause must be determined by an
independent and neutral magistrate prior to the search. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443 (1971). On the other hand, Watson permits an arrest, even absent any exigent circum-
stances, in a public place without a prior determination of probable cause by a judicial officer.
Although Pugh still requires such a determination after arrest, it nonetheless sanctioned
warrantless arrests. Justice Powell wrote the opinion in Pugh and concurred in the result in
Watson.
Viewing these cases as the result of the balancing test used by Justice Powell, the results
are not so anomalous, since Justice Powell has accorded great weight to the interests of law
enforcement. He felt that requiring a warrant for an arrest in public was neither historically
mandated nor wise policy, since it would unduly inhibit the freedom of action of law enforce-
ment officers. 96 S. Ct. at 832. Moreover, to Justice Powell, society has a greater interest in
immediately apprehending a violator of the law than in conducting an immediate search,
making an interference with the conduct of a search less burdensome. Therefore, on balance,
the difference, although somewhat peculiar, is in Justice Powell's view legitimate.
23. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975); Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
24. One factor has seemed to be very important in the area of border searches: the searches
are not usually conducted to obtain incriminating evidence in order to prosecute. Criminal
penalties can be and have been assessed for the importation of illegal aliens, but this has not
been determinative to Justice Powell. He has consistently relied on Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), which allowed area-wide municipal searches, but only after a
showing by the authorities as to why they believed a particular area contained dangers to
society. The facts were not required to relate to an individual dwelling but to a specific area.
The fact that an individual could have been prosecuted for refusing entry to the official did
not persuade the Court that the full protections of the fourth amendment should apply.
The general situation in border searches is the same. To allow searches without probable
cause or a warrant would leave the individual at the mercy of the discretion of the official in
the field. To require a warrant and probable cause may unduly hinder the border patrol. This
conflict has been the backdrop against which these cases were decided.
25. 413 U.S. 266, 275 (1973). In addition to border inspections, permanent checkpoints for
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Powell dealt with this problem. The case is very instructive since, although
it addressed both the interests of law enforcement and the right of citizens
to fourth amendment protections, it did not exclusively support either.
The Court refused to sanction random searches of automobiles by roving
patrols, not at the border or its functional equivalent, when there was
neither a warrant nor probable cause. However, weighing this against the
impossible task facing the government,2 Justice Powell fashioned a com-
promise which called for a substituted form, or "functional equivalent,"
of probable cause.2 8
Besides probable cause, Justice Powell also examined the need for a
warrant. He would have held, after weighing the effect on the government
created by requiring a search warrant against the intrusion occasioned by
a roving search, that the particular border patrol case did not meet the
criteria for warrantless searches.29 This result, to Justice Powell, was dic-
tated by the conclusion that the inconvenience to the government of ob-
taining a warrant was not sufficient to overcome the extensive intrusion
on personal freedom." The warrant Justice Powell advocated was an area
the discovery of illegal aliens were maintained at various locations on major highways extend-
ing north from the Mexican border into the United States. Border patrol officers also con-
ducted searches of automobiles when they were encountered in areas where the smuggling of
aliens was known to occur.
26. The search took place twenty-five miles from the Mexican border.
27. "The Immigration and Naturalization Service suggests there may be as many as 10 or
12 million aliens illegally in the country." United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878
(1975). Many had entered along the largely uninhabited 2,000-mile border between the
United States and Mexico. The border patrol had utilized vehicle inspections as one method
of attempting to minimize this illegal immigration.
28. 413 U.S. at 279. The justifications for this substituted form of probable cause were: a)
consistent prior judicial approval of this form of search; b) absence of reasonable alternatives;
and c) a modest intrusion. The justifications were modeled after Camara, where the Court
noted that the long history of permitting administrative searches of houses attested to the
reasonableness of the search. 387 U.S. at 537.
One significant difference between Camara and this type of situation in a border search
was that the former involved a dwelling and the latter an automobile. The fact that an
automobile has been traditionally afforded less protection than a dwelling, Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48 (1970), was a significant factor on the side of the government.
The government had argued this point, saying that since an automobile was involved, an
exception should apply to the requirement of probable cause and a warrant. But Justice
Powell rejected this, saying that the cases providing an exception for automobiles, such as
Chambers, created an exception to the warrant requirement, not the probable cause require-
ment. 413 U.S. at 281.
29. 413 U.S. at 277.
30. Without requiring a warrant, an individual would be subjected to the discretion of the
official in the field and not a neutral and independent judicial officer. 413 U.S. at 280.
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warrant of the type required in Camara v. Municipal Court,3' because he
felt that such a warrant would prevent unreasonable intrusions into the
privacy of individuals without significantly interfering with the interests
of the government.
32
The seriousness with which Justice Powell viewed the intrusion in
Almeida-Sanchez was evidenced by the fact that it overcame strong policy
arguments of the government and a somewhat lessened expectation of
privacy caused by the presence of an automobile. United States v. Ortiz
33
underscored this belief of Justice Powell. Writing for the majority, Justice
Powell applied Almeida-Sanchez and required a showing of probable
cause . 3  The fact that a permanent checkpoint was involved did not
mitigate the intrusion nor change the result. 5
In a case decided the same day, United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,3 Jus-
tice Powell, again writing for the majority, concluded that probable cause
was not required for a roving border patrol to stop a vehicle for a brief
questioning of its occupants and a visual inspection. 37 Returning to his
Almeida-Sanchez rationale, Justice Powell balanced the difficult task
faced by the border patrol of controlling illegal immigration, against the
limited nature of the intrusion into individual privacy occasioned by the
questioning and limited visual inspection. The compromise he reached was
31. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). The facts which Justice Powell considered relevant in this case in
determining whether a warrant should be issued on probable cause for an area included: a)
the frequency of known illegal entry in the area; b) the area's proximity to the border; c) the
size and geographic characteristics, including the number and condition of the roads and the
type and frequency of their use; and d) the probable interference with ordinary use of the
roads by the general public. 413 U.S. at 283-84.
32. 413 U.S. at 283-85.
33. 422 U.S. 891 (1975). The defendant's automobile was searched at a permanent check-
point, not at the border or its functional equivalent, without either probable cause or a
warrant.
34. Justice Powell applied the majority view of Almeida-Sanchez and left open the ques-
tion of the applicability of area warrants, as he had advocated in Almeida-Sanchez, to this
situation. 422 U.S. at 897 n.3.
35. The government argued that the permanency of the checkpoint and its routine proce-
dures mitigated the intrusion. Justice Powell rejected this, noting that only a small
percentage of cars was searched, which meant that the individual was subject to the discre-
tion of the official and, moreover, established procedures did not lessen the embarrassment
of the search. 422 U.S. at 895.
36. 422 U.S. 873 (1975). The defendant's automobile was stopped at a permanent border
patrol checkpoint by a patrol car because the checkpoint was closed due to inclement
weather. There was no warrant or probable cause, the stop being primarily based upon the
Mexican ancestry of the defendant. There was no search either, but merely a brief question-
ing. Since the checkpoint was closed, and the questioning was conducted by an officer in a
patrol car, the Court characterized the stop as a roving patrol stop.
37. Id. at 881.
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a requirement of reasonable suspicion based upon articulable factors3 to
support a stop for questioning. Justice Powell emphasized that this did not
authorize a wholesale search, but only the less drastic alternative of a mere
questioning and visual inspection.
In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte," which involved a stop for ques-
tioning and a limited inspection at a permanent border patrol checkpoint,
Justice Powell and the majority concluded that neither probable cause nor
reasonable suspicion was necessary to justify the intrusion. Again this
conclusion was a compromise wrought by Justice Powell's balancing of all
the facts in a given situation. A brief stop for questioning at a clearly
marked permanent check point was felt to be a minimal intrusion which
was outweighed by the momentous problem border patrol officers were
faced with in attempting to halt illegal immigration." Therefore, Justice
Powell felt it was unnecessary to impose a standard, which would protect
the individual from such a minimal intrusion. The individual would 'be
sufficiently protected by limiting the scope of the stop to a questioning
rather than a full scale search.'
The area of border searches has provided a forum for Justice Powell to
balance extensively. The results have shown that as the intrusion on pri-
vacy has been reduced the justification that need be shown in order to
38. Id. at 884-87. These factors include: a) the area in which a vehicle is encountered; b)
its appearance-loaded etc.; c) the appearance of the occupants, including their ancestry; d)
the behavior of the driver, attempts at evasion; and e) the officer's general knowledge of alien
smuggling. This decision paralleled Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), which allowed a "stop
and frisk" based upon a reasonable belief that the suspect was armed and dangerous.
39. 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976). The defendant's vehicle was stopped at a permanent border
patrol checkpoint and diverted to a secondary area for questioning and a visual inspection.
There was no warrant and no probable cause, not even reasonable suspicion.
40. Justice Powell differentiated Brignoni-Ponce on the basis that the intrusion occasioned
by a stop and question by a roving patrol was greater than at a permanent checkpoint because
the individual knows that at a permanent checkpoint the intrusion will occur and therefore
the regularity will be greater. 96 S. Ct. at 3083. Although this differentiation was insufficient
to create a difference in result when a search was involved, it was felt to be a significant
enough lessening of the intrusion to make a stop for questioning, which is by itself a minimum
intrusion, virtually no intrusion upon an individual's privacy.
41. Id. at 1086-87. The defendant had asked the Court to require at least an area warrant
for such searches as was required in Camara and as Justice Powell had advocated in Almeida-
Sanchez. Justice Powell, however, felt that both were distinguishable because they involved
searches. Moreover, in this situation, the reasons for requiring a warrant were already ful-
filled. The permanency of the checkpoint provided assurance of legality and would prevent
hindsight from coloring the facts that existed at the time of the intrusion. Also, individuals
other than the official in the field designated the location of the checkpoint. This fact limited
the discretion of the officer and negated the need to protect the individual from this discretion
by the use of a judicial officer.
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justify the intrusion also has been reduced. Moreover, a lesser intrusion has
resulted in a similarly diminished need for a warrant, since subjecting the
individual to the discretion of an official in a situation where the intrusion
would be minimal would be of little harm.
b. Inventory Searches
Almost the identical rationale found in border searches can be seen in
the 1976 case which validated inventory searches of cars: South Dakota v.
Opperman.42 The majority found such a search reasonable, primarily be-
cause the purpose of the search was not to obtain incriminating evidence
and the search was conducted according to strict police procedures. 3
Justice Powell concurred, but wrote apparently to specify considerations
that were crucial to the result. Again he noted that the resolution would
depend on the result of balancing the interests of society against the inter-
ests of the individual.4 The interests of society lay mainly in protecting
the police and the owner of the automobile from loss;45 and, to Justice
Powell, these interests were felt to be significant. The individual's interest
in protection was felt to be lessened by two factors. The first was that an
automobile as opposed to a home or office was involved." The second was
that the search was limited by established police procedures and, there-
fore, the intrusion was minimized. 7 Moreover, Justice Powell believed that
the search was not rendered unreasonable because of the lack of a war-
rant.48 A warrant in this situation, as in Martinez-Fuerte, would have
42. 96 S. Ct. 3092 (1976). The defendant's automobile was impounded after multiple park-
ing tickets had been issued and it had not been moved. Pursuant to department procedure,
the vehicle was searched and its contents inventoried and stored.
43. Since the search was held not to be criminally oriented, a probable cause determination
and a warrant were unnecessary. 96 S. Ct. at 3095-96. Also, the majority found the fact that
an automobile was involved lowered the expectation of fourth amendment protection. Id.
44. As precedent, Justice Powell cited, among others, three of the four border search cases,
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
45. [T]hree interests generally have been advanced in support of inventory searches: (i)
protection of the police from danger; (ii) protection of the police against claims and disputes
over lost or stolen property; and (iii) protection of the owner's property while it remains in
police custody.
96 S. Ct. at 3101.
46. As in the border search cases, this fact was held to lower the individual's expectation
of privacy, which meant that only a lesser amount of justification was needed to overcome
the expectation. Justice Powell cited United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 96 S. Ct. 3074 (1976)
and United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 897 (1975), as precedent for the fact that one's expecta-
tion of privacy was reduced when in an automobile.
47. 96 S. Ct. at 3102.
48. Id. Justice Powell emphasized, as he had in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413
U.S. 266, 281 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring), that the exception to the warrant requirement
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served no purpose and, therefore, was not required. 9
c. Conclusion
These cases point out significant features of Justice Powell's analysis
when dealing with what are basically administrative searches. His balanc-
ing is detailed and two-tiered. Interference with police functions, discre-
tion exercised by the official in the field and the policy behind the actions
(search for criminal evidence or other reasons) all affect the government's
interest. The presence of an automobile and the extent of the intrusion
(full search or stop and question and the presence or nonpresence of the
owner) affect the individual's interest. The weighing of these factors deter-
mines the permissibility of the search. Whether a warrant will be required
is determined by balancing the purposes of a warrant (hindsight review
and the limiting of discretion) against the worth of requiring it. The worth
is determined by analyzing both the protection a warrant will afford the
individual and the hinderance it will create for the police. The result de-
termines the applicability of the warrant requirement."
4. Search Incident to Arrest
The concept that evolved in the area of administrative searches, that the
created by Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), due to the presence of an automobile,
was applicable only because of the presence of special circumstances and was not a general
exception.
49. As noted in Martinez-Fuerte, a warrant serves basically two functions. First, it insu-
lates the individual from the exercise of arbitrary discretion as to the existence of probable
cause by the officer in the field. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). In an
inventory situation, Justice Powell, as well as the majority, has felt that this discretion does
not exist because the police follow set procedures, and the decision to search is, therefore,
not dependent on varying fact, as would be the case in a search to discover criminal evidence.
96 S. Ct. at 3103. Secondly, a warrant is to prevent hindsight review from coloring the
reasonableness of the search. Here, Justice Powell believed that proper hindsight review was
assured because of the set procedures. Id.
Camara, which had required a warrant for certain administrative searches, was distin-
guished. The primary concern in Camara had been that the occupant of the dwelling to be
inspected had no way of discerning the legitimacy of the search or its allowable limits without
the presentment of a warrant. However, an inventory search places no discretion in the hands
of the police. Moreover, the owner is not usually around nor reasonably accessible and,
therefore, a warrant would serve no notice of the legitimacy of the search.
50. In both Martinez-Fuerte and Opperman, Justice Powell reiterated the traditional pref-
erence for a warrant unless the situation is one of the recognized exceptions. It appears to be
an open question whether the balancing of the need for a warrant against the purposes of a
warrant will in the future expand the instances when no warrant will be required in non-
border search situations. This area certainly is not identical to searches for incriminating
evidence. However, the balancing, as done by Justice Powell, at the minimum foreshadows
a more flexible approach in the future in the application of fourth amendment protections
against searches.
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lesser the intrusion the lesser need be the probable cause to search, found
its earlier fruition in Justice Powell's concurrence in United States v.
Robinson." The majority, extending the search incident to arrest doctrine
to arrests for automobile violations, held that upon a full custody arrest a
full search of the person was reasonable, since the arrest was based upon
probable cause and this probable cause was sufficient to uphold the subse-
quent search.52 The driver of the automobile, once in custody, was allowed
to be fully searched even without any apparent reason to believe that he
had weapons or evidence on his person.53
Justice Powell in his concurrence went philosophically one step further.
He would have held that once an individual has been arrested, his expecta-
tion of privacy has been fully abated or, when compared to the significant
state interest in controlling an individual upon a valid arrest, any expecta-
tion that did remain has been vastly outweighed. 54
51. 414 U.S. 218 (1974).
52. A search incident to arrest has always been an exception to the fourth amendment's
warrant requirement. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). Since such a search
is conducted without a warrant or probable cause to search, the Court has had, to maintain
the reasonableness of the search, to limit the search to the person's body and the area under
his control. Also, since such a search was allowed for the policy reasons of protecting the
officer and preventing the destruction of evidence, the search could only be for articles of
evidence or weapons. See, e.g., id.
53. The suspect was stopped for a minor traffic violation and put under full arrest upon
discovery of his driving with a revoked license. The nature of the offense and the situation
clearly did not give rise to any belief of danger on the part of the officer as this was a
nonviolent crime, nor did it create a belief that the suspect had any "evidence" on his person,
since the crime had no "evidence." The lower court found that no grounds existed for a full
search incident to arrest since no probable cause existed, 414 U.S. at 227, nor was a pat-down
justified without the existence of a reasonable belief. Id. The later holding was based on an
analogy to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
However, Justice Rehnquist and the majority reversed. Based on the history and the nature
of a search incident to arrest, they upheld the search on the basis that an arrest based on
probable cause, even without a warrant, was reasonable under the fourth amendment and,
therefore, so was a search of the person, as the arrest and the search were all components of
the same action. Id. at 235. The fact of a lawful arrest gave full authority for a full search of
the person.
Terry was distinguished on the grounds that in a "stop and frisk," it was necessary to limit
the extent of the intrusion as the intrusion was based only upon a limited form of probable
cause-a reasonable belief. Id. at 228. But to try to minimize a further intrusion after the
massive intrusion of a valid arrest was held to be without any justification, since the intrusion
of the arrest was of a continuing and not of a limited nature. 414 U.S. at 228.
54. 414 U.S. at 237, 238. The interesting question is whether the expectation of privacy
could be, in Justice Powell's view, revived in the future; if not, then a prisoner would appear
to have no fourth amendment protections available while incarcerated. For this reason, the
rationale of the majority-that the probable cause for arrest makes the search reasonable
-seems the better decision. Once the transaction that began with the probable cause to
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5. Searches of Third Parties
The expectation of privacy can be abated by many factors. The most
complete of which is the release of control over things or information. The
crucial question is, however, how much expectation is retained when one
turns items or information over to a third party either because the law or
the exigencies of modern life compel him to do so.
The passage of the Bank Secrecy Act in 1970 brought this question to
the forefront.5  Originally challenged in California Bankers v. Shultz,56 the
Act, in United States v. Miller,57 was held not to violate the fourth amend-
ment. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, found no expectation of
privacy in papers neither owned nor possessed by the complaining party, 8
nor any expectation of privacy in information revealed by such a person
to a third party.59
arrest and ended with the search has been completed, the expectation of privacy would again
increase, subject, of course, to the substantial interests of the government.
In view of the manner in which Justice Powell has balanced most fourth amendment
claims, it appears likely that all he may have been saying was that at the time of arrest the
government's interest was so overwhelming, and in view of the already significant intrusion
caused by the arrest, the prisoner's rights were clearly outweighed. If this was truly his view,
then his rationale was not very different from that of the majority.
55. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1730d, 1829b, 1951-59 (Cum. Supp. 1976) and 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-62,
1082-83, 1101-05, 1121-22 (Cum. Supp. 1976). The Bank Secrecy Act required banks to keep
microfilm records of all day-to-day transactions, and to report foreign transactions and sub-
stantial domestic transactions to the Secretary of the Treasury.
56. 416 U.S. 21 (1974). The fourth amendment challenge by certain depositors was dis-
missed since no evidence was produced to show that they had engaged in any of the actions
which were required to be reported. The simple act of maintaining records pursuant to the
requirements of the Act was held not to be a search. Id. at 54.
Justice Powell concurred but voiced misgivings concerning the domestic reporting provi-
sion, since no neutral judicial determination was required to check executive discretion. "At
some point, governmental intrusion upon these areas would implicate legitimate expectations
of privacy." Id. at 79.
57. 96 S. Ct. 1619 (1976).
58. 96 S. Ct. at 1623. See the discussions of fifth amendment cases which have also under-
cut this rationale in section III C(1) infra.
59. This holding simply reaffirmed the old doctrine that the fourth amendment does not
prohibit the government from
obtaining. . . information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to govern-
ment authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be
used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not
be betrayed.
96 S. Ct. at 1624, quoting United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971). See also Hoffa
v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
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6. Conclusion
The substantive fourth amendment protections provided by Justice
Powell are narrower in scope than those provided by the Warren Court.
This has occurred because Justice Powell has been more receptive to the
interests of the state and more willing to find circumstances that mitigate
the expectation of privacy. This tendency has also prevented the expansion
of fourth amendment protections into areas where the Warren Court may
have done so (i.e., the cases involving the Bank Security Act). In the
future, there will no doubt be a continuance and further refinement of this
approach.
C. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Determination of a fourth amendment violation by itself provides no
protection to an offended party. It is the judicially formulated exclusionary
rule which implements the protection accorded by the Constitution. Thus,
where the exclusionary rule is not applied, a fourth amendment right is a
hollow protection. Justice Powell in applying the exclusionary rule has
balanced in the same manner as he has in determining the extent to which
the substantive protections of the fourth amendment would apply. His
view has been that the rule should be applied only "where its remedial
objectives will be most efficaciously served,"60 and this has usually been
found to be where the most harm could occur.
Justice Powell, writing for the majority in United States v. Calandra,6'
concluded that the exclusionary rule should not be extended to grand jury
proceedings. He balanced the burden its application would place on the
function of the grand jury against the deterrent effect it would have on
violations of the fourth amendment. He determined that the extension
would unduly fetter grand jury proceedings and would act only as a mini-
mal deterrent to police misconduct.2 The exclusionary rule and a balanc-
ing of these same underlying factors formed the basis of Justice Powell's
concurring opinion in Brown v. Illinois.3 The majority of the Court felt
that a variety of factors should determine whether incriminating state-
60. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 350-52. Justice Powell felt that the deterrence would be minimal since the
benefits of the exclusionary rule were already being enjoyed. The evidence could not be used
in a subsequent trial and it was therefore unlikely that a prosecutor would seek such evidence
to obtain an indictment if there was no hope for a conviction.
63. 95 S. Ct. 2254 (1975). The defendant made certain incriminating statements when
questioned pursuant to an arrest without a warrant or probable cause after the police had
broken into his home without a warrant or probable cause.
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ments obtained following an illegal arrest should be excluded." Justice
Powell agreed, but saw the greatest deterrent effect where the misconduct
was greatest and, thus, would exclude a confession only when obtained
pursuant to flagrant and purposeful violation of the fourth amendment. On
the other hand, he saw only a slight deterrent effect on police where the
misconduct was technical (e.g., a defective warrant), and would not ex-
clude a confession obtained in such a situation. 5
Justice Powell's consistent advocation of disallowing federal habeas cor-
pus appeals from state courts based on fourth amendment violations" was
predicated on this same balancing of all interests and the same insistence
that deterrence was the only justification for the rule. 7 The crucial element
in his view was that the rule was a means to uphold the efficacy of the
fourth amendment, and did not, in reality, bear on the question of the guilt
or innocence of the person. On the other hand, a reversal by a federal court
after all state appeals had been exhausted, years after the violation, would
have no deterrent value whatsoever." Therefore, when weighed against
the injury to society by releasing a guilty individual and other considera-
tions," no reason existed to apply the rule. This belief became law in Stone
v. Powell.7 0
64. Id. at 2261-63. The majority and Justice Powell agreed that Miranda warnings per se
could not render admissible a confession pursuant to an unlawful arrest. The majority con-
cluded that the totality of the circumstances must be determinative and these would include:
(1) Miranda warnings; (2) temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession; (3) presence
of intervening circumstances and (4) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.
65. Id. at 2265-66. A problem with this approach is the potential for inconsistent determi-
nations as to whether a particular police indiscretion was flagrant.
66. See Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring); Cupp v.
Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
67. In sum, the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth
Amendment rights, generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal con-
stitutional right of the party aggrieved.
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
68. On collateral attack, the exclusionary rule retains its major liabilities while the
asserted benefit of the rule dissolves. For whatever deterrent function the rule may
serve when applied on trial and appeal becomes greatly attenuated when, months or
years afterward, the claim surfaces for collateral review. The impermissible conduct
has long since occurred, and the belated wrist slap of state police by federal courts
harms no one but society on whom the convicted criminal is newly released.
412 U.S. at 269.
69. The concept of federalism has been important to this philosophy. Justice Powell has
felt that reversals by a single lower federal court of decisions by the highest court of a state
has bred friction between the two systems. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 263-
64 (1973). Another consideration has been that to Justice Powell the purpose of habeas corpus
is "redressing an unjust incarceration." Id. at 258. Justice Powell has felt that since a viola-
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V. EQUAL PROTECTION REVIEW OF STATUTORY
CLASSIFICATIONS
A. INTRODucrION
In 1972, Justice Powell's first year on the Supreme Court, there began
to develop a new model for the review of statutory classifications.' This new
model represented a shift from the Warren Court two-tiered standard of
analysis and a return to the traditional or old equal protection standard. 2
However, unlike the old equal protection standard, the Burger Court, and
especially Justice Powell, will not hypothesize a governmental interest to
tion of the fourth amendment does not affect one's guilt or innocence, allowing habeas corpus
appeals on the basis of a fourth amendment violation has been unjustified.
70. 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976). This reversed Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969),
which had originally given the right of appeal by habeas corpus petition to state prisoners.
For an analysis of the Stone v. Powell holding see Boyte, Federal Habeas Corpus After Stone
v. Powell: A Remedy Only for the Arguably Innocent?, 11 U. RICH. L. REv. 291 (1976).
1. See generally Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolv-
ing Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV.
1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther]; Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under
the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62
GEO. L.J. 1071 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Nowak]; Yackle, Thoughts on Rodriguez: Mr.
Justice Powell and the Demise of Equal Protection Analysis in the Supreme Court, 9 U. RICH.
L. REV. 181 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Yackle]; Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, the Equal
Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945 (1975).
See also San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 102-03 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
2. Traditional equal protection review required a substantial relationship between the
legislative classification and the legislative purpose. However, this requirement received little
more than "lip service." "[E]xtreme deference to imaginable supporting facts and conceiv-
able legislative purposes was characteristic of the 'hands off' attitude of the old equal pro-
tection." Gunther, supra note 1, at 21. Characteristic of the old equal protection was F.S.
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920). See generally Tussman & tenBroek, The
Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341 (1949).
In contrast, the Warren Court developed a two-tiered standard of review with the results
determined by the selection of an appropriate standard. If the interest affected was funda-
mental (those interests associated with the political process, interstate travel or the judicial
process) or the classification was suspect (based on race or national origin) the government
was required to show: (1) Its interest was compelling, not merely legitimate; (2) the class was
necessary and not merely rational; (3) there was a less restrictive alternative; (4) the statute
was narrowly tailored and (5) the public interest involved outweighed the detriment to the
individual. This test was always fatal to the governmental interest.
The second tier was the traditional "hands off" minimum rationality. This standard of
review was applied when there were neither fundamental interests nor suspect classifications
involved. This "hands off" standard was especially deferential when the classification in-
volved an economic regulation. See generally Gunther, supra note 1; Developments in the
Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
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support a classification 3 but will demand that the governmental interest
be obvious or articulated. Also, the Court will demand a factual showing
that the classification be rationally related to the legislative purpose. In
his opinions, Justice Powell has determined rationality by the use of a
case-by-case balancing approach. This flexible standard of review has be-
come more and more an abandonment of the rigid two-tiered equal protec-
tion standard of review, where minimum rationality was "minimal scru-
tiny in theory and virtually none in fact," and strict scrutiny "'strict' in
theory and fatal in fact."4
An example of this form of review is McGinnis v. Royster,5 in which
Justice Powell stated the test which was to be the basis of his equal protec-
tion decisions, including, to some extent, those involving a suspect class.'
In McGinnis, Justice Powell conceded that the statute drew a distinction,7
yet held that the groupings only required some rational basis to sustain
them.8 He stated:
We do not wish to inhibit state experimental classifications in a practical and
troublesome area, but inquire only whether the challenged distinction ration-
ally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose.9
The formulation stated was the traditional equal protection analysis,
but with an added element-the word articulated. As Justice Powell
stated in his opinion, "the Court supplied no imaginary basis or purpose
for this . . . scheme."'" It relied on the articulated state purpose to find
that the differentiation was rational. The fact that the purpose relied
upon, rehabilitation,1' was only a secondary purpose was not important in
Justice Powell's view. He emphasized that it is not for the Court to pick
3. Compare McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973), with Railway Express Agency v.
New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
4. Gunther, supra note 1, at 8. Accord, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also Craig v. Boren, 45 U.S.L.W. 4057, 4063 n.* (U.S. Dec. 7,
1976).
5. 410 U.S. 263 (1973). State prisoners incarcerated in county jails prior to sentencing were
denied good-time credit, whereas those incarcerated in state prisons prior to sentencing were
given full credit.
6. See generally Yackle, supra note 1, at 213 n.164.
7. 410 U.S. at 268.
8. Id. at 270. See also Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417 (1974). In Marshall, treat-
ment for narcotics addiction was being denied to addicts with two or more felony convictions.
Nonetheless, the Court found the denial of such treatment to be rationally related to Con-
gress' determination that such addicts were less susceptible to rehabilitation.
9. 410 U.S. at 270 (emphasis added).
10. Id. at 277.
11. Id.
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and choose legislative objectives, but to sustain the regulation as long as
some legitimate state interest was advanced.'2
Throughout the remainder of this section in the discussions concerning
suspect classifications and neutral classifications, it will be shown that
Justice Powell has demanded that there be an obvious or articulated state
interest to support any statutory classification; that once such an interest
has been shown, it has been weighed against the individual's interests; that
the result of this balancing has determined whether the means-the
statutory classification-was rationally related to the articulated legiti-
mate state purpose. This scrutiny has been purely means oriented 3 and
has not entailed the ends scrutiny reminiscent of the era of Lochner v. New
York.' 4 Also shown will be that, although the questions in all of Justice
Powell's decisions in this section have concerned equal protection, the
analyses have been, to a large extent, grounded in substantive due process
and the results have been a combination of both, mixed with a bit of
fundamental fairness.
The test articulated in McGinnis has been utilized consistently through-
out Justice Powell's opinion. It has been relied upon more and more in
recent years by other members of the Supreme Court when there has been
a fourteenth amendment equal protection claim or a fifth amendment due
process claim alleging discrimination by the federal government.
B. SUSPECT CLASSIFICATIONS
1. Alienage
The pre-Burger Court had held that classifications based on race' 5 and
national origin'" were inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scru-
tiny. In Graham v. Richardson,'7 the Burger Court added alienage to the
12. Id. at 276. See generally Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 96 S. Ct. 2488 (1976). Here
the Court, in an opinion by Justice Powell, sustained a requirement that out-of-state junk
processors produce a Maryland motor vehicle certificate of title before they could collect a
bounty for junk hulks, because the statute was rationally related to an obvious state interest
in removing auto hulks from Maryland's landscape.
13. See generally Gunther, supra note 1; Yackle supra note 1.
14. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). With an ends scrutiny analysis, the Court decided which legislative
ends were legitimate. On the basis of what appeared to be the prevailing economic theory of
the day, many economic regulations were invalidated under the due process clause. Accord,
id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
15. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). Cf.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
16. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
17. 403 U.S. 365 (1971). The Court held invalid a state law denying welfare benefits to
anyone not a United States citizen, and, if an alien, benefits were denied unless one had
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list of suspect classifications. Graham held aliens to be a prime example
of a "discrete and insular" minority"8 for whom a heightened judicial
scrutiny was appropriate. This heightened scrutiny required the state to
show a compelling justification for the classification.
In In re Griffiths,"5 the Court, through Justice Powell, held unconstitu-
tional a state law denying aliens admission to the state bar. Relying on
Graham's holding that alienage was inherently suspect, Justice Powell
stated that a statute which contains a suspect classification "bears a heavy
burden of justification."2 To meet this burden, a state was required by
Justice Powell to show that its interests were "both constitutionally per-
missible and substantial, and that its use of the classification is 'necessary
. . .to the accomplishment' of its purpose or the safeguarding of its inter-
est."'" In a footnote,22 he explained that "substantial" could be substituted
for "overriding, '2 "compelling" 4 or "important."2 Although, these were
all words of the Warren Court's strict scrutiny level of review, Justice
Powell, unlike members of the Warren Court, actually examined the
state's asserted interest and weighed it against the individual interest at
stake. 2 Indeed, Justice Powell did not limit the Court's future review of
resided in this country for several years. The statute was invalid under the equal protection
clause and because of Congress' plenary powers over immigration and naturalization under
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. See, e.g, Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948);
Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
18. 403 U.S. at 372. See United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4
(1938).
19. 413 U.S. 717 (1973). The same day the Court decided Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S.
634 (1973), which held unconstitutional a state statute which had denied employment in the
New York Civil Service to anyone who was not a United States citizen. The flat ban could
not be sustained. Yet, the Court did not hold that a person may never be discharged because
he is an alien. A statute embodying "legitimate state interests that relate to qualifications
for a particular position or to the characteristics of the employee" could be upheld. Id. at 646-
47. See also Note, Wandering Between Two Worlds: Employment Discrimination Against
Aliens, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 355 (1976); Comment, The Constitutionality of Employment Re-
strictions on Resident Aliens in the United States, 24 BUFFALO L. REv. 211 (1975); 39 Mo. L.
Rsv. 241 (1974).
20. 413 U.S. at 721, quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
21. 413 U.S. at 721-22 (footnotes omitted). In a footnote, Justice Powell explained that an
intent to discriminate was not a constitutionally permissible purpose. Id. at 722 n.8.
22. Id. at 722 n.9.
23. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
24. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375 (1971).
25. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972).
26. Justice Powell closely examined the state's articulated purpose of determining the
character and general fitness of a member of the bar. However, there was no question of
Griffiths' character and fitness. The sole reason for her exclusion was that she was an alien.
Weighed against her interest in the right to work, the state was unable to carry the burden
of justification.
[Vol. 11:335
BALANCED JUSTICE
statutory classifications of aliens to an inflexible standard where the gov-
ernment's interest, not only would never be sufficiently substantial, but
would not even be considered. However, this past term the Supreme Court
in two cases refused to extend the doctrine of Griffiths or Sugarman v.
DougaU127 to the federal government because of Congress' paramount power
over immigration and naturalization.2s
In dealing with the suspect classification of alienage, the Burger Court
will apply a strict scrutiny. However, it appears that this scrutiny is more
a balancing test as used by Justice Powell in Griffiths, than the strict
scrutiny of the Warren Court and its predictable death blow to the classifi-
cation. This is so because the Court will actually consider the governmen-
tal interests involved and, as seen in the two most recent cases, the classifi-
cation may survive due to the weight of these interests.
2. Race-School Desegregation
The cases following Brown v. Board of Education2 did not question the
constitutional mandate to eliminate segregation, but considered instead
what remedies were appropriate for dismantling dual systems." For south-
ern urban schools, massive busing became the solution.3' However, the
cases mandating this remedy have all dealt with school systems that his-
torically have maintained dual systems through which state and local
officials had purposefully engaged in discrimination.3 2 Consequently, the
southern school cases were limited by their facts. They did not answer the
question as to whether a remedy existed for segregated districts where
there had been no showing of an intent to discriminate.33 It appeared as
27. See note 19 supra.
28. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8. In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 96 S. Ct. 1895 (1976), the Court
rejected the notion that all resident aliens may be arbitrarily subjected to substantive rules
different than those applied to citizens by any agency of the national government. Id. at 1904.
However, the Court did recognize the national interest in flexibility of foreign affairs.
In Mathews v. Diaz, 96 S. Ct. 1883 (1976), the Court upheld a congressional requirement
that in order to be eligible for welfare benefits an alien must have been legally admitted, have
been a resident continuously for five years and have been admitted for permanent residence.
29. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
30. 52 N.C.L. REv. 431 (1973). See Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968), where
freedom of choice was found to be an ineffective tool in the abolition of a segregated system.
The school board was charged with an affirmative duty to formulate an immediate solution.
31. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), authorized the use
of busing within reasonable limits of time and distance, along with the grouping of noncontig-
uous school zones as permissible tools of desegregation.
32. See Amak, Milliken v. Bradley: The Meaning of the Constitution in School Desegrega-
tion Cases, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 349, 357 (1975).
33. See generally Comment, Keyes v. School District No. 1: Unlocking the Northern
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though the answer would come in Keyes v. School District No. 1,11 but the
majority searched for and found an intent to discriminate on the part of
the school board.
Justice Powell, concurring in part and dissenting in part, addressed
himself to two issues of the majority's opinion. He first attacked the con-
tinued use of the de facto-de jure distinction and the failure of the majority
to pronounce a uniform desegregation rule of national, not just regional,
application. The de facto-de jure distinction, in his view, had resulted in
a lack of progress towards integration of nonsouthern schools which did not
have a history of purposeful segregation.35 While the majority had looked
to the cause of segregation, Justice Powell wanted the Court to look at the
effect. In all major cities, the housing and migratory patterns were such
that the segregation of schools was seldom the result of official action.36
Justice Powell stated that where a segregated school existed, a prima
facie case of intent should be found and the burden should be placed on
the school board, because of its affirmative duty to promote integration,
to demonstrate that they had operated a genuinely integrated school."7
The second major issue addressed was the Court's remedy. The lower
federal courts had been reading Swann as requiring massive busing to
achieve maximum desegregation." Justice Powell called for a flexible rem-
edy that would balance the quest for desegregation with the competing
community interest in neighborhood education. He would not completely
prohibit court-ordered busing but would require that greater respect be
given the legitimate community interest in neighborhood schools.3 9 This
Schoolhouse Doors, 9 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIV. L. L. REV. 124 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Unlocking].
34. 413 U.S. 189 (1973). Without questioning the de jure-de facto distinction, Justice
Brennan set forth criteria that would facilitate a finding of de jure discrimination in northern
areas without a background of state-mandated segregation. First, if the plaintiff could show
that the school authorities had carried out a systematic program of segregation affecting a
substantial proportion of the students, school, teachers and facilities, absent a showing that
the system was divided into unrelated districts, the court was authorized to find the system
a dual system and invoke the remedies of Swann. Second, if an intent to segregate was found
in one area of the school district, it was proof of intent to segregate in the other areas of that
district which would result in a district-wide remedy.
35. Id. at 218-19. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 3-5 (1971).
36. 413 U.S. at 222-23. For the Court to determine the cause of segregation, it would have
to look for a subjective intent to segregate. The elimination of the de jure-de facto distinction
would establish an objective national test. Justice Powell saw no basis for the Court to look
to the effect in Virginia, as it did in Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972),
and then look to the cause in Colorado. 413 U.S. at 231.
37. 413 U.S. at 224. See Unlocking, supra note 33, at 145-46.
38. 413 U.S. 237-38. See note 31 supra for a discussion of Swann.
39. Id. at 251.
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opinion represented an endeavor by Justice Powell to find a result that was
fundamentally fair.
Since Keyes, the de facto-de jure distinction has persisted. In Milliken
v. Bradley,45 a multidistrict remedy ordered by a lower federal court was
overruled because there had been no showing of purposeful or intentional
segregation in any of the effected districts other than the one district where
the segregation was found. Even if the Court had applied Justice Powell's
opinion in Keyes and had looked to the effect, the results may not have
been different because of Justice Powell's strong emphasis on the people's
interest in neighborhood schools." Last term in Pasadena City Board of
Education v. Spangler,4" a year-by-year review by a lower federal court of
Pasadena's school system was found to be beyond the authority of the
district court. Once the city had remedied the past de jure discrimination,
the school system could not be subjected to future scrutiny, absent a new
showing of an intent to discriminate. To have followed Justice Powell's
decision in Keyes may have, in this case, put an affirmative duty on the
school board to run an integrated school system. However, the standard
Justice Powell stated in Keyes was a balancing test. Furthermore
[an integrated school system does not mean -and indeed could not mean
in view of the residential patterns of most of our major metropolitan areas-
that every school must in fact be an integrated unit . 3
Another recent case where the Court examined an intent or purpose to
discriminate was Washington v. Davis." The Court in Washington stated
that simply because a law had a racially disproportionate impact did not
make it unconstitutional without a showing of a racially discriminatory
purpose.45 The Court, referring to Keyes, emphasized the need for an intent
40. 418 U.S. 17 (1974). The lower federal court had ordered a multidistrict remedy after a
finding of de jure segregation in one school district. The Supreme Court held that the remedy
exceeded the wrong. Id. at 744-45.
41. 413 U.S. at 240. "Where desegregation steps are possible within the framework of a
system of 'neighborhood education,' school authorities must pursue them." Id.
42. 96 S. Ct. 2697 (1976). The school board sought relief from a 1970 district court order
that there were to be no schools with a majority of minority students. The school board had
complied, but failure to restructure the school district each year to compensate for shifts in
population had resulted in nonliteral compliance with the lower court's order.
43. 413 U.S. at 226-27.
44. 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976). The District of Columbia Police Department required all appli-
cants to pass a written personnel test. Based on results of this test, a disproportionately high
number of black applicants were denied employment. For an analysis of the case see 11 U.
RICH. L. REV. 209 (1976).
45. Id. at 2047.
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or purpose to segregate."6 Justice Powell voted with the majority in
Washington as he had in Milliken and Pasadena. While his vote in
Washington is difficult to reconcile with his Keyes opinion, possibly his
vote with the majority can be explained because of the difference in subject
matter. Perhaps it was because the law was neutral on its face and had
only a disproportionate impact and for the Court to have held such a law
unconstitutional would have had a grave impact on tax, welfare, public
employment and licensing statutes." It is possible, also, that he voted with
the majority because the verbal personnel tests were rationally related to
the state's interest in having police officers with certain minimum verbal
skills.
3. Conclusion
The area of suspect classification scrutiny is an example of the Burger
Court's shift from the rigid levels of scrutiny of the Warren Court. ' , The
scrutiny is still intensive, but not necessarily fatal to the classification.
This has been true because the Court has been willing, as in Griffiths, to
consider the interests of all parties, even though the state has continued
to carry a heavy burden. Further evidence of this desire to maintain flexi-
bility has been the Court's refusal to add to the list of suspect classifica-
tions since Graham.9 However, in the area of race, flexibility, although
advocated by Justice Powell in Keyes, has not been the standard, since no
remedy has been provided regardless of the hardship involved, without a
showing of intent to discriminate.
C. NEUTRAL CLASSIFICATIONS
1. Sex-Based Classifications"
Not until 1971 in Reed v. Reed 5' was a gender-based classification de-
46. Id. at 2049.50. Accord, Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Devel.
Corp., 45 U.S.L.W. 4073 (U.S. Jan. 11, 1977).
47. Id. at 2051-52. See also Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: Constitutional and
Empirical Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 275, 300 (1972), as cited in 96 S. Ct. at 2052 n.14.
48. Gunther suggested that there was a growing discontent with the Warren Court two-
tiered standard of review even in 1972. Gunther, supra note 1, at 12.
49. Not only has the Court not created many new suspect classifications, it has refused to
recognize new fundamental interests which also had triggered strict scrutiny by the Warren
Court. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). For further
discussion on the nature of a suspect class and what may constitute a fundamental right, see
notes 97-103 infra and accompanying text.
50. See generally Nowak, supra note 1. These "neutral" classifications have included sex,
illegitimacy and wealth.
51. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Reed held a state statute which gave preference to males over
females as administrators unconstitutional.
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clared to be unconstitutional. Prior to Reed, the Court had generally ap-
plied a "hands off" rational basis test to all sex-based classifications.52 But
even today, "the Court [has] never developed a principled basis for de-
terminging what sorts of governmentally-ordered discriminations are sex-
based," nor has the Court ever "reached [a] consensus on the mode of
equal protection or due process analysis that should be applied to gender-
based discrimination."53
This lack of consensus is readily ascertainable by examining three cases.
In Reed, the Court applied the traditional rational basis test of F.S.
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia54 and inquired if the statutory classification
had a fair and substantial relation to the governmental interest. In Stanley
v. Illinois,55 the Court used the due process, irrebuttable presumption stan-
dard of review to overturn a state statute. In 1973, in Frontiero v.
Richardson,"8 four Justices, 57 without relying on either precedent, at-
tempted to add sex to the list of suspect classifications.58
52. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), where the Court upheld a statute
forbidding a woman to be a bartender unless she was the wife or daughter of the barkeeper;
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), where the Court upheld a statute prescribing a maxi-
mum workday for women. Cf. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled,
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), in which the Court invalidated laws
setting minimum wages for women because the legislation interfered with the liberty of
contract.
53. Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court-1975, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 235
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Johnston]. See generally Lombard, Sex: A Classification in
Search of Strict Scrutiny, 21 WAYNE L. REV. 1355 (1975); Comment, The Supreme Court 1974
Term and Sex-Based Classifications: Avoiding a Standard of Review, 19 ST. Louis U.L.J. 375
(1975).
54. 253 U.S. 412 (1920). See also note 2 supra.
55. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). The state statute in question presumed that an unmarried father
was unfit to take custody of his children and denied him a hearing to prove his fitness.
56. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). A federal statute required a female member of the armed services
to demonstrate that her husband was dependent upon her for more than half of his expenses;
however, it was presumed that the wife of a serviceman was dependent upon her husband
for more than half of her living expenses. The Court relied on the equal protection element
of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. See also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954).
57. These four were Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall and White. Justice Brennan in
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), did not invoke the suspect class standard
review; in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), Justice White also departed from the
suspect classification analysis; Justice Douglas had been the first to retreat from this position
in Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). Contra, Mathews v. Lucas, 96 S. Ct. 2755 (1976),
where Justice Blackmun, who had joined Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Frontiero,
placed sex next to race as a classification which carries an obvious badge of discrimination.
Id. at 2762. See Johnston, supra note 53, at 238.
58. It is questionable if the plurality really did apply the strict scrutiny level of review.
They stated that the statutory classification could not be supported "solely for the purpose
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Justice Powell concurred in the Court's results but not in its opinion in
Frontiero, because of the "far reaching implications of such a holding.""5
Reed had not added sex to the list of suspect claims and to Justice Powell
Reed was controlling. In Frontiero, as in Reed, Justice Powell would have
demanded a showing that the classification was substantially related to
the government's purpose of providing benefits for dependents of uni-
formed service personnel. 0 He would have weighed the government's inter-
est in administrative convenience against the statutory classification.
It appeared that Justice Powell's reluctance to designate sex as suspect
may have resulted from a justifiable fear that such action would commit
the Court to an inflexible compelling interest test in all future litigation
involving gender classifications." To Justice Powell, the rational basis test
of Reed was sufficient to overturn the regulation, therefore, declaring sex
suspect was unnecessary.
In Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur," the Court again returned
to its "irrebuttable presumption" analysis and held that school board regu-
lations concerning pregnancy leave created an irrebuttable presumption
that interfered with matters of marriage and family life, one of the liberties
protected by the due process clause. 3
Justice Powell again concurred in the Court's result but not with its
opinion." The Court's use of the irrebuttable presumption analysis of
of achieving administrative convenience .... " 411 U.S. at 690. This appears merely to be
a more rigorous application of the old minimum rationality test. See generally Nowak, supra
note 1, at 1081-82. This standard of review has been called by Nowak "the demonstrable basis
standard." It required the state to demonstrate a factual relationship between a state's
interest, capable of sustaining the analysis, and the means chosen to advance that interest.
In Frontiero, the state's interest of administrative convenience did not withstand analysis.
59. 411 U.S. at 691-92. Justice Powell also preferred to delay any addition of sex to the
group of suspect classes because of the pending adoption of the equal rights amendment to
the United States Constitution which would resolve the dispute without preempting a major
political decision. Id. at 692.
60. Id.
61. Nowak, supra note 1, at 1079.
62. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
63. 414 U.S. at 639, 648. The school board compelled a teacher to quit her job several
months before the expected birth of her child and prohibited a return to work until three
months after childbirth. In a footnote, Justice Powell stated that he did not reach the question
of whether these regulations involved sex classifications or disability classifications. Id. at 653
n.2 (Powell, J., concurring). Accord, Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). See generally
Comment, Geduldig v. Aiello: Pregnancy Classifications and the Definition of Sex Discrimi-
nation, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 441 (1975). Accord, General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 45 U.S.L.W.
4031 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1976).
64. One basis for Justice Powell's disfavor with the majority opinion was that, although
the regulation added burdens to childbearing, Congress had a similar right in its ability to
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Stanley appeared to trouble Justice Powell because of the implications of
the doctrine to the traditional legislative power to classify. 5 Justice Powell
felt that the Court should have applied an equal protection analysis, since
the constitutional difficulty was with the irrational classification, not with
the board's decision to classify. 6
In determining this irrationality, Justice Powell examined the govern-
mental interest to be served and how this interest was promoted by the
classification. His analysis was a rigorous rational basis standard of review.
He pointed out that the legislative objectives (the "ends") were legitimate,
but that they were not furthered by the statutory classification (the
"means").7 Hence, the statute was violative of the equal protection clause.
Since LaFleur, the Court has decided several cases challenging sex-
based classifications. In each case, the results have depended upon
whether the classification had perpetuated past discrimination" or
whether it was benign and viewed by the Court as a remedy for past
discrimination. 9 One case in which past discrimination was perpetuated
was Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld.0° The majority, however, did not specify a
limit tax deductions in order to discourage excessive population growth. He cited Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), to illustrate his point. 411 U.S. at 651. In that case, the
Congress had placed a $250 per month limit on welfare benefits regardless of family size.
65. 414 U.S. at 652.
66. Id. As pointed out in note 63 supra, Justice Powell did not treat this as a sex classifica-
tion, yet he applied the same test as though it had been. The implication seems to be that,
in the view of Justice Powell, this rigorous rational basis test is applicable to almost any equal
protection claim.
67. In fact, Justice Powell determined that the asserted interest in continuity of teaching
was actually hindered by the cut-off date. Id. at 654.
68. See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975), where a state statute which distin-
guished between the ages of majority for males and females could not survive an equal
protection attack under any test. See also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), where a
law which excluded women from jury duty unless they submitted a written declaration of
their desire to serve was held in violation of the sixth amendment because a jury without
women could not be a representative cross section of the community. For more discussion of
Stanton, see 7 TEx. TECH. U.L. REv. 161 (1975). See also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 689 n.22 (1973), where the Court identified various statutes as placing additional disad-
vantages on women.
69. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), which upheld a congressional
mandate for discharge of male Navy officers who twice were passed over for promotion;
whereas, female officers were guaranteed at least thirteen years service before mandatory
discharge. See also Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), which upheld a Florida statute that
gave a property tax exemption to widows but not widowers.
70. 420 U.S. 636 (1975). A husband-father challenged the Social Security Act which paid
benefits to a widow and the couple's minor child based on the earnings of the deceased father
and husband but denied benefits to a widower after the death of the wife and mother wage-
earner. The majority found that the gender-based differentiation resulted in less protection
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test,7' but it did apply a relatively high level of scrutiny, 2 making the
opinion an excellent example of the Court's use of Justice Powell's tech-
nique of examining the government's objectives and then determining if
these objectives had been substantially furthered by the statutory classifi-
cation.
It is obvious that neither Justice Powell nor a majority of the Court will
apply the strict scrutiny-compelling interest test to classifications based
on sex. "It is equally clear, however, that the Court is serious about exam-
ining the governmental interest asserted in support of statutes and regula-
tions that discriminate on the basis of sex. 7 3 Exactly what standard of
review the Court will decide on is still not settled. This past term in Turner
v. Department of Employment,74 the Court returned to the irrebuttable
presumption analysis of LaFleur and Stanley in a per curiam decision.
However, it appears from a majority of the cases that, whichever form of
analysis is utilized, Justice Powell and the Court will apply a more intense
rational basis test than did the Warren Court.
2. Illegitimacy
Unlike sex-based classifications, the standard of equal protection review
seems to have been determined for statutes affecting illegitimates. In the
1968 cases of Levy v. Louisiana5 and Glona v. American Guarantee &
Liability Insurance Co.,7" it appeared as though the Warren Court had
for the families of women wage-earners than was afforded families of men wage-earners. Id.
at 645.
The Wiesenfeld opinion suggests the Court's readiness to look beneath the surface
of 'benign' or 'compensatory' rationalizations, and to strike classifications based on
the notion that social roles are prescribed by sex, that woman's first job is wife and
mother, man's, doctor, lawyer or Indian chief.
Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. CINN. L. REV. 1, 14 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Ginsburg].
71. Johnston, supra note 53, at 256. Justice Powell concurred in the result, but disagreed
as to where the discrimination took place.
72. See generally 5 N. MEx. L. REV. 335 (1975).
73. Johnson, supra note 53, at 261.
74. 96 S. Ct. 249 (1975). A Utah statute made pregnant women ineligible for unemploy-
ment benefits during a period from twelve weeks before expected birth to six weeks after
childbirth.
75. 391 U.S. 68 (1968). A Louisiana wrongful death statute that barred unacknowledged
illegitimate children from recovering for the death of their mother was held to be unconstitu-
tional.
76. 391 U.S. 73 (1968). A Louisiana wrongful death statute that barred a mother from
recovering for the death of her unacknowledged illegitimate child was found to be unconstitu-
tional.
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added illegitimacy to the list of suspect classes.7 Then, in Labine v.
Vincent,"5 decided in 1971, an illegitimacy classification was sustained. In
Glona, the Court had stated a rational basis test; in Labine the Court
applied it. However, in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,"9 because
a total deprivation had been suffered, Justice Powell held that Levy, where
a total deprivation had also been suffered, and not Labine,80 controlled.',
After Weber, the Court decided all challenges to classifications dealing
with illegitimates on the basis of that case.8 2 However, this term in
77. When these two cases were decided, there were only two levels of review, strict and
minimum. Since the statutes had not withstood the attack, it was assumed, in 1968, that
strict scrutiny had been applied. Note, Illegitimacy and Equal Protection, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv.
479, 482 (1974).
78. 401 U.S. 532 (1971). A Louisiana intestate succession statute subordinated the claims
of an acknowledged illegitimate child to the claims of legitimate children in the sharing of
their father's estate. The Court in Labine distinguished Levy and Glona as being based on
tort, id. at 535, whereas Labine dealt with the state's interest in disposition of property left
within the state. Id. at 536 n.6.
The Court in Glona had found that there was no rational basis for prohibiting a mother
from recovering for the wrongful death of her son. 391 U.S. at 74-75. The statute in Labine
was found to have a rational basis. 401 U.S. at 536. Unlike Levy, the state in Labine had not
created an insurmountable obstacle to the illegitimate child. The father could leave a will,
marry the mother or legitimize the child.
79. 406 U.S. 164 (1972). Louisiana's Workmen's Compensation laws relegated unacknow-
ledged illegitimates to the position of other dependents, allowing recovery only if the legiti-
mate and acknowledged illegitimate children did not exhaust the maximum compensation
benefits awarded.
80. The children in Weber could not have been acknowledged by the father because Louis-
iana prohibited the acknowledgment of children whose parents were unable to marry. In
Levy, whether the child was acknowledged or unacknowledged he could not recover. In
Labine, the father could easily have changed the status of his illegitimate daughter.
81. In Weber, Justice Powell articulated a test which would seem to have applicability to
all equal protection cases.
[This Court requires, at a minimum, that a statutory classification bear some ra-
tional relation to a legitimate state purpose . . . . Though the latitude given state
economic and social regulation is necessarily broad, when state statutory classifica-
tions approach sensitive and fundamental personal rights, this Court exercises a
stricter scrutiny.
406 U.S. at 172 (citations omitted). (The omitted citations are both minimum rationality and
strict scrutiny cases.) This test, although very similar to traditional equal protection scrutiny,
is in essence a balancing test-the interests of the state versus the interests of the individual.
Weber has also given a clear indication that, when a complete deprivation has occurred,
the Court will apply a stricter scrutiny, for three articulated state interests were held to be
outweighed in importance by the damage to the individual. The state claimed an interest in
1) legitimate family relationships; 2) preventing false claims and 3) administrative conveni-
ence. 406 U.S. at 173-74. See generally Note, Illegitimacy and Equal Protection, 49 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 479 (1974).
Not to be ignored in this balancing is the sense of fundamental fairness that has permeated
this and many other of Justice Powell's opinions:
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Mathews v. Lucas83 the Court, distinguishing earlier cases, relied on
Labine, the only case dealing with illegitimates which had upheld the
statutory classification to uphold a classification based on illegitimacy. 4
The Court flatly disagreed with the lower court's holding that illegitimacy
was suspect,85 but also stated that the scrutiny to be employed was "not a
toothless one."8
The standard of scrutiny which the Court will employ when analyzing
illegitimacy-based classifications seems to be settled by Mathews. Based
on Justice Powell's dual-inquiry balancing test, such a classification will
be upheld only when the individual's interest does not outweigh the gov-
ernment's interest. This analysis will be means-focused, as in all of Justice
Powell's equal protection opinions, with the Court closely examining the
government's purpose to see if it is substantially furthered by the statutory
classification.
3. Wealth
A wealth classification by itself cannot support an equal protection
claim, but coupled with a fundamental interest the Court will scrutinize
[I]mposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our
system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility
or wrongdoing.
406 U.S. at 175.
82. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 629 (1974), where the Court held unconstitutional a
provision which denied disability insurance benefits to afterborn illegitimates, since the pri-
mary purpose was to provide support for dependents (not simply legitimate dependents) of
disabled wage earners. The government's interest in preventing spurious claims was held
insufficient. See New Jersey Welfare Rights Org'n v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973) (per curiam),
where a program which denied health benefits to illegitimates because the parents were not
married was overturned. See also Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (per curiam), which
held that once a state has granted a judicially enforceable right on behalf of children to
support from their natural father, there could be no constitutionally-sufficient justification
for denying such an essential right to illegitimate children.
83. 96 S. Ct. 2755 (1976). The Social Security Act presumed the dependency of legitimate
children and denied benefits to any illegitimate child who could not prove dependency on
the father at the time of his death.
84. Id. at 2762.
85. Id. at 2761-62.
86. Id. at 2764. The Court scrutinized the government's claim that the classification would
prevent spurious claims and found the interest substantial. In Weber, this governmental
interest, although substantial, was not sufficient. However, it was found to be sufficient in
this case. The difference probably can be found in the differing weight accorded the interest
of the individual in the balancing process. In Weber, there was a complete deprivation, while
in Mathews the deprivation was not complete since the child needed only to have rebutted
the presumption to get the same benefits as a legitimate child.
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the claim more closely."7 In his first term, Justice Powell, in James v.
Strange,"8 was faced with the claim that a state recoupment statute inter-
fered with the constitutional right to counsel in felony cases. 8 Instead of
deciding the claim on sixth amendment grounds, Justice Powell declared
the statute to be unconstitutional under the equal protection clause."
The standard of review applied was more stringent than the old mini-
mum rationality and almost identical to the standard of review for classifi-
cations based on illegitimacy. Justice Powell closely examined the state's
interest in recouping expended funds and found this interest to be impor-
tant.' However, there was no articulated state purpose for the difference
in treatment accorded indigents, as opposed to other judgment creditors,"
and Justice Powell did not infer a purpose which could have supported the
classification. Therefore, the means used to ensure recoupment (affording
less protection to indigent defendants) were not rationally related to the
state's purpose of recouping money spent. Moreover, an element of fairness
was noticeable throughout the opinion. There was constant reference to
"harsh conditions," "hardship," "discourages the search for self-
sufficiency," "denying him the means to keep himself and his family
afloat," and Justice Powell characterized the statute as punitive and
discriminatory. 3
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,94 wealth dis-
87. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa Cty., 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (right to travel inter-
state); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote); Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to counsel on first appeal as of right). See also Clune,
Wealth Discrimination in School Finance, 68 NEv. U.L. REv. 651, 655 (1973).
88. 407 U.S. 128 (1972). A state statute provided for the recovery of counsel and other legal
fees from the indigent defendant in a subsequent civil proceeding.
89. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to counsel on first appeal as of
right); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth amendment right to counsel in all
felony cases). See also Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (Douglas not extended to discretion-
ary appeals); Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974) (state's recoupment statute held constitu-
tional).
90. 407 U.S. at 140-41.
91. Id. at 141.
92. Id. at 135. The indigent's wages could be garnished without limit. His clothes, books
and tools were not exempt. Even his food, fuel, clothing and family burial plot could be
attached. None of these items could be taken from other judgment creditors.
93. Yackle, supra note 1, at 212. Yackle has compared Justice Powell's search for fairness
in equal protection with Justice Harlan's "eloquent defense of the notions of fundamental
fairness he found embodied in due process." Id. at 210.
94. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). See generally Morgan & Yudof, Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indepen-
dent School District: Gathering the Ayes of Texas-The Politics of School Finance Reform,
38 L. & CONTEMP. PROs. 383, 402 (1974); Richards, Equal Opportunity and School Financing:
Towards a Moral Theory of Constitutional Adjudication, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 32 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Richards].
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crimination was again the issue. However, it was not coupled with a pre-
viously declared fundamental right but with education,95 which at that
time was a close candidate for inclusion in the list of fundamental rights.
The challengers hoped that the combination of the two would be sufficient
to overturn the Texas system of school financing."
Writing for the majority, Justice Powell first determined that wealth, at
least on the facts in the case, was not a suspect classification. This deter-
mination was predicated on the fact that, although some forms of wealth
discrimination may have occurred,97 none of the forms of discrimination
was against an identifiable class.9" The group was not identifiable since
there was "reason to believe that the poorest families are not necessarily
clustered in the poorest property districts."99 Nor was there an absolute
deprivation of the desired benefit,' 0 since "at least where wealth is in-
95. The system of school financing in Texas was very complex. The discrimination com-
plained of had arisen from the fact that a school district was required to reimburse the state
for twenty percent of its expenditures for schooling in the district. Any amount raised by
property taxes which exceeded the twenty percent could be used by the district to supplement
the state funding of its schools. This gave rise to greater per pupil expenditures in "affluent"
districts than in other districts.
96. The district court found wealth a suspect classification and education was a fundamen-
tal interest. It had also held that on the basis of wealth, the system discriminated in the
manner in which education was provided for its people and required the state to show that
the system was premised upon some compelling state interest. 411 U.S. at 16.
The state admitted the system had "defects" and "imperfections" and that if the compel-
ling interest test was applied, the Texas finance system, as well as virtually every other state
school finance system, would not pass. Id. at 16-17. See generally Richards, supra note 94, at
35.
97. (1) against 'poor' persons . . . who might be characterized as functionally 'indi-
gent,' (2) against those who are relatively poorer than others, (3) against all those who,
irrespective of their personal income, happen to reside in relatively poorer school
districts.
Id. at 19-20.
98. These groups were not a "discrete and insular minority" as found in Graham v. Ri-
chardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). See notes 17-18 supra and accompanying text. Therefore,
there was no way in which the traditional indicia of suspectness, a history of purposeful
unequal treatment and a position of political powerlessness, could exist. 411 U.S. at 28.
99. 411 U.S. at 23.
100. Id. at 19-20. In the text of the opinion, Justice Powell cited several cases to illustrate
this point. In all of the cases cited, there was an absolute denial of a benefit. It is significant
that in all the cases he discussed, the benefit could be linked to a fundamental interest. See,
e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (access to the ballot); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395
(1971) (access to the judicial process). Later in the opinion, Justice Powell said, "this court
has never heretofore held that wealth discrimination alone provides an adequate basis for
invoking strict scrutiny. ... 411 U.S. at 29 (emphasis added). See also Roos, The Potential
Impact of Rodriguez on Other School Reform Litigation, 38 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 566, 578
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Roos].
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volved, the equal protection clause does not require absolute equality or
precisely equal advantages."'"' Justice Powell also rejected the contention
that education was a fundamental right on the basis that the Constitution
had neither expressly nor implicitly guaranteed the right to an educa-
tion.10 Moreover, the facts of the case had not indicated any infringement
on first amendment rights or the right to vote caused by the differentials
in educational opportunities,' 3 therefore these fundamental interests were
not involved.
Since strict scrutiny was not appropriate, Justice Powell turned to the
traditional standard of review "which requires only that the State's system
[of financing education] be shown to bear some rational relationship to
legitimate state purposes."'0 4 Like all of Justice Powell's decisions in this
field, this was more than traditional "hands off" minimum rationality. He
demanded a showing of some articulated state purpose sufficient to relate
to the system of finance used. The articulated state purpose in Rodriguez
was local control.'0 5
The significance of Rodriguez lies in Justice Powell's "thorough and
revealing inquiry into the equal protection doctrine."'0 6 The opinion re-
vealed that to be a suspect classification there must exist an identifiable
class that has suffered a total deprivation of a right. 107 However, the opin-
101. 411 U.S. at 24. See also Yackle, supra note 1, at 217.
102. 411 U.S. at 33. Justice Powell also emphasized that it was not for the Court to create
substantive constitutional rights. What is fundamental is not determined by how important
one interest is as compared with another interest. See Roos, supra note 100, at 567; Yackle,
supra note 1, at 228.
103. Id. at 35-37.
104. 411 U.S. at 40. Justice Powell pointed out that this was really a case questioning a
state's taxing power, an area from which the Court has traditionally stayed clear. Since most
states operate their school finance systems in much the same manner as Texas, for the Court
to overturn the system could have caused chaos and interfered with the system of federalism.
Id. at 40, 56-59.
Furthermore, the case dealt with educational policy, a very complex area where the Court
lacks competence and where legislative judgment should be given respect. Id. at 42.
105. Id. at 53-54. Contra, Nowak, supra note 1, at 1116-17. The Court in Rodriguez never
inquired whether the system in fact bore a rational relation to the state interest which could
withstand analysis.
106. Yackle, supra note 1, at 215.
107. The benefit derived from being a suspect classification has been the fact that the
statutory classification seldom withstood scrutiny. However, as noted in the discussion of
classifications based on alienage (see section m B(1) supra), the Burger Court, even when
dealing with such a classification, will not inevitably strike down the classification. See note
28 supra. This result has occurred because of the balancing form of scrutiny espoused by
Justice Powell. Therefore, since all factors will be evaluated, whether a classification is
suspect or not seems no longer determinative, but simply a factor to be considered along with
all other factors in the particular case.
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ion also revealed that once the determination has been made that a classi-
fication was not suspect, further inquiry would not foreclosed. The interest
of the state would still be weighed against the interest of the individual in
light of what would seem fundamentally fair.
D. CONCLUSION
As in most other areas of the law, the Burger Court has brought to equal
protection scrutiny a flexible standard of review. This tendency has been
accelerated by Justice Powell and his desire to accommodate all inter-
ests.'0 8 Minimum scrutiny of the Warren Court was a complete abdication
to the interests of the state. Strict scrutiny was a complete abdication to
the interests of the individual. The desire of both the Burger Court and
Justice Powell to avoid being locked into these rigid forms of analysis has
caused a definite shift in equal protection analysis from the Warren Court
years.
This shift was best exemplified in Rodriguez. Justice Powell shied away
from creating another suspect class or fundamental interest so as to avoid
being locked into a strict scrutiny form of analysis. Yet, the analysis per-
formed was not minimum rationality review. It was a flexible analysis that
concerned itself with the interests of both the state and the individual with
deference to neither. The fact that the classification was not suspect did
not automatically *affect the result, since the form of analysis in the case,
and seemingly in all current equal protection analysis, did not depend on
the description of the classification but rather on the interests of the par-
ties involved.
VI. FIRST AMENDMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
The language of the first amendment to the United States Constitution'
108. Compare Justice Powell's equal protection analysis with the due process analysis of
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934): "The guaranty of due process. . . demands only
that the law shall not be unreasonable . . . and the means selected shall have a real and
substantial relation to the object sought to be attained." Id. at 525.
1. Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment was made applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis,
J., concurring).
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is plain. However, what this apparently simple set of phrases means has
produced a constant stream of litigation over the last fifty years. It is not
the object of this section to attempt an examination of all facets of first
amendment litigation.' Rather, narrow concerns in broad first amendment
areas have been selected to demonstrate how Justice Powell typically deals
with several important aspects of constitutional concern. For purposes of
analysis, several areas of the first amendment will be examined indepen-
dently with the realization that they are actually greatly intertwined.3
B. FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Included in the area of freedom of speech are many problems, such as
content of speech restrictions, the clash of important governmental inter-
ests with freedom of speech and the problem of the captive audience. To
say that Justice Powell has a comprehensive theory for resolving first
amendment problems would be misleading.4 There are, however, doctrinal
threads that run through his opinions. He has noted many times the im-
portance of freedom of speech in our society. However, he also has been
keenly aware that legitimate governmental interests at times can be so
important that some speech must be curtailed.' To prevent the dominance
by one group of interests, Justice Powell, as he has done in most other
areas, has balanced all the interests so as to find a just solution.7
1. Access to the Public Forum
The streets and sidewalks of every municipality historically have been
appropriate forums for the dissemination of information and the communi-
2. "The lines drawn by the Supreme Court in first amendment cases have always been
wavering and uncertain ones, and it is no easier to say where [the Court] is headed in this
respect than to sum up where the Court stood at any earlier juncture." Howard, Mr. Justice
Powell and the Emerging Nixon Majority, 70 MicH. L. REv. 445, 459 (1972).
3. See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Nimmer, Introduction-Is Freedom of
the Press a Redundancy: What Does It Add To Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639
(1975).
4. Compare Justice Powell's use of overbreadth in Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S.
130 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring), with his suggestion in Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S.
901 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting), that "fighting words" was a broader concept than the
majority recognized.
5. See Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
6. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
7. Justice Powell has often been compared to the late Justice Harlan because of his use of
a balancing methodology in first amendment cases. See generally Gunther, In Search of
Judicial Quality on a Changing Court: the Case of Justice Powell, 24 STAN. L.R. 1001
(1973)[hereinafter cited as Gunther]. Professor Gunther stated that the Harlanesque balanc-
ing approach is one which avoids categorical answers and simplistic rules but which is rich
in sensitive, candid and articulate perceptions of the competing interests. Id. at 1013-14.
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cation of ideas. Individuals cannot be totally banned from exercising their
right of free speech on the ground that title to the property is in the
municipality.' However, restrictions on access to private property have
been treated in a different fashion?
The Warren Court in Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590
v. Logan Valley Plaza10 searched for a means to treat private property the
same as public property so as to prevent the restriction of the union's first
amendment rights. The means derived was to label the property "the
functional equivalent" of a "business block." Although the case indicated
that the Warren Court felt that actions on truly private property would not
give rise to any first amendment rights, the Court did show its preference
for first amendment rights by developing a test that, once fulfilled, over-
came the rights of the property owner.
The Burger Court, beginning with Justice Powell's decision in Lloyd
Corp. v. Tanner,12 has shown much more solicitude for the rights of the
property owner. This solicitude has been manifested by a steady drift away
from the rationale of Logan Valley by according substantial weight to the
rights of an owner of private property. In Lloyd, Logan Valley was sharply
narrowed by the holding that private property was not a public forum,
since the state was not involved in any form with the property.' The
8. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
9. Hudgens v. NLRB, 96 S. Ct. 1029 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
10. 391 U.S. 308 (1968). The case concerned picketing of a store in Logan Valley Plaza
which was a large suburban shopping center with sidewalks and extensive parking facilities
surrounding it. Union members picketed the Weis market in the center. In response to a
request by the owner of the shopping center, a Pennsylvania court enjoined the picketing on
the property of the center. The union sought to attack this injunction as a deprivation of its
first amendment rights. Id.
11. Id. at 325. The Court relied for much of its rationale on Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501 (1946), a case which held that a company-owned town could not deprive a Jehovah's
Witness of her first amendment right to use the sidewalks to distribute handbills just because
the sidewalks were owned by the company. The basis of the holding was that the town, except
for being privately owned, had "all the characteristics of any other American town." 326 U.S.
at 502.
12. 407 U.S. 551 (1972). Vietnam protesters had attempted to pass out handbills criticizing
the war in Southeast Asia in a privately owned shopping mall. Officials of the mall threatened
to have the protesters arrested for trespassing. The protesters departed but later filed suit
for injunctive relief claiming their first amendment rights had been violated. The lower
courts, relying on Logan Valley, held that the mall was depriving these protesters of their
first amendment rights.
13. 407 U.S. at 569. "The Constitution by no means requires such an attenuated doctrine
of dedication of private property to public use." Justice Powell further stated that property
does not lose its private character merely because the public is invited to use it for a specific
purpose. Id.
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finding of a lack of infringement of first amendment rights appeared to be
dictated by the weight of the property interest and the modest intrusion
on first amendment rights." To Justice Powell, any other holding in these
circumstances would have shown an insufficient regard for personal prop-
erty rights.'5
However, the concept that private property with no nexus to the state
could be the equivalent of a public forum in certain circumstances 6 was
fully rejected in Hudgens v. NLRB.17 Justice Stewart held that Logan
Valley had been overruled by Lloyd and that Lloyd had held that first
amendment rights were inapplicable to private property. Justice Powell
seemed to agree with Justice Stewart, 8 although he felt that "the present
case can be distinguishable narrowly from Logan Valley." 9
It now seems that what began in Justice Powell's opinion in Lloyd has
been completed: unless property privately owned has assumed "to some
significant degree the functional attributes of public property devoted to
public use,""0 no first amendment rights are applicable due to the defer-
rence now accorded the rights of property owners.2 Although that much
14. Id. at 568. The intrusion was felt to be modest because the aggrieved parties had
alternative forums available to them and the shopping mall uniformly banned all handbilling.
These factors gave the appearance of a balancing test. Cf. Greer v. Spock, 96 S. Ct. 1211
(1976) (government property) (see discussion infra). Contra, Hudgens v. NLRB, 96 S. Ct.
1029 (1976); Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539 (1972).
15. See Yarbrough, The Burger Court and Freedom of Expression, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
37, 67-71 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Yarbrough].
16. Justice Powell seemed to imply that Logan Valley had validity for protection of first
amendment rights on private property if: 1) the picketing was directly related to the purpose
for which the property was used and 2) no other reasonable opportunity existed for pickets
to communicate their message to their intended audience. 407 U.S. at 563.
17. 96 S. Ct. 1029 (1976).
18. "Upon more mature thought, I have concluded that we would have been wiser in Lloyd
Corp. to have confronted this disharmony rather than draw distinctions based upon rather
attenuated factual differences." Id. at 1039 (Powell, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
Justice Powell came to believe that the great lengths to which he went to distinguish Lloyd
and Logan Valley had not been wise, since the threshold question in both cases was whether
private property would be deemed sufficiently "public" in order that first amendment limita-
tions could be imposed. The narrow ground for decision he attributed to Logan Valley (see
note 16 supra) made little sense in light of his assertion that if state action was not involved,
then the first amendment does not apply.
19. Id. at 1039.
20. Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 547 (1972) (emphasis added).
21. The only deviation has come in labor cases where the right to organize has been
involved. However, these cases were decided on the statutory basis of 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970)
and not on constitutional grounds, since no state action was involved. See Hudgens v. NLBB,
96 S. Ct. 1029 (1976); Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539 (1972). Both cases dealt
with when the employers' private property rights must "yield" to the statutory right given
unions to organize.
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is now settled, the factors that may create attributes of public use may still
be open to question."
Parallel to this evolution in the protection of the rights of owners of
private property have been the questions that have arisen when govern-
ment property maintained for other than public use has been chosen as a
public forum 33 The difficulty has arisen from the fact that the parallel to
privately-owned property has been readily discerned. However, the impor-
tant factor as to first amendment rights missing in the private property
decisions has been present in these situations-state action. To solve this
tension, Justice Powell has treated such property more like public property
than private property, in that first amendment rights have been considered
and weighed against the state's interest. In Greer v. Spock,2 the majority
held that" 'the State, no less than a private owner of property, has power
to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully
dedicated.' ",25 Consequently, no first amendment rights were applicable.
Justice Powell concurred, but only because on balance he felt that the
government's interest outweighed the individual's first amendment inter-
est.
21
Justice Powell has been in the mainstream of the Court's retreat from
expansion of the public forum concept. His disposition of the problem in
Lloyd drew the Court back from expansion of the public forum concept
that had attempted to cover private property held open to the public. As
Greer shows, the Court and Justice Powell will also allow first amendment
activity to be totally banned on government property. However, as opposed
to situations where property privately owned by an individual is involved,
22. See Heneley, Property Rights and First Amendment Rights: Balance and Conflict, 62
A.B.A.J. 77, 80 (1976).
23. See, e.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); cf. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S.
229 (1963). Contra, Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
24. 96 S. Ct. 1211, 1220 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). The commander of Fort Dix, N.J.,
refused permission for minority party presidential candidates to campaign on the base. This
was part of a general policy forbidding all political activity on the base.
25. Id. at 1217, quoting Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966).
26. The factors which caused Justice Powell to find for the government were that the
intrusion into the activity of the military base was significant, since it threatened the long
standing policy of ensuring that the military remains politically neutral. Id. at 1220. Sec-
ondly, alternative forums were available which limited the intrusion. Id.
The use of the alternative forum concept in balancing was reminiscent of Justice Powell's
narrowing of Logan Valley in Lloyd, which seemed to be precluded in Hudgens. See note 16
supra and accompanying text. The question which arises from this is whether Justice Powell
would consider this factor when dealing with private property or is it simply restricted to
property owned by the government. If the former, then private property may not be, in Justice
Powell's view, a complete bar to the application of first amendment rights.
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Justice Powell will show more regard for first amendment freedoms than
the majority by balancing the competing interests.
2. Scurrilous Language
The Supreme Court has had numerous occasions to deal with the prob-
lem of the proscription of speech that contained scurrilous language. Jus-
tice Murphy, in his famous dictum in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,2" laid
down the rule that is still generally adhered to with respect to fighting
words and other narrow classes of speech.28 This rule gives no constitu-
tional protection at all to these forms of speech. The difficulties have arisen
in defining when speech falls into these categories. Some Justices deter-
mine the result by the words themselves, while others examine the circum-
stances in which the speech was uttered. 9
The early Burger Court, before Justice Powell's appointment, had the
opportunity to twice review state statutes that dealt with obscene or scurri-
lous words. 0 The convictions of both defendants were reversed by the
Supreme Court because the state was found to be intruding on protected
speech. Cohen v. California"' was decided on the basis that no fighting
words were involved and first amendment protections were therefore avail-
able.2  Gooding v. Wilson 3 was decided under a Warren Court first
27. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
28. There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the pre-
vention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insult-
ing or 'fighting words' - those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances
are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by
the social interest in order and morality.
Id. at 571-72 (footnotes omitted).
29. The position of some members of the Court has been that in these scurrilous language
cases, fighting words are "conduct" and not speech. See Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S.
901 (1972); Bogen, The Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Guarantee of Freedom of
Speech, 35 MD. L. REv. 555, 583 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Bogen]. The position of the other
members of the Court, including Justice Powell, is not this simplistic. They perceive in these
cases often times a communicative function of the words used and thus subject the statutes
involved to first amendment scrutiny.
30. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
31. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
32. "[Flighting words are unprotected, but that category is no longer to be understood as
a euphemism for either controversial or dirty talk but requires instead an unambiguous
invitation to brawl." Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1482, 1493 (1975). Cohen's jacket
message ("Fuck the Draft") did not constitute fighting words because it was not employed
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amendment protective technique-the overbreadth doctrine.,
Instead of dealing with the problem of scurrilous language by utilizing
the techniques developed by the Warren Court, Justice Powell has looked
to the words themselves and their potential effect on the listener in each
case. An example is Lewis v. City of New Orleans.3" The majority found
the statute overbroad and not simply limited to fighting words and re-
manded the case. Although Justice Powell agreed with the remand, he felt
that the crux of the matter was to whom the words had been addressed.
Since the statute dealt with language directed to a trained police officer,
the words to him were not fighting words, although they could have been
in some other situation.36 The potential chilling effect of an ordinance of
this nature was also a factor, as well as a concern by Justice Powell with
the real likelihood of police abuse of such a statute. 37 Justice Powell's
balancing in this case was not so much to see if the speech itself was
protected, but rather if the speech in this particular factual setting consti-
tuted fighting words, which would then be afforded no protection. The fact
that the speech was directed to a policeman, as opposed to an ordinary
citizen, was the determining factor in this balancing.
This "who is the receiver" test has played a significant role in cases
dealing with speech which was directed at captive audiences. Who the
receiver is will not only determine the probability that offense may be
taken at the words (and therefore possibly threaten community peace), but
it will give rise to an examination of the rights of the receiver in not being
spoken to. This examination has led Justice Powell to balance the rights
of all involved. When scurrilous language has been directed at a captive
audience, it has been the right of the listener that has usually been deter-
minative of the outcome, not whether the scurrilous language actually
constituted fighting words under the Chaplinsky doctrine.3 8 For this reason
in a personally provocative manner. "[A]bsent a more particularized and compelling reason
[than that the words might upset some people] for its actions" states cannot make it a crime
to publicly display a four-letter word. 403 U.S. at 26.
33. 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
34. See 405 U.S. at 520-21 for a description of this technique.
35. 415 U.S. 130 (1974). The decision dealt with a Louisiana statute which made it a crime
to curse a policeman.
36. See Bogen supra note 29, at 586.
A police officer, because of the nature of his job and his training, plus his role in society,
should be able to take more verbal abuse than ordinary citizens. 415 U.S. 130, 135 (Powell,
J., concurring).
37. Id. at 135.
38. Although not technically within the Chaplinsky definition, Justice Powell felt that
language which could grossly offend and emotionally disturb its listeners fell within the
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the use of the overbreadth technique is inappropriate in Justice Powell's
view.39 Rather, he seeks a determination on the difficult first amendment
issue by a careful analysis of all available, and sometimes competing, facts.
This position led Justice Powell to dissent in Rosenfeld v. New Jersey.4"
The majority had remanded the case for an overbreadth determination and
for an examination as to whether the language constituted fighting words.4
Justice Powell conceded that these words probably were not fighting
words, because it was unlikely anyone in the audience would react with
physical violence.42 But he would not allow these words to be uttered with
impunity by a speaker in front of a captive audience simply because they
technically were not fighting words. The captivity of the audience and the
offensiveness of the words went into the constitutional balance, with the
result that the language was, in Justice Powell's view, unprotected.4" To
Justice Powell, such words as used in Rosenfeld could by their very utter-
ance inflict injury.44
Justice Powell has shown independence of thought in the scurrilous lan-
guage cases. He has tried to perceive new rationalizations for the protec-
tion of first amendment rights by balancing, in each case, the right of the
speaker to speak and the listener not to be spoken to." In Lewis, he again
did not accept the overbreadth argument but rather felt that abusive lan-
guage when directed to a policeman did not constitute fighting words.
However, such speech when directed to a captive audience may be prohib-
ited.4" Justice Powell has not abandoned facial overbreadth but has advo-
spirit of Chaplinsky, since it offended the listener in the same manner as would fighting
words. Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 905 (1972).
39. Id. at 907.
40. 408 U.S. 901 (1972). The case involved a speaker's conviction under a New Jersey
statute prohibiting offensive language in a public place. The speaker used a particularly
offensive word repeatedly during a school board meeting at which were present women and
children. The majority ordered the case remanded in light of Cohen and Gooding. See also
Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 901 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
41. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and Blackmun dissented, essentially on
the ground that the words were clearly fighting words, at least in the sense that they could
have caused outrage on the part of a parent whose children had never been subjected to this
type of language.
42. Id. at 905.
43. See Shea, "Don't Bother to Smile When You Call Me That" - Fighting Words and
the First Amendment, 63 Ky. L.J. 1117 (1975).
44. See note 28 supra. The other dissenters, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist
and Blackmun, agreed with Justice Powell's result, but they sought to do this by arguing that
such language was "fighting words" even though the possibility of immediate violence was
remote.
45. See Gunther, supra note 7.
46. See Bogen, supra note 29, at 588.
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cated restraint in applying it. For Justice Powell, the focus is on the cir-
cumstances in which the speech is uttered. His willingness to extend the
Chaplinsky dictum beyond fighting words to language calculated to inflict
injury, mental or physical, suggests that Justice Powell has a stronger
concern for the rights of the captive audience than many of the other Court
members. 7 And this concern has been manifested by his placing of these
rights into the constitutional balance, rather than permitting the defini-
tion of fighting words found in Chaplinsky to be controlling.
However, when the unwilling listeners have not been a captive audience,
their rights have not been accorded as much weight, and, consequently,
the result of the balancing has changed. In Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville," Justice Powell reached such a result. Although not scurri-
lous language of the type in Rosenfeld, the motion pictures presented
essentially the same issue of offending the listener/viewer. Several factors
went into Justice Powell's disposition of the case. 9 First, he found that this
was an ordinance to prohibit speech on the basis of content which meant
that the government justifications had to be more substantial than in other
contexts." Second, he saw the problem of the privacy of the citizens. Jus-
tice Powell did not consider the privacy interests of sufficient value to
uphold the ordinance because the audience was not in fact captive. Absent
narrow circumstances, in Justice Powell's view, "the burden normally falls
upon the viewer to avoid further bombardment of [his] sensibilities sim-
47. See Yarbrough, supra note 15, at 50.
48. 422 U.S. 205 (1975). The ordinance in question prohibited drive-in movies from showing
films which contained human nudity when the theater screen could be seen from a public
place or public road. The principle argument upon which the city tried to justify the regula-
tion was that the ordinance was designed to protect the privacy of its citizens. The city also
made the argument that the ordinance was designed to protect children from obscenity and
that the ordinance was a traffic regulation in that it attempted to prevent nude movies from
distracting drivers. Justice Powell dismissed both of these latter asserted grounds. The stat-
ute as applied to protect children was overbroad in that it prevented even the showing of
educational films at drive-ins and thus deprived children of their right to receive this commu-
nication. The traffic argument was dispensed with by a rationale similar to equal protection
in that other movies, equally distractive as nude movies, were not banned at drive-ins. Id. at
206-17.
49. Justice Powell felt that nudity in the films did not lessen their need for first amendment
protection. In contrast, Chief Justice Burger characterized "the First Amendment interests
involved . . . [as] trivial at best" and dispensed with the case as an appropriate use of the
police power. 422 U.S. at 223 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
50. "[Wlhen the government, acting as censor, undertakes selectively to shield the public
from some kinds of speech on the grounds that they are more offensive than others, the First
Amendment strictly limits its power to do so." 422 U.S. at 209. See also Young v. American
Mini Theaters, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2440 (Powell, J., concurring).
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ply by averting [his] eyes." 51 Also, Justice Powell invoked notions of over-
breadth in that the statute affected both constitutionally protected speech
and unprotected speech.2 The key to the decision for Justice Powell seems
to have been that this was a content prohibitive statute designed to protect
more than a captive audience. Given the captivity of the audience, Justice
Powell may well have concluded that this ordinance was constitutional as
in Rosenfeld.0
Lewis, Rosenfeld and Erznoznik give some indication of the importance
of the receiver to first amendment speech in Justice Powell's set of values.
The probability of the listener taking action or being offended because of
the communication and his ability to avoid being a listener have weighed
heavily as to whether or not Justice Powell will deem the utterance pro-
tected speech.
3. Time, Place and Manner Restrictions
Another important factor in the balance of first amendment rights has
been the legitimate interests of the government. These interests have been
given weight in the balancing process in accordance with their value to
society. The principal countervailing factor in the balancing determina-
tions has been the extent to which this governmental interest has con-
flicted with the individual's first amendment rights.
51. 422 U.S. at 210-11 (citation omitted). The narrow circumstances which would make
this a compelling state interest have been when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the
home or the degree of captivity makes it impractical for the unwilling auditor or viewer to
avoid exposure. Id. at 209. See the discussion of Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972),
at notes 40-44 supra and accompanying text, where Justice Powell felt as if scurrilous lan-
guage used in front of a captive audience could be punished. Cf. Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
52. This idea of overbreadth is not the same type of overbreadth used by the Court in cases
like Gooding. Here, as in his concurrence in Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974),
Justice Powell used overbreadth only as another factor to weigh, not as an outcome determi-
native technique.
53. Justice Powell concluded that the limited privacy interest of persons on the street could
not "justify this censorship of otherwise protected speech on the basis of its contents." 422
U.S. at 212 (footnote omitted).
54. Justice Powell seemed to agree with the set of recommendations made by Professor
Haiman in Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There A Right Not To Be Spoken To?, 67 Nw.
U.L. REv. 153 (1972). In that article, Haiman made the following observation which accords
well with Justice Powell's view.
[I]n the clash of free speech and privacy interests surrounding claims of a right not
to be spoken to, we must be careful not to allow our natural sympathy for tender
psyches to beguile us into accepting serious erosions of the first amendment ....
Privacy will be adequately safeguarded if our right to escape from one another after
the first exposure to unwelcome communication is made secure.
Id. at 199.
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The problem of the clash between a zoning ordinance and the first
amendment came to the Court in Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc.55
Justice Powell in his concurrence dealt with the problem of valid govern-
mental objectives that implicate first amendment concerns only secondar-
ily and to a limited extent." For Justice Powell, the resolution lay in
whether or not this was an attempt by the city to regulate the content of
speech under the guise of zoning. If so, a more demanding balancing test
would be in order to determine if the ordinance was justified.' But Justice
Powell found that the impact of this ordinance on speech was both
secondary and minimal and, therefore, held the city to a lesser standard
of justification. Justice Powell believed that the test used in United States
v. O'Brien"5 could be used as a guide.-9 The essential finding of this test in
Young was that first amendment freedoms were being encroached upon no
more than was necessary. Therefore, since the theater owners were not
completely deprived of an avenue for exercise of their first amendment
rights, the interest furthered by the ordinance outweighed the effect of the
minimal intrusion that had resulted from a statute that was not intended
to directly restrict speech. 0
55. 96 S. Ct. 2440 (1976). This case involved a section of a Detroit zoning ordinance that
prohibited theaters that showed obscene movies (as defined by the ordinance) from locating
near one another. The ordinance was attacked as unconstitutional by theater owners as
violative of their first amendment rights in that it allegedly was an impermissible ban on the
content of speech. The Court through Justice Stevens held that this ordinance did not violate
the commands of the first amendment since the restriction was on where the owners could
locate and not whether they could locate and operate their theaters.
56. Id. at 2453.
57. Justice Powell made two inquiries to determine if this ordinance was an attempt to
regulate speech because of its content: 1) did the ordinance impose any content limitations
on the makers of adult movies or their ability to make them available to the public and 2)
did it restrict in any significant way the viewing of these movies by people desiring to see
them. Justice Powell answered both inquiries in the negative, finding only that the ordinance
was concerned with where expression took place and not with its content. 96 S. Ct. at 2456.
See also Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
58. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
59. O'Brien was a speech-plus case involving the burning of a draft card. The destruction
of the draft card violated a statute which the government contended furthered an important
goal. The Court announced a four-part test for deciding if a statute which did not attempt
to suppress the content of speech violated the first amendment. The statute had to: 1) be
within the government's power; 2) further an important governmental interest; 3) be unre-
lated to the suppression of speech; and 4) restrict first amendment freedoms no more than
was essential to further the government's interest. Id. at 377, as cited in 96 S. Ct. at 2456
(Powell, J., concurring).
An intent to restrict the content of speech would make the O'Brien test inapplicable. 96
S. Ct. at 2457 n.4.
60. Justice Powell has frequently cited three speech-plus cases to make his point that states
can reasonably regulate the time, place and manner of the exercise of first amendment
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The significance of various governmental interests relating to the main-
tenance of prisons has been the focus of several recent cases.' These inter-
ests had been used to restrict first amendment rights, including
associational rights of inmates, other individuals and the press. The basic
justification had been that the state's interest in prison security had re-
quired these time, place and manner restrictions. In Procunier v. Martinez,
Justice Powell refused to view the case as presenting only a problem of
prisoners' first amendment rights, because he believed that the first
amendment rights of those with whom prisoners had communicated were
also implicated. 2
However, Justice Powell viewed the situation as one in which first
amendment rights were only incidentally infringed by a governmental
regulation; therefore, the O'Brien test was again the applicable model for
balancing the interests. 3 In contrast to Young, first amendment freedoms
were being encroached upon more than necessary, and when balanced
against the interest of the government, the statute was unconstitutional.
If the statute had dealt directly with such purposes as discipline, order or
rehabilitation, it may have withstood the scrutiny.64
In Pell v. Procunier, the Court directly confronted the first amendment
rights of prisoners and rejected the claim that the prisoners had a constitu-
speech. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966);
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965). It is unclear whether Justice Powell has put any weight
on the speech/speech-plus distinction as developed by the Warren Court. Justice Powell has
seemed to draw from these cases the general principle that government may reasonably
regulate the time, place and manner of public speech without addressing the problem of
whether the speech involved was more speech or more conduct.
61. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817
(1974); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
Martinez presented the problem of prison officials censoring prisoners' mail. Pell presented
two problems. First, whether or not prisoners had a right to demand face-to-face interviews
with willing newsmen. Second, whether or not newsmen had a right to face-to-face interviews
with prisoners of their choice in order to gather news. Washington Post dealt with the latter
problem in the federal prison system. Justice Powell wrote the decision in Martinez, con-
curred with the majority opinion in the disposition of the first problem in Pell and dissented
on the issue of newsmen's right to interview in both Pell and Washington Post.
62. 416 U.S. at 409. The interests of free citizens had to be balanced along with the rights
of prisoners against the governmental justifications.
63. Professor Ely has criticized the O'Brien test as being not very protective of first amend-
ment values. He saw its use as appropriate only in symbolic speech-plus cases. Ely, Flag
Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment
Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1482, 1493-96 (1975).
Justice Powell has used this approach only in cases where the effect on speech had been
incidental and where the Court was not particularly competent to suggest alternative ways
to accomplish the governmental interests which would have no effect on the first amendment.
64. Yarbrough, supra note 15, at 78.
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tional right to demand interviews with willing newsmen. 5 Justice Powell
concurred, but without his usual systematic weighing of all relevant fac-
tors. One is left to guessing whether Justice Powell agreed with the rather
restrictive and unprotective balancing of Justice Stewart. Perhaps central
to Justice Powell's agreement was the fact that there were reasonable
alternative means for exercising this claimed first amendment right.
The newsmen's challenges in Pell and Saxbe v. Washington Post were
rejected by Justice Stewart. 8 Justice Powell, in dissent, strongly voiced his
disapproval. He found that personal interviews were essential to effective
reporting in the prison environment. 7 Because the press has such an im-
portant function to play in society, Justice Powell felt that "without some
protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscer-
ated." 8 To prevent this, Justice Powell stated that he would apply the
balancing test of Martinez and strike down any statute that too broadly
infringed upon first amendment rights. He noted that he would require
more than administrative convenience to uphold a complete ban on the
newsmen's right to gather information89 and the public's right to receive
information. "The balance should be struck between the absolute ban...
and an uninhibited license to interview at will."7
The cases concerning time, place and manner restrictions reveal that
Justice Powell will not ignore first amendment problems that have been
created by the secondary effects of a statute. Instead, he will measure the
extent of the intrusion against valid governmental interests by using a
balancing technique based on the test laid down in O'Brien. The method
is no different, essentially, than that used in examining content restric-
65. Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, noted that under some circumstances, the right
of free speech has included the right to communicate with any willing listener, and also that
prisoners do retain those first amendment rights not inconsistent with inprisonment. 417
U.S. at 822. Justice Stewart, however, found there were alternative means for the prisoners
to communicate with whom they wanted and so dismissed their claim. Id. at 827-28.
66. Justice Stewart delivered a rather conclusory opinion. He did not carefully weigh the
asserted first amendment rights of newsmen to gather news. Instead, he used what seemed
to be a rational basis equal protection test. "It has generally been held that the First Amend-
ment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right to special access to information not
available to the public generally. . . . [N]ewsmen have no constitutional right of access to
prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the general public." 417 U.S. at 833-34. See
the factual discussion of Washington Post in note 61 supra.
67. Id. at 856.
68. Id. at 860, quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
69. See the discussion of Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), at notes 89-96 infra and
accompanying test.
70. Id. at 872. For a general discussion of these cases see Comment, Problems in Defining
the Institutional Status of the Press, 11 U. RICH. L. REV. 177 (1976).
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tions. The difference is found in that the intrusions causedby time, place
and manner restrictions are usually less than that caused by content re-
strictions and, therefore, the government's interests need not be as compel-
ling in order to save the statute.7 '
C. PRESS
The Court has encountered a special set of problems when dealing with
the first amendment right of freedom of the press. Those problems concern
what first amendment protection is due commercial speech, prior re-
straints on publication and the interface between a free press and the law
of defamation. Justice Powell has had a large impact on the Court in these
areas as he has striven consistently to achieve a fair balance between
competing interests.
1. Prior Restraints, Commercial Speech and Testimonial Privilege
a. Prior Restraints
A view of the great solicitude which Justice Powell has for a free press
can be found in his concurrence in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart.7 2
The case presented a clash between first amendment values and the com-
mands of the sixth amendment. Chief Justice Burger wrote for the Court
but was joined by only two Justices. 3 The Chief Justice found that to
protect the defendant's sixth amendment rights, the trial court should
have used an alternative method than gagging the press.74 However, he did
not lay down workable guidelines for the resolution of future problems of
the same nature.
Justice Powell concurred in a separate opinion in order to emphasize
71. See Peebles, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and The Nixon Court: Some Reflections on Con-
temporary Judicial Conservatism, 24 AMaR. U.L. REv. 1, 56-57 (1974).
72. 96 S. Ct. 2791 (1976). In the case, a county judge presiding over a spectacular murder
case in a small town had issued an order prohibiting the publishing of a wide array of items
concerning the trial and the defendant. The press objected to the order, contending it was
unnecessarily broad and violated its first amendment rights.
73. The basic backdrop for a prior restraint problem was set out in New York Times Co.
v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy
presumption against its constitutional validity .... The government thus carries a
heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint.
Id. at 714 (citation omitted).
74. Chief Justice Burger, relying on Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), mentioned
four possible protective devices short of prior restraint: 1) continue the case until the publicity
has died down; 2) transfer it to another county not permeated with publicity; 3) sequestration
of a jury; and 4) prevent prosecutors, counsel for the defense and witnesses from collaborating
with the press in the dissemination of information concerning the trial. 96 S. Ct. at 2800.
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what he felt was the unique burden on the government to justify prior
restraints. Justice Powell would have required a difficult four-prong test
to be met by the government before allowing a prior restraint on publica-
tion by the press.7- These requirements indicate the importance which
Justice Powell has placed on the right of freedom of the press. The fact that
a sixth amendment right was also included did not change the result. This
approach, however, retains the possibility that in cases where a strong
evidentiary showing could be made, the governmental interests may out-
weigh the first amendment interests of the press.
b. Commercial Speech
Commercial speech, since the decision in Valentine v. Chrestensen,"7
had been afforded little or no constitutional protection. However, Justice
Powell, as he has done when first amendment rights have been incidentally
affected by a statute,77 has not ignored potential restrictions on first
amendment rights, even when the rights were supposedly nonexistent. An
example of this desire to accommodate all interests was Pittsburgh Press
Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations7 8 in which Justice Pow-
ell paid lip service to the doctrine that commercial speech was due no
constitutional protection. But rather than summarily dismissing the
paper's claim, Justice Powell examined the Commission's basis for insti-
tuting the restriction. Such an examination was indicative of his refusal
automatically to deny constitutional protection merely because the speech
was categorized as commercial.
Following Pittsburgh Press, the Court has extended first amendment
7b. Justice Powell would require a showing that: 1) there must be a clear threat to the
fairness of the trial; 2) such a threat is posed by the actual publicity to be restrained; 3) no
less restrictive means are available; and 4) a restraint may not issue unless it is shown that
previous publicity would not render the order inefficacious. Id. at 2808 (Powell, J., concur-
ring).
76. 316 U.S. 52 (1942). Chrestensen involved the distribution of handbills advertising tours
of a submarine. In the course of his opinion, Justice Roberts first reiterated the commercial
speech exception. Although the streets are proper places for communication and states may
not unduly proscribe their use as a public forum, nonetheless said Justice Roberts, "[w]e
are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on Government as respects
purely commercial advertising." Id. at 54. Read broadly, this implied that commercial adver-
tising was due no constitutional protection.
77. See discussion in section VI B(3) supra.
78. 413 U.S. 376 (1973). The case dealt with a ruling by the Human Relations Commission
that the newspaper could not put want ads in columns designated male-only or female-only
because this violated a local sex discrimination ordinance. The newspaper claimed that this
violated their first amendment rights, because it was a matter of editorial judgment where
the paper put such ads and the headings it used.
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protection to commercial speech in Bigelow v. Virginia 9 and Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc."0 Justice
Powell joined the Court in these decisions, thus making explicit what was
at least arguably implicit in his holding in Pittsburgh Press. Justice Pow-
ell's sensitivity toward first amendment concerns and his dislike for simple
categorizations in the resolution of first amendment problems would
indicate that he had not been very comfortable with the commercial
speech doctrine.'
c. Newsmen's Privilege
As with commercial speech, Justice Powell has refused to create a defini-
tive test that would determine the question of the right of a newsman to
keep his sources confidential. In Branzburg v. Hayes,12 the Court held that
newsmen must answer all relevant questions propounded by a grand jury
even without a showing by the state of compelling need."
Justice Powell filed a concurring opinion "to emphasize what seems to
me the limited nature of the Court's holding. ' '18 Justice Powell stated that
newsmen subpoenaed before a grand jury were not without constitutional
rights with respect to news gathering or in maintaining the confidentiality
79. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). The Court held that commercial advertisements were entitled to
some first amendment protection. Speech was not stripped of first amendment protection
merely because it was a form of paid commercial advertising. Id. at 820-21. In the Court's
opinion, Justice Blackmun cited Pittsburgh Press and said that the case reaffirmed the
principle that commercial advertising enjoyed some degree of first amendment protection.
80. 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976). The Court found that the first amendment protection due com-
mercial speech was bound up with the right of prople to receive information. As such, com-
mercial speech was within the first amendment, be it advertising of something of societal
importance or a mere commercial transaction.
81. Compare Peebles, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and The Nixon Court: Some Reflections on
Contemporary Judicial Conservatism, 24 AMER. U.L. R.v. 1, 50-51 (1974), with DeVore &
Nelson, Commercial Speech and Paid Access To The Press, 26 HASTINos L. J. 745, 758-64
(1975).
82. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). This case actually involved three newsmen who made basically
the same argument-that newsmen had a qualified constitutional privilege not to reveal their
sources before grand juries absent the showing of a compelling state interest.
83. This was very similar to the majority's argument in Pell and Washington Post that
newsmen are not given special treatment under the first amendment. If a rule applies to
private citizens, it is valid against newsmen as well. The issue for Justice White was settled
by this overriding importance of having everyone, be they newsman or other citizen, answer
questions relevant to the grand jury investigation. Id. at 690-91.
Justice White did add, however, that "newsgathering is not without its First Amendment
protections, and grand jury investigations if instituted or conducted other than in good faith,
would pose wholly different issues for resolution under the First Amendment." Id. at 707.
84. Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
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of their sources.85 He showed a more sensitive solicitude for the first
amendment than did the plurality, since he felt that courts could not force
newsmen to reveal their sources when the information sought bore only a
remote relationship to the subject of the investigation. This, he believed,
struck the fair balance between society's right to receive all relevant testi-
mony concerning criminal conduct and the newsmen's need to be able to
obtain as much information as possible." But what Justice Powell was
saying in the way of guidelines is unclear. Because he concurred in the
plurality's result, it is probably fair to conclude that in most situations he
would require a newsman who had witnessed a crime to testify and reveal
all relevant information.87 But until specific circumstances arise, he cannot
predict how the balance will be struck. The importance of his concurrence
is that he tempered the holding of the plurality to reflect a nebulous
constitutional right for newsmen to keep sources confidential whenever a
fair balancing of the competing interests will allow.
2. Libel and The First Amendment
The area of libel long has been an area conducive to balancing, since
there exists a strong tension between the right of the press not to be re-
strained in the information it publishes and the right of each individual
to his or her privacy. The state's interest in compensating the individual
for a breach of his privacy has also been an important factor. The Court's
first major decision in this area was New York Times Co. v. Sullivan."8 The
Court held that the press can be held liable for the publishing of defama-
tory falsehoods concerning a public official only upon a showing of actual
malice. This actual malice rule was extended to the recovery of damages
85. Id.
86. Id. at 710.
87. Because Justice Powell has placed such heavy reliance on the case-by-case basis of
decision making, there might well be extenuating circumstances that would outweigh the
state's interest in even this information.
88. Justice Stewart dissented, joined by Justices Marshall and Brennan. Justice Stewart
felt as if the Court had taken a "crabbed" view of the first amendment rights involved and
that the Court was insensitive to the "critical role of an independent press in our society."
Id. at 725. Justice Stewart would endorse a view that only in very narrow circumstances could
a newsman be forced to reveal his source of information. Id. at 743.
See also Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and The Developing Qualified Privilege For
Newsmen, 26 HASTINGS L. J. 709, 717 (1975). Taking Justice Powell's concurrence with Justice
Stewart's dissent, Goodale felt confident in his thesis that a majority of the Court endorsed
a qualified privilege for newsmen. This reading of Justice Powell's concurrence is justified
by the great lengths Justice Powell went to in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843
(1974), to point out the limited holding in Branzburg.
89. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
90. Actual malice was defined as knowledge that a statement was false or reckless disregard
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for publishing defamatory falsehoods in the case where a public figure was
libelled in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts."1 A plurality opinion in
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.9 2 sought to extend the actual malice rule
to the situation where a publisher prints defamatory falsehoods about a
private individual who was involved in an issue of general or public inter-
est. Justice Powell rejected this extension of the New York Times rule of
actual malice to private individuals in Gertz v. Robert Welsh, Inc.9"
Justice Powell perceived a clear collision between the first amendment
rights of a newspaper and the legitimate state interest in compensating
private individuals for reputational injuries inflicted on them and the right
of private citizens not to have their privacy shattered. He felt that, al-
though "neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially ad-
vances society's interest in uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate on
public issues,"94 punishment of errors would run the risk of inducing an
overcautious and restrictive use of first amendment freedoms. Erroneous
statements of fact deserve no constitutional protection, but to make pub-
lishers strictly liable for erroneous statements would induce self-
censorship. On this basis, Justice Powell felt that a scrutiny of the govern-
mental and privacy interests involved was appropriate.
Justice Powell's approach was to accommodate all the interests in a fair
and just way. To protect the reputational and privacy interests, he set up
a standard whereby private citizens could recover on a showing of negli-
gence for the defamatory falsehoods of the press. 5 But to assure enough
"breathing space" for the press, he limited recovery to only actual damages
as to whether a statement was false or not. Id. at 279-80.
91. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). The definition of public figure, as set out by Chief Justice Warren,
was persons who by their fame shape events in areas of concern to society at large and persons
who are intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions. Id. at 163-64
(Warren, C.J., concurring).
92. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
93. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Gertz was an attorney retained by the family of a murder victim
to represent it in civil litigation. The convicted murderer was a policeman who was the subject
of a magazine article claiming that the policeman was the victim of a Communist conspiracy
to discredit police. The article falsely stated that Gertz was responsible for the frame-up,
implied he had a criminal record and labelled him a Communist. Gertz sued for libel but
the district court applied the actual malice test relying on Rosenbloom and found for the
magazine.
94. Id. at 340.
95. "We hold that, so long as [states] do not impose liability without fault, the States
may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability. . . ." Id. at 347. See Time,
Inc. v. Firestone, 96 S. Ct. 958, 970 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring), where, in explaining Gertz,
Justice Powell said "there is no First Amendment constraint against allowing recovery upon
proof of negligence."
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and no punitive damages. 6 Justice Powell felt justified to narrow the appli-
cation of the actual malice rule for two principal reasons. First, public
officials and public figures usually have enjoyed significantly greater ac-
cess to channels of communication than private citizens and have thus
been able to counteract false statements more realistically. Second, public
figures and public officials have voluntarily held themselves out for expo-
sure to the public thereby lessening their expectation of privacy.
Justice Powell, through his balancing of interests, was not showing any
less solicitude for the first amendment rights of the press than the Court
in previous libel decisions. He announced a new rule "not because the
media interest was less demanding, but because the state interest in pro-
tecting the private individual was more compelling."97 For Justice Powell,
the state interest and the interest of the private citizen in his reputational
integrity required that he limit the New York Times rule to public figures
and public officials. 8
Justice Powell also had occasion in Gertz to define the critical question
of who was a public figure. For Justice Powell, "voluntary notoriety" and
"access to the media" constituted basic criteria of public figure status.9
Also important was the extent of the participation in an event by an
individual. ' The Court in Time, Inc. v. Firestone'0 relied on Justice Pow-
ell's explanation of a public figure in Gertz. For first amendment purposes,
public figures were held to be people who have "assumed roles of especial
prominence in the affairs of society" or those people who "have thrust
themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to
influence the resolution of the issues involved."'' 2
Justice Powell has had a profound effect on the Court's disposition of
cases involving the clash of libel laws and the first amendment. He has
stopped the expansion of the actual malice test to more and more situa-
tions and he has also narrowed the definition of public figures so that fewer
people will be required to prove actual malice before recovery. The Justices
are unanimous in holding a public official or public figure to the actual
96. 418 U.S. at 349.
97. Brosnahan, From Times v. Sullivan to Gertz v. Welch: Ten Years of Balancing Libel
Law and The First Amendment, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 777, 796 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Brosnahan].
98. See generally Bogen, supra note 29.
99. See Brosnahan, supra note 97, at 794.
100. 48 TEMp. L.Q. 450, 458 (1975).
101. 96 S. Ct. 958 (1976).
102. Id. at 965, quoting from Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
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malice test and the majority agree with Justice Powell that private individ-
uals can recover upon a showing of negligence.113
Facts of a private nature which are in a public record entitle the person
to less protection, however, since the privacy expectation is diluted. In Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn"'0 the right of a private citizen to maintain an
invasion of privacy action for the truthful publication of matter contained
in open court records was at issue. The Court found that the press was
immune to suit for publication of information in open court records. Jus-
tice Powell concurred in this judgment of the court. However, he wrote
separately to make two points. First, he felt that Gertz constitutionally
mandated that truth be a complete defense to an action for defamation by
a private individual against the media.' 5 Second, Justice Powell did not
feel that truth would necessarily be an absolute defense to all actions for
invasion of privacy."' Justice Powell conceded that in some instances the
right to privacy for private individuals may outweigh the press' first
amendment rights, where the interest sought to be protected was the repu-
tational integrity of the private citizen.
Justice Powell can be seen to evidence a strong desire to protect both
the privacy of individuals and the state's legitimate interest in protecting
people's reputation. Although first amendment press rights weigh heavily
in Justice Powell's scales, other interests also must be weighed. Privacy is
a theme that has run through many of Justice Powell's decisions,"7 and has
been accorded significant weight. Gertz represented a marked departure
from the Warren Court trend to expand the actual malice rule and showed
clearly Justice Powell's willingness to consider governmental justifications
even though the first amendment was implicated.
D. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
The right of free association is a recent development in constitutional
law; nowhere is it mentioned in the first amendment. 81 Although implicit
in some cases, freedom of association was not elevated to its present, sepa-
103. Bogen, supra note 29, at 612.
104. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
105. Id. at 500.
106. See 420 U.S. at 500.
107. See, e.g.,Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting), where
Justice Powell felt that the privacy interest of the captive audience outweighed the first
amendment rights of the speaker.
108. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Some of the background for this section was taken from Emer-
son, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as Emerson] and Rice, The Constitutional Right of Association, 16 HASTINGS L.J. 491
(1965).
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rate status until 1958, in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.09 Under
the Warren Court, freedom of association was upheld by the available
devices, such as vagueness"' and overbreadth,' that were common to free
expression cases. These have given way, generally, to a balancing of inter-
ests by the Court."' In his decisions, Justice Powell has taken heartily to
the balancing test"' and has shown an independence in determining which
values should be weighed. More than in other areas, Justice Powell has
been likely to dissent or concur.
Despite the great number of cases touching on the issue,' freedom of
association has retained some aspects of its late origin. There are inconsis-
tencies about when freedom to associate is burdened and what standards
are to be used when it is found to be burdened. Now as before, there is no
single key to the varying constitutional issues involving associational
rights."' Many times delineation of the freedom is clouded by other issues
in the particular case.
1. Reaching the Issue of Association
With one possible exception,"' Justice Powell has been quick to perceive
freedom of association issues when the lower courts and other Justices have
not. This exceptional case was the most recent one, and it opened the
question of whether Justice Powell was reconsidering his earlier stance as
exemplified in Healy v. James' 7 and Rosario v. Rockefeller."8
Healy v. James was typical of Justice Powell's early insight in reaching
associational issues. Central Connecticut State College had refused to
grant official recognition to a local chapter of the Students for a Demo-
cratic Society, which was organizing on campus. The federal district court,
affirmed by the circuit court, held that only an official stamp of approval
109. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). Freedom of association was implicit and mentioned, though not
as a separate right, in De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
110. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-35 (1963). Cf. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516 (1960).
111. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
112. Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539 (1972); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169
(1972). But see Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973). The last case relied on the equal
protection clause. See also Elrod v. Bums, 96 S. Ct. 2673 (1976).
113. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
114. The cases since 1958 are collected in Annot., 33 L. Ed. 2d 865 (1972).
115. Emerson, supra note 108, at 3.
116. Elrod v. Bums, 96 S. Ct. 2673, 2691 (1976) (Powell, J., dissenting).
117. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
118. 410 U.S. 752, 763 (1973) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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had been denied."' Justice Powell disagreed, holding that the practical
effect of the nonrecognition was to impede the local chapter's first amend-
ment rights. No longer could they use bulletin boards or other campus
facilities necessary to a student organization. The limitations may have
operated indirectly, but Justice Powell was on firm precedent in holding
that "the Constitution's protection is not limited to direct interference
with fundamental rights."'' 20
Justice Powell's dissenting opinion in Rosario v. Rockefeller 21 was an
example of this same discernment of interests. The petitioners had chal-
lenged voter registration deadlines which were designed to eliminate "raid-
ings" in the following primaries. The majority gave short shrift to their
associational claims. To the majority, the rules set only a time deadline
and were not a complete ban on the petitioners' associational rights. 2
Consistent with his view in Healy, Justice Powell dissented. A permanent
ban on a fundamental right was not necessary, he felt, to breach the consti-
tutional limitation. The length of time might have some effect on the
weighing of interests, but it was not basic in itself to a finding of whether
the freedom had been burdened.'2
These two cases are to be contrasted with Justice Powell's dissent in the
patronage case, Elrod v. Burns. 2 The majority, in holding the patronage
dismissals to be unconstitutional, relied heavily on the employees' rights
of association. Justice Powell later addressed this issue, but intimated
strongly that he did not want to reach the constitutional implications. He
observed that the decision might well disserve the core values of the first
119. Healy v. James, 319 F. Supp. 113 (D. Conn. 1970), affd, 445 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1971).
120. 408 U.S. at 183. See Justice Harlan's opinion in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,
357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958). The case was the one which first held the right of association had
separate constitutional content. See note 109 supra. Justice Powell also had to consider the
setting of the right. First amendment freedoms have not always been guaranteed when on
school property. Note, Freedom of Political Association on the Campus: The Right to Official
Recognition, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1149, 1156 n.46 (1971). Tinker v. DeMoines School Dist., 393
U.S. 503 (1969), brought the right to full flower, and Justice Powell followed it. 408 U.S. at
180.
121. 410 U.S. at 763-69.
122. Id. at 758.
123. Id. at 765. In Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973), Rosario was narrowly distin-
guished. The Court held that the rights of association could not be defeated by a mere
showing of state interest. The statute was found to be too imprecise. 414 U.S. at 58-59.
124. 96 S. Ct. 2673 (1976) (Powell, J., dissenting). Respondents in the case, Republicans,
had been hired for patronage jobs in the Chicago area. When the Democrats were elected to
office, the respondents were asked to change affiliations or find a Democrat to sponsor them.
Respondents did neither and were shortly dismissed. A good predecision account of the issues
can be found in O'Neil, Politics, Patronage and Public Employment, 44 U. CIN. L. REv. 725
(1975).
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amendment.' = Justice Powell's wording in the dissent is difficult to com-
prehend. He appeared to be saying that the political employees when hired
were receiving a political boon, and that they lost nothing when it was
taken away. Yet, it is difficult to see how the origins of a job- preclude
examining the rights of association when it is lost. He may also have been
referring to the historical process of patronage so well established. Justice
Powell's dissent may be otherwise well-founded,' but the ominous tone
of describing the denigration of core values is reminiscent of his limitations
on fifth amendment rights "when they leap their proper bounds. 1 2 If that
is the implication, fewer cases will reach this first amendment issue.
issue.
2. The Constitutional Standard
Although the freedom of association was raised to its separate status
almost twenty years ago, there has been no general agreement on what
standards should be used to define the right. Rather, the problems have
been framed and answered in terms of more traditional constitutional
doctrines. 12 For Justice Powell, this has presented fewer problems than it
might, since he has balanced most issues. In fact, freedom of association
may be looked on as a rough, constitutional currency in balancing tests. It
has significant value of its own, but may also be used to discover what
value Justice Powell places on the concomitant and opposing areas of the
law.
If that is taken as a premise, it may be said that the right to vote and
the right to political representation occupy a vital area of Justice Powell's
125. 96 S. Ct. at 2691. Essentially Justice Powell felt that the Court's decision needlessly
constitutionalized another portion of American life. The politics of patronage had been prac-
ticed for 200 years and "it would need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect
it." Id. at 2697, quoting Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922) (Holmes, J.).
The reasoning is very much like the historical conservatism of Edmund Burke:
[Ilt is with infinite caution that any man ought to venture upon pulling down an
edifice which has answered in any tolerable degree for ages the common purposes of
society, or on building it up again, without having models and patterns of approved
utility before his eyes.
E. BURKE, REFLEcTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 74 (1790, Dolphin ed. 1961).
126. See note 145 infra and accompanying text.
127. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 336 (1973). The phrase has marked the limita-
tions on fifth amendment rights. See section III supra.
128. Freedom of association has seemed to absorb the analytical tools from whatever else
was in the case; protectional devices and balancing as in Healy v. James, from first amend-
ment free expression; equal protection strict scrutiny as in Rosario v. Rockefeyler, from the
fundamental right to vote; accommodation of interests as in Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477
(1975), from competing legitimate claims. This uncertain situation has caused one author to
write, "[tihe concept is essentially obscurantist." Emerson, supra note 108, at 14.
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constitutional construction. In Rosario v. Rockefeller, 29 associational
rights were appended to the right of enfranchisement in primary elections.
The result was a powerful combination of values requiring strict scrutiny
protection. Justice Powell castigated the majority for denying those funda-
mental rights without identifying the standard of scrutiny utilized. To him
the state's interest in the prevention of "raiding" was less than a
compelling interest, especially since the petitioners had never before
voted.'30
His position in Cousins v. Wigoda"3 I shows a more subtle balance. In this
case, the state's legitimate interests in protecting the electorate's right to
vote were opposed to freedom of political association in the National Dem-
ocratic Party. The facts of the case were complex. 132 In short, the majority
held as paramount the associational interests of the Democrats. Justice
Powell concurred in part and dissented in part. His decision was that the
state could enjoin the unelected delegates from being seated as delegates
from Illinois (thus upholding the state's legitimate interests), but that
Illinois could not prevent the party from seating the unelected persons.as
delegates at large (thus upholding the Democrats' freedom of association
in their task of selecting a presidential candidate) .33 Justice Powell in his
decision maintained that a weighing which accommodated the powerful
and legitimate interests of both sides was required.
Rights of association, when allied with the freedom of expression, have
also represented important interests. However, in the context of Healy v.
James,'34 that combination of rights was more easily overcome than either
of the associational rights found in Rosario and Cousins. This was due to
129. 410 U.S. 752 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 764-69. Raiding occurs when voters of one persuasion cross over and vote in the
opposing party's primary to give a distorted impression of the public sentiment.
131. 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
132. As briefly as possible, the facts were as follows: Cousin's delegates challenged the
seating of Wigoda's delegates before the Democratic credentials committee at the 1972 Na-
tional Convention. The committee decided in favor of Cousin's delegates because of infrac-
tions of the party's promulgated rules in the election of Wigoda's delegates. A Wigoda dele-
gate sought an injunction from a Illinois circuit court, which granted it, and leave to appeal
was denied by the Illinois Supreme Court. Another Wigoda delegate challenged the party
rules in a federal court in the District of Columbia. Cousin's group cross-claimed for an
injunction of the state court action. The district court denied both claims, but the circuit
court reversed, granting the injunction, although still dismissing the claim of the Wigoda
delegate. After a remand for a determination of mootness, the issue appeared before the
Court. Id. at 478-87.
133. Id. at 496-97. A helpful article is Note, Cousins v. Wigoda: Primary Elections, Dele-
gate Selection, and the National Political Convention, 70 Nw. U.L. Rav. 699 (1975).
134. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
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the fact that just as some of the strengths of free expression are included
in the complex of values, so too are some of its weaknesses. Therefore, in
outlining guidance for a lower court remand, Justice Powell found applica-
ble many of the tests that had been developed earlier in the law. The
college, though it had a legitimate interest in preserving a peaceful cam-
pus, could not deny the local SDS recognition because of national policies.
Without some proof that the two were related, this was only "guilt by
association,""' nor could the college deny the organization recognition on
philosophical grounds.'36 On the other hand, the college could withhold
recognition if the group openly incited violence under the Brandenburg'3 7
test or refused to obey reasonable regulations. There was a similar weighing
and accommodation of interests in Healy as in Rosario and Cousins, but
of a lower order. Instead of searching for compelling interests, there was a
shifting in the burden of proof. Instead of a declaration of rights, there was
a remand to determine if the students would follow reasonable regula-
tions. 38
Private property rights have also seemed to be at parity with freedom
of association. In Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB,' 31 Justice Powell re-
manded a case to find the "yield point" between the conflicting values of
property owners and labor organizers. Consistent with his opinion in Lloyd
Corp. v. Tanner,"' Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza' was distin-
guished. The union and the employees had the right "to self-organization,
to form, join, or assist labor organizations."'' The employer could not
interfere with the organization, but neither was he forced to aid it. The
135. Id. at 186. See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); cf. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
136. 408 U.S. at 187-88. Cf. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
137. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). See Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290
(1961). The distinction made in Brandenburg was between advocacy of the use of force
generally and the direct incitement of lawlessness.
138. A point by point analysis was undertaken in Gunther, supra note 7, at 1015-23. See
Note, Freedom of Political Association on the Campus: The Right to Official Recognition, 46
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1149 (1971), which gives a very close approximation of how Justice Powell
decided the case. See Note, Freedom of Association and the College Community, 9 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 574 (1973).
139. 407 U.S. 539 (1972).
140. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
141. 391 U.S. 308 (1968). Logan Valley and Lloyd are discussed in more detail in the
freedom of expression cases. See section VI B(1) supra.
142. Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. at 542, citing section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). Although Justice Powell used this statu-
tory right, the situation seemed sufficiently analogous to the constitutional right of associa-
tion to have probably been impliedly present.
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associational rights were accommodated to the private property interests
of Central by holding that the property right would only have to yield
during a campaign by union organizers and that access would be limited
to prescribed nonworking areas."'
Rights of association are most disadvantaged in the eyes of Justice Pow-
ell when ties of political affiliation, which do not otherwise touch on funda-
mental rights, encounter a strong governmental need for stability. Thus in
United States Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter
Carriers, he joined the majority of the Court in upholding the Hatch Act.'
And in his dissent in Elrod v. Burns, 45 he stated that the political appoint-
ees' rights were outweighed by the substantial governmental interest in the
patronage system. Of particular importance in Elrod was the historical
nature of patronage and its function in local politics. It could be easily
argued that, since he utilized a balancing test, Justice Powell held the
associational rights not less dear, but found a stronger governmental inter-
est than did the plurality.
3. Conclusion
It is likely that Justice Powell will continue to produce separate deci-
sions in free association cases. Among other things, he seems to perceive a
stronger role for state and local governments than do the other Justices.
Moreover, if the first paragraphs of his Elrod dissent are an indication, he
may be arguing against reaching the issue at all.
Justice Powell's basic strength in this area is his handling of the balanc-
ing test. He is eminently practical and discerning, and he gives profound
attention to detailing the possible arguments. He has a fine sense for
accommodating the competing, legitimate claims, giving some life to each.
His weakness may well be in not articulating further the policies and ideas
behind the right of free association.
E. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Since the early 1960's, there has been increasing litigation 6 on the first
amendment's initial clauses: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
143. Id. at 544-45.
144. 413 U.S. 548 (1973). The postal workers were testing the provisions of the Hatch Act,
5 U.S.C. §§ 7324-25 (1970), which forbade them from being active in political campaigns. The
Court held that the interest in keeping the federal service politically neutral supported the
limitations on their associational rights. See United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75
(1947).
145. 96 S. Ct. 2673 (1976).
146. See Annot., 37 L. Ed. 2d 1147 (1973).
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establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... ,17
The first of these, the establishment clause, has been highlighted by the
cases concerning prayer in the public schools, 4 ' but more important, if less
dramatic, have been the cases questioning the constitutionality of govern-
mental benefits to sectarian institutions.'48 Most of the programs recently
considered have run afoul of the Burger Court's interpretation of the estab-
lishment clause, a stance prompting much criticism.'50 Nevertheless, in his
decisions, Justice Powell has agreed with the interpretation given by the
Court; indeed, he has helped shape it by writing three majority opinions
during his second term-Hunt v. McNair, 5' Committee for Public Educa-
tion & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist 2 and Sloan v. Lemon. '5 Although
cautious of approval, Justice Powell has not disallowed legislation indiscri-
minately. The statute examined in Hunt survived while those in Nyquist
and Sloan did not. These differing yet strict results warrant closer atten-
tion to Justice Powell's ideas on the establishment clause and his analysis
of facts in each case.
1. Background of Analysis
As in most areas, Justice Powell has not been writing on an empty tablet.
He has consciously acknowledged his indebtedness to the history of the
establishment clause and the prior decisions of the Court for his "broad
contours of. . .inquiry."'54 An important element in Justice Powell's anal-
ysis has been the well-recognized natural tension that has existed between
the establishment and free exercise clauses of the first amendment.' 5 For
example, denying tax exemptions on church property imposes burdens on
147. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
148. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). In this case, the reading of a nondenomi-
national prayer was held to violate the establishment clause. The second clause is the "free
exercise" clause. There has been little activity in this area lately, and it will be discussed
only as is necessary to make clear the analysis of the establishment clause.
149. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672
(1971); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
150. Boles, The Burger Court and Parochial Schools: A Study in Law, Politics and Educa-
tional Reality, 9 VAL. U.L. REV. 459 (1975); Mott & Edelstein, Church, State, and Education,
The Supreme Court and Its Critics, 2 J. L. & EDUC. 535 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Mott &
Edelstein]; Pfeffer, Aid to Parochial Schools: The Verge and Beyond, 3 J. L. & ED. 115 J.
LAW & ED. 115 (1974).
151. 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
152. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
153. 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
154. 413 U.S. at 761. Justice Powell has particularly relied on Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672 (1971), Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), and Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971).
155. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 668-69.
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the rights of parishioners to exercise freely their beliefs, while allowing the
exemptions raises establishment clause objections. In such circumstances,
either action or inaction by the Court "occasions some degree of involve-
ment with religion."'' 6 Nor, to Justice Powell's mind, has the nation's
history been "one of entirely sanitized separation between Church and
State.' '5 7 Despite the broad terms of the amendment and the unbending
interpretation of them given by some Justices "[i]t has never been
thought either possible or desirable to enforce a regime of total separa-
tion."'' 5 Thus the first amendment itself, as well as the national history,
belies an "impenetrable wall of separation" between religion and govern-
ment. Although Justice Powell has occasionally referred to Jefferson's
metaphoric wall, 59 those thoughts have not been the foundation of his
ideas on the establishment clause, and they have played little part in his
ratio decidendi.
Instead of viewing the clauses as banning all contracts, Justice Powell
has required that the legislation exhibit an attitude of neutrality which
neither advances nor inhibits religion."' Such an attitude has marked an
intermediate course between the conflicting clauses of the amendment,
whose purpose "was to state an objective . . . not to write a statute.""'
Neutrality has not been hostile indifference; incidental benefits have not
destroyed otherwise sound legislation." 2 Although there is still a zone of
laws that are impermissible as "respecting an establishment of religion,"
the idea of neutrality has better comported with the crosscurrents in the
history of the country."3
Outside a few cryptic references,"4 Justice Powell has infused little of his
own content into the idea of neutrality. Relying extensively on Walz v. Tax
Commission"5 and Lemon v. Kurtzman,"' he has seemed to accept the
concept as a developed part of the case law." 7 Such acceptance has not
156. Id. at 672-73.
157. 413 U.S. at 760.
158. Id.
159. See, e.g., id. at 761 n.5.
160. Id. at 788.
161. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 668. The words are those of Chief Justice Burger,
but they reflect the attitude of Justice Powell equally as well.
162. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. at 742-43. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968);
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
163. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
164. 413 U.S. at 771 n.28, 788, 793.
165. 397 U.S. 664 (1969).
166. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
167. 413 U.S. at 770 n.28. Here Jutice Powell refe'red to Madison's Memorial and
Remonstrance as a cornerstone of neutrality as if that were all that is possible. But see
Piekarski, Nyquist and Public Aid to Private Education, 58 MARQ. L. REV. 247, 255-62 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Piekarski].
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been free from difficulty; there have been many competing definitions of
neutrality 8' and the cases have not always been consistent.'69 The Court
itself has recognized that "the course of constitutional neutrality in this
area cannot be an absolutely straight line .... ,,,7.
Despite its difficulties, the idea of neutrality has been fundamental to
Justice Powell's analysis. If legislation has transgressed the boundaries of
neutrality, it will be declared unconstitutional. That much has been ortho-
dox establishment clause theory.' 7' But where the application of the neu-
trality test has not been clear because the lines of demarcation have not
been well settled,' 72 Justice Powell has contributed to the establishment
clause by providing guidance as to the application of the test.
2. The Test
Respect for the subtleties in applying the standard of neutrality has
carried over into the three-part test by which Justice Powell and the Court
determine whether or not a statute is sufficiently neutral. The parts are
merely a shorthand for the cumulative criteria developed in the Court's
long experience. I73 The test itself can be succinctly stated:
[T]o pass muster under the Establishment Clause the law in question, first,
must reflect a clearly secular legislative purpose, . . . second, must have a
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . .. and, third,
must avoid excessive government intanglement with religion .... 7
a. Purpose
That a statute have a secular legislative purpose has been the easiest
hurdle for it to pass. Consistent with his philosophy of judicial restraint
and separation of powers' 71 Justice Powell did not inquire deeply into the
purposes of any of the statutes considered in Hunt,'76 Nyquist'77 or Sloan. 78
168. See Piekarski, supra note 167. See also Mott & Edelstein, supra note 150, at 585.
169. Compare Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), with Illinois ex rel. McCollum v.
Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). In McCollum, the Supreme Court struck down a "re-
leased time" program for religious instruction in the public schools. The instructors were not
paid by the state, but they used the public facilities. In Zorach, the Court upheld a released
time program for instruction off the public property.
170. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
171. Piekarski, supra note 167, at 261-67.
172. 413 U.S. at 761 n.5, citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
173. Id. at 773 n.31.
174. Id. at 773.
175. J. WILKINSON, SERVING JuscE 117-18 (1974).
176. 413 U.S. at 741-42.
177. Id. at 773-74.
178. Id. at 829-30.
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He did leave the door open to such scrutiny should the occasion arise,"'
but unless some egregious statute were before the Court this part of the
test probably would not be involved. The litigants in Hunt, for example,
did not even raise the issue.8' The search for a pluralistic society,'"' the
increased burden on the public schools should the parochial system fail,' 2
a healthy and safe environment for all school children,' the indirect bene-
fit of education to this and future generations'4 have all been acceptable
to Justice Powell as secular purposes for aid to sectarian schools.
b. Primary Effect
Justice Powell has relied most heavily on the second strand of the test:
if the legislation has a primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion,
it cannot withstand a constitutional challenge. The name is somewhat
misleading since Justice Powell has refused to make "metaphysical judg-
ments" about the ultimate effects of legislation.'1 Even if judges could
ascertain which effects were primary, that could not serve today any more
than "200 years ago to justify. . . a direct and substantial advancement
of religion" by secondary effects.8 ' This broad prohibition explains some
of the stringency of the test as used by Justice Powell. This test has en-
snared not only the statute in Sloan,"7 but also each section of the tripar-
tite statute in Nyquist. I"
179. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. at 741. Justice Powell said that a "legislature's declaration
of purpose may not always be a fair guide to its true intent.
180. Id.
181. 413 U.S. at 764.
182. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. at 829.
183. 413 U.S. at 773.
184. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. at 741.
185. 413 U.S. at 783 n.39. Justice Powell was responding to the dissenting opinion of Justice
White. Id. at 823.
186. Id. at 785 n.39.
187. 413 U.S. at 830-32. The statute in Sloan was thought to be indistinguishable from the
second part of the Nyquist statute. It provided for a tuition reimbursement program to the
parents of students attending nonpublic schools. More than ninety percent of those nonpublic
schools were controlled by religious organizations. Justice Powell wrote that the state had
singled out a class of citizens for an economic benefit and, characterizations of the aid aside,
its "intended consequence" was to preserve and support religious institutions. Id. at 831-32.
There had been no attempt to restrict the benefit to the secular aspects of the schooling. Id.
at 832. See notes 192-201 infra and accompanying text. Justice Powell did not explain why
those "intended consequences" of supporting religious institutions were not impermissible
purposes under the first part of the test (purpose scrutiny).
188. 413 U.S. at 774-94. The first part of the Nyquist statute allowed funds for repair and
maintenance payable directly to nonpublic schools, eighty-five percent of which were church-
affiliated. There was no attempt to restrict the funds to secular facilities. See notes 192-201
infra and accompanying text. Rather, a statistical guarantee was provided that the funds
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In Hunt, Justice Powell explained that the effects of legislation breach
the boundaries of the establishment clause when aid flows to a pervasively
sectarian institution or when the legislature funds "sectarian activity in an
otherwise secular setting."'89 There have been questions about the first of
these, since what constitutes a pervasively sectarian institution has gone
relatively untested. In dicta in Hunt, Justice Powell provided some guid-
ance by indicating that religious qualifications for faculty or students, or
a disproportionate representation of the sponsoring religion would evidence
a forbidden sectarian character. 9 ' He also reaffirmed that institutions of
higher learning have been less inclined to be pervasively sectarian than
elementary or secondary schools. 9'
A large part of Justice Powell's analysis in determining what is the
primary effect has been focused on what would constitute funding a reli-
gious activity in a secular setting. If not pervasively sectarian, parochial
schools and religiously-backed colleges perform secular functions as well
as religious ones. Benefits given to such schools must be carefully restricted
to secular, neutral and nonideological purposes.'92
Certain types of aid, to Justice Powell, have been more amenable to
adequate safeguards than others. For example, books to be supplied by the
could not exceed fifty percent of the costs of maintenance. This sort of guarantee was disposed
of by citing Early v. DiCenso, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971), which rejected a fifteen percent salary
supplement for teachers. Justice Powell also reasoned that since the goverment could not
finance the construction of buildings which twenty years later would become sectarian, a
fortiori they could not presently provide for the maintenace and upkeep of religious facilities.
413 U.S. at 777. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
The tuition scheme, very much like that in Sloan, was struck down for the same reasons.
See note 187 supra. The tax credit to the parents in the third part of the statute had no
different effect than the reimbursement of tuition. "The qualifying parent under either pro-
gram receives the same form of encouragement and reward for sending his children to non-
public schools." Id. at 789-91.
One important difference between the statutes in Sloan and Nyquist, and the acceptable
one in Hunt was the form of the state aid. In the former cases, there was a direct application
of state funds to the schools. In Hunt, the aid was of a special sort. The statute provided for
no expenditure of state funds, no reimbursement and did not involve the state's credit.
Rather, by creating an authority, the government had allowed all institutions to take advan-
tage of favorable interest rates traditionally associated with government revenue bonds. 413
U.S. at 745 n.7.
189. 413 U.S. at 743.
190. Id. at 743-44.
191. Id. at 746. The Court has on a number of occasions taken notice that religious indoctri-
nation may not be a substantial activity of church-related colleges. E.g., Tilton v. Richard-
son, 403 U.S. at 687. Older students have been considered less impressionable than their
younger counterparts.
192. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. at 833.
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state may be read and thereafter purged if they are not secular.'93 Aid for
the construction of college buildings has been acceptable, but only if the
buildings would never be used for religious activities. 94 That funds saved
by the schools from state aid might be diverted to religious purposes has
not been enough of an effect to invalidate a statute.'9 5 Other types of aid,
such as tuition reimbursements,'99 tax credits to the parents of parochial
students 7 and unencumbered grants for repair and maintenance'99 have
not been as susceptible to adequate restrictions. A tax credit to the par-
ents, for example, might allow a child to attend a parochial school no
matter what religious activities are performed at the institution. In disap-
proving of these forms of aid in Nyquist and Sloan, Justice Powell felt that
there had been no effort to separate the secular from the religious and to
supply benefits only to the secular, and without such an effort the aid must
fail. 99
Justice Powell also has inquired as to who has received the benefit, since
this too may effect a statute's constitutionality. Of course, direct benefits
to sectarian institutions have been the most conducive to forbidden effects,
but a statute has not been necessarily saved by acting indirectly. That the
parent and not the instiution received a tax credit was only one of many
factors considered in Nyquist.0 The question has been important in an-
other way. Effects on the verge of unconstitutionality may be mitigated if
religious institutions have not been the only objects of the legislation. If a
statute has affected all school children or all colleges, public or private, it
has been more likely that the benefits were merely incidental and not a
primary effect of the legislation. 9 '
c. Entanglement
The final strand of the test is the newest. It forbids excessive entangle-
ment between church and state, or more specifically "a comprehensive,
193. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
194. Compare Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973), with Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
672 (1971). In Tilton, the possibility that facilities would be free to be used as religious places
in twenty years offended the establishment clause. Hunt maintained an absolute ban. Only
by judicial sale could the facilities be so used and that "speculative possibility" was not
sufficient to defeat the statute.
195. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 670-71.
196. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. at 827. This was also the second part of the statute in
Nyquist. 413 U.S. at 764.
197. 413 U.S. at 765-69.
198. Id. at 774-80.
199. Id. at 783.
200. Id. at 781.
201. Id. at 782 n.38.
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discriminating, and continuing state surveillance." ' This requirement has
presented something of a paradox when taken with the requirement that
aid must be limited to secular functions. If there are no restrictions on the
benefits, they have unconstitutional effects, and if the restrictions are too
cumbersome, they will engender an unconstitutional entanglement with
religion. The path between the two has been a narrow one, as the cases
have shown. Justice Powell has attributed those results to the nature of
the establishment clause itself even though they are paradoxical.20 3
Thus far in his career on the bench, Justice Powell has had little occasion
to use the entanglement test as described. In Hunt, the record was atten-
uated and, therefore, this question received little attention. 21 The statutes
in Nyquist and Sloan violated the primary effects part of the test, so
anything said in them about entanglement was dictum. But given the
opportunity, Justice Powell used the entanglement section in Nyquist to
outline his thoughts on "[the] grave potential for entanglement in the
202. Id. at 794, quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
203. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. at 835. A difference in perspective on this paradox may well
explain why Justice Powell and Chief Justice Burger obtain different results with the same
analytical tools. In his theory, Justice Powell has relied heavily on formulations of the Chief
Justice. See notes 154, 165 & 166 supra and accompanying text. However, the Chief Justice
has often disagreed with the application of those formulations. 413 U.S. at 798 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring and dissenting). See also Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 385 (1975) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring and dissenting). But see Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 96 S. Ct. 2337 (1976).
The Chief Justice has regarded these two tests, entanglement and effects, as part of a policy
of "benevolent neutrality" towards religion. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. at 669. In fact,
the entanglement test, at its creation, helped the Chief Justice save the preferential tax
treatment for churchs, because denying the preferences would have fostered excessive entan-
glement with the parishoners' rights of free exercise. Id. at 674-77. He saw that granting
exemptions effected an economic benefit, id. at 674, but "benevolent neutrality was not
restricted to a narrow channel." Id. at 669, quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 422
(1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Justice Powell, on the other hand, has taken each part of the test to be independently
powerful. The doctrines are part of the constitutional command with which he cannot tamper,
paradox or not. To him the channel of aid is a narrow one. 413 U.S. at 775. Given certain
types of aid, the channel might be closed. Id. at 774. See notes 193-198 supra and accompany-
ing text.
This stringency was apparent in Justice Powell's concurrence to Wheeler v. Barrera, 417
U.S. 402, 428 (1973). By statutory construction, the majority of the Court decided, among
other things, that Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, as
amended, 20 U.S.C. § 241(a) et seq. (1970), did not require states to furnish special teaching
services to nonpublic as well as public schools. Id. at 419. Justice Powell, writing his only
concurrence in an establishment clause case, emphasized his "serious misgivings about the
constitutionality of a statute that required the utilization of public school teachers in sectar-
ian schools." Id. at 428.
204. 413 U.S. at 749.
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broader sense of a continuing political strife over aid to religion.""2 5 What
he outlined was a balancing test."' On one side of the scales were the
acceptable purposes-the role of private education in society, the burden
on low income families who wish their children to go to parochial schools
and, the grave fiscal problems engendered by such action. Against that
must be weighed "the relevant provisions and purposes of the First
Amendment, which safeguard the separation of Church from
State .. ,, "I Especially important was the potentially divisive political
effect of an aid program, which had a natural tendency to grow larger.
Such potential might not, by itself, invalidate legislation, but Justice Pow-
ell understated his view by saying simply that it should not be ignored."8
The language on balancing is puzzling. The test as described does not
seem to be a pure balancing test such as Justice Powell has used in other
areas. Whether he was being candid about the Court's decision, or whether
he was merely being descriptive of the policy engraved in the clause, or
whether the language should be limited to entanglements is simply not
known.
3. Conclusion
In the establishment clause and the existing cases, Justice Powell has
found a large barrier to governmental aid to religious instructions. The
ominous tone in Nyquist about political divisiveness shows how seriously
Justice Powell takes this area of the law. It portends similar results in
future litigation. His weaknesses, if any, are in failing to state more clearly
what is meant by the amorphous word "neutrality" and what part a weigh-
ing of interests actually plays in his decisions. Among his many strengths
are an assiduous answering of the competing arguments and a clear impa-
tience with contentions not going to the heart of the matter. In these cases,
Justice Powell has always kept before him the reasons for the first amend-
ment. He has not allowed artificial distinctions or sophistical arguments
to blind him to the substance of the legislation or the establishment clause.
F. CONCLUSION
Like Justice Harlan, Justice Powell has found that a balancing approach
has been the best technique for first amendment adjudication. In these
first amendment cases, he has carefully balanced the governmental inter-
205. 413 U.S. at 794.
206. Id. at 794-98.
207. Id. at 795.
208. Id. at 798.
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ests and the individual interests against one another, striving always to
arrive at a just accommodation of the conflicting claims. A balancing
approach as used by Justice Powell requires the preception of every first
amendment interest in any situation and a careful scrutiny of all justifica-
tions for restrictions of first amendment rights. As a balancer, Justice
Powell has not avoided substantive issues in the areas of free speech and,
to some extent, associational rights by invoking Warren Court techniques,
such as overbreadth, but rather has focused his attention on the case before
him. Justice Powell has rejected simple categorizations, thereby allowing
himself much flexibility in his decisional process.
In some areas of first amendment concern, Justice Powell has been at
the forefront of the Court's directional changes. He was responsible for
curtailing the increasing enlargement of areas where actual malice was
necessary as a condition precedent to recovery from the news media for
libel. Justice Powell has also played a major role in the recognition by the
Court of a first amendment right of newsmen to gather information. In
other areas, such as the abrogation of the commercial speech exception or
in applying the concept of neutrality, Justice Powell has shown some guid-
ance and is certainly in the mainstream. Justice Powell has also gone in
different directions than the Court on some problems. For Justice Powell,
"fighting words" has been a sufficiently flexible concept to allow punishing
the use of scurrilous language when used before a captive audience which
has no reason to expect such language. He has not permitted absolute
prohibition of so important a news gathering tool as personal interviews in
the prison context. He has readily identified issues affecting associational
rights.
Justice Powell has shown a marked consistency to strive to isolate the
crucial factors in every situation and then to balance them according to
their importance to a society founded on individual liberty. Balancing, for
Justice Powell, has been and is the most potent judicial tool for the resolu-
tion of conflicts within our pluralistic society.
VII. CONCLUSION
As this examination of Justice Powell's opinions in the area of constitu-
tional law has revealed, his chief tool in framing the result in any case has
been a balancing test. The factors on each side of the scale have been
weighed according to their value in the particular case. However, this value
has been skewed by three overrriding concerns of Justice Powell: judicial
restraint, the American system of federalism and the need for an ordered
society. Whether one agrees or disagrees with these concerns, Justice Pow-
ell's opinions have been logically consistent with these points of view.
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